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ABSTRACT
THE CATHOLIC ETHIC AND THE SPIRIT OF CORPORATISM:
HISTORICAL AND CONTEMPORARY LINKS BETWEEN CHURCH AND STATE
IN SOCIAL SERVICES, HEALTH CARE AND EDUCATION
FEBRUARY 1999
RICHARD L METAFORA, B.A., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS BOSTON
M.A., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST
Ph.D., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST
Directed by: Professor Howard Wiarda
The political concept of corporatism is used to analyze Catholic-
sponsored organizations as providers of US welfare-state services.
Corporatism nowadays characterizes a political arrangement by which
professional and industrial sectors acquire state-like powers in order to
coordinate social productivity. Though corporatism usually refers to non-
governmental fields which acquire govemment-like status, this
dissertation takes a somewhat reverse perspective by focusing on the
welfare state, an area which by definition already is governmental, yet by
1 996 US welfare reform legislation is slated to increase its delegation of
welfare delivery services to non-govemment practitioners.
Much of early twentieth century corporatist thought was founded on
the papal encyclicals Rerum Novarum (1891) and Quadragesimo Anno
(1931), but the Church cut its involvement with corporatism after
disastrous cooptations by fascism. This study presents a revised formulation
V
of Catholic corporatism by tracing its origins to the eleventh century
canon law concept of the Mystical Body of Christ, whereby sacred imagery
was invoked to protect religious vocations from encroachments by the
newly evolving sovereign state. Today, as the devolution of the welfare
state includes faith-based organizations, the largest of which are Catholic, a
more complete genealogical look at Catholic corporatism provides a
framework to evaluate a welfare industry increasingly run by a semi-
public aggregation of professional institutions invested with the duties and
resources of the state.
The study uses a conjectural hypothesis, "Catholic Welfare
Corporatism," defined by three traits - organicism (unity), subsidiarity
(localism), and multimodality (performance across business, government
and community forums). By this measure. Catholic-sponsored organizations
in the welfare service industry are found to demonstrate a "social-
corporatist" orientation at odds with the "state-corporatist" authoritarian
category into which Catholic corporatism is typically placed. But the public
warrant of Church-sponsored operations in the US have been contingent
on their adaptation to American democratic pluralist values. The balance
struck between a Catholic corporate identity and its responsiveness to the
culture which it serves is key to its survival. Prewar Catholic corporatist
inclinations toward monopolism, institutional hubris and political naivete
must be resisted for corporatist innovations to progress.
VI
PREFACE
When I told a Catholic friend recently that 1 was doing a dissertation
on corporatism she acted as most people do, as though 1 had just lapsed into
a foreign language. "What?" she asked, her eyes blank. Since we were in
our church s parish house at the time, 1 thought it would be helpful to
explain that for half a century corporatism was at the very heart of
modern Catholic social doctrine, that is, before Mussolini got involved. "1
want to look at it again," 1 said brightly. She winced and asked, "But why?"
One-sentence explanations of this thesis have an amazing capacity to
repel a wide variety of listeners. Non-Catholics who care about religion
assume that I am on the verge of an accusatory sermon, and everyone else
seems to think 1 live in a windowless cellar reading crackpot manifestos.
Some very brief autobiographical details may be helpful in explaining how
I arrived at this particular project.
I have worked at various times throughout my life in a family food
importing business created by my dad which, when 1 was about seven,
converted from a proprietorship to a corporation. It was a distinction I took
serious pride in as a child when typing its invoices and letters. I wasn't just
doing office work, I was part of a corporation, the same species as Ford
Motors or Firestone or Del Monte.
vii
A lifetime later in graduate school 1 noticed "corporatism" in the
syllabus of Howard Wiarda's Comparative Politics seminar, and had been
told that Howard was an expert on Latin America. Scholars will be amused to
know that in my ignorance 1 thought this might have something to do with
the United Fruit Corporation, and when 1 heard that corporatism also
involved Italian politics, 1 thought this might please my father, whose
business 1 had recently quit. 1 thought corporatism might focus his wildly
contradictory recollections of II Duce, despite the fact that fascism was a
major reason for his difficult emigration to the US in 1936.
I rapidly learned that corporatism had far more to do with politics
than ethnic food importing, but its Catholic dimension kept alive some of
my earliest impressions of a corporation: that corporations can be much
more than simply a means to make money, that they can be very personal,
cultural and even spiritual. What was a genuine surprise to me however,
was that for most of Catholic history the idea of a corporation was
concerned more with community than private accumulation. This view
escapes most of my far younger fellow graduate students, who welcome the
idea of work affiliations as labor unions, but tend to see business
enterprises in Chomskian terms, that is, as little more than front
organizations for criminals. (My attempts to discuss the Catholic Church
have been met with similar skepticism). The more I looked into Catholicism
and corporatism, the more it seemed to me that a fabulous
misunderstanding was afoot, not simply in the sense of good intentions
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gone awry, but that perfectly useful ideas had been thrown away by both
extremes of the political spectrum, in a fashionable rush toward sexy
cliches and facile imagery.
What does this have to do with the welfare state? The rest of this
dissertation will speak for itself, but to state the idea briefly, as alternatives
to the welfare state are considered, 1 feel that the Church's approach to the
welfare industry deserves to be understood in its full historical and
contemporary context, especially in its orchestration of business, state and
community. The nineteenth century corporatist social doctrine of the
Church is a powerfully useful tool to do this, because it suggests a thematic
unity among what might seem diverse if not antithetical ideas: the Church,
government, commerce, families, classes, labor, philanthropy, property
and faith. However, no grand 'unified field' theory is proposed here, simply
a way to orient thinking in ways which would otherwise be neglected.
Methodological annroach
This study casts an extremely wide net to gather its interests together.
First, the Catholic Church's notions of work groups and service to society is
easily as old as Christianity - although I consider the eleventh century the
point at which the roots of organizational corporatism become visible,
mostly as an outgrowth of medieval monasticism and the Investiture
contest. Second, the modern political form of corporatism necessarily
involves at least two major Catholic social documents between 1891 and
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1931, the latter of which must unavoidably be described in terms of its
entanglement with Italian fascism. Finally, Catholic-sponsored work in
welfare state services requires a contemporary demonstration, certainly in
social services, but also including the rich doctrinal context of Catholic-
education and the very big business of Catholic health care.
This is a broad work of synthesis, designed to stimulate questions and
speculation. It is descriptive and explanatory, but it also recommends that
Catholic constructions of corporatism be seen as a respectable and useful
source of analytical insight about the welfare state. Though the
contemporary section does draw on survey research, this study does not
originate a sufficiently large sample of empirical data to produce any
scientifically conclusive, quantifiable findings of its own. Neither does this
study aim to prove a formal causal theorem, tested by numerical analysis.
Rather, it offers a conjectural hypothesis, specifically, a model - "Catholic
welfare corporatism" - observable in history and applicable to the
present-day prospect of a devolved welfare state. It represents the insights
and anecdotal reflections of at least thirty three professionals in the fields
of Catholic sponsored social services, health care and education, and
several years of my own reflection and analysis of corporatist history.
Therefore, the prime purpose of this study is to orient ways of thinking
about work affiliations, especially as an ethical-cultural process of social
reconciliation, in the context of a pluralist, capitalist, democratic political
system.
X
I suppose I am not the first to believe that I live in a unique moment
in history, or that I was born in a spectacularly lucky nation. Nor is it a
particularly original wish that 1 retlect the best of my era. My hope
however is that this study may be slightly ahead of its time in reconciling
what too often seems alienating, unreal, or out of date. 1 believe that the
idea of faith and community as a fundamental element of work is either
enormously underrated or largely invisible, and that American politics
hasn't quite gotten a handle on it, but that it soon will.
XI
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GIAl’TCR 1
FROM CORPORATISM TO CATHOLIC WELFARE CORPORATISM
IllC IToblem Ot tho W(>lt;m'
Since the 1970s doubts have been increasing about the US welfare
state. The very word "welfare" has been shunned by the US Congress,
whose title for recent welfare reform legislation is the "Personal
Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996." ^ Besides
the newly temporary nature of welfare checks, other aspects of the welfare
state are under close scrutiny, particularly the cost and effectiveness of
human services, health care and education. The 1996 Act responds to a
growing political sense that money and effort is better invested by
"devolving" more of the work of the welfare state to church-based
organizations, whose sense of mission, especially to the disadvantaged, is
now considered of vital assistance to the state's interests. Arguably,
church-based organizations may in some aspects be more capable of
serving the needy than the government bureaucracy. However there are
also questions of First Amendment constitutionality, risks of sectarian bias,
and worries about pressure for religious conversion ("catechesis"). Is it
right for religion-based welfare state services, such as those sponsored by
the Catholic Church, to be paid for by taxpayer funds? 2
An analytical tool for this problem is corporatism, a political
technique which delegates part of government's economic decisionmaking
to self-directing, semiprivate vocational organizations. These organizations
1
are reterred to by using the word corporation in a specialized way, that is,
as officially empowered associations which represent their particular lines
of work (this is also called "functional representation," in the sense of
representation-by-function). These group associations can be made up of
labor unions, tradesmen, nonprofit "public benefit" corporations and small
business firms, but for most people, when the word "corporation" is used to
describe a political arrangement, it implies an unholy alliance between big
business and big government. It would follow, therefore, that corporatism
must amount to a conspiracy to bypass democracy in the name of profit and
power.
Such visions of injustice are not entirely unfounded. In fact, they
typify many corporatist political outcomes in the twentieth century. But
this was far from the intent among those who first conceived of
corporatism and vastly different from the cultural traditions from which it
emerged.
This study proposes a new version of corporatism, or at least a new
term to describe a type of corporatism which already exists unrecognized:
Catholic welfare corporatism. The study's purpose is to use Catholic welfare
corporatism as a framework to address the question of using faith-based
"welfare state surrogates," that is, transferring the work of the welfare
state to Catholic-sponsored (and other religious) organizations. In the
process. Catholic welfare corporatism suggests part of the altruistic
significance which Catholics once saw in corporatism, and which
nowadays is winning renewed interest in various interpretations of
communitarianism.
2
It may be said that the hypothesis of this study is that the
independent variable" Catholic welfare corporatism promotes faith-based
surrogates for the welfare state (the "dependent variable").
Three key traits of Catholi c Welfaro (
Catholic welfare corporatism can be identified by three key
characteristics which appear, to varying degrees, in the selected history of
corporatism which this study traces, and in contemporary Catholic-
sponsored social services, health care and education. These three traits are
organicism, subsidiarity, and multimodality. The three traits are identified
as follows:
Organicism
Organicism refers to a Catholic concept of unity, whose significance
for collective "bodies politic" is that they are understood to be indivisible
wholes distinct from other integral bodies and imbued with inviolable
dignity. Organicism is grounded in ancient Catholic tradition drawn
directly from Catholic notions of the Body of Christ, St. Paul's metaphor for
the followers of Jesus. In the Middle Ages - precisely at the moment that the
clergy's autonomy was under assault by the increasing ambitions of the
state - canonists applied this sacred notion to the institutional Church as
well, as the Mystical Body of Christ. The spiritual authority implied by this
organic notion is used to justify a divinely ordained legitimacy
independent the state.
3
Subsidiarity
Subsidiarity is an administrative credo which holds that the decision
making of local organizations should not be unnecessarily preempted by
greater authorities. Subsidiarity is presented in the 1931 papal encyclical
Quadragesimo Anno primarily as an indirect critique of Italian fascism.
Though the corporatist concept of subsidiarity is thus grounded in the
Church s autonomy from the state, it is not limited to jurisdictional conflicts
with the state. Subsidiarity here also refers to the institutional autonomy
which the Church's subsidiary organizations expect from the Church itself.
Therefore subsidiarity in Catholic welfare corporatism is a rationale of
corporate self-direction in both Church-state and Church-sponsor
relations.
Multimodality
Organicism and subsidiarity are traits which are uncontroversially
recognized as corporatist. The third trait of Catholic welfare corporatism,
multimodality, is less conventional, but is observable in Catholic sponsored
public benefit (welfare-service) corporations as well as in their corporatist
precursors in the Middle Ages, and in the late 19th/early 20th centuries.
Multimodality calculates political bargaining power in terms of
versatility. It is not a trait which is exclusive to Catholic welfare
corporatism, but it is a characteristic which is particularly strong in
Catholic welfare corporatism. Multimodality describes an organization's
capacity to operate simultaneously in multiple spheres of social activity
4
(called "modes of regulation,” in the sense of three distinct forums of
institutionalized social behavior).
Lange and Regini detine "modes of social regulation" as methods by
which "activities are coordinated, resources allocated, and conflicts
structured, and label those modes state, market and community. 3 These
modes are classically identified with Hobbes (the state - authority and
hierarchy), Adam Smith (the market - exchange), Durkheim (the
community - solidarity).
Catholic sponsored welfare services simultaneously perform in all
three of these modes. They (1) do the work of the state as subcontractors
( surrogates ) and bargain with government for regulatory space and
revenue, (2) compete in the market with a variety of service providers
including other nonprofit and investor owned businesses - and the
government itself, and (3) serve the community as charitable benefactors
in the religious tradition of the Church. Medieval antecedents of Catholic-
sponsored welfare service corporations can also be shown to share these
qualities in analogous ways.
These three traits, organicism, subsidiarity and multimodality will
provide the reference points by which Catholic welfare corporatism is
observed through the chronology of the study.
5
The "Fou rth Modo
In addition there is a relatively new concept among neocorporatists
which has particular interest for this dissertation, but it is not presented
here as a defining trait of Catholic welfare corporatism. The "fourth mode"
refers to Streeck and Schmitter’s hypothesis of an additional mode of social
regulation, beyond the three customary modes of social interaction (state,
market, and community). The fourth mode is an arena which is populated
only by corporations. Dubbed "the association," it focuses on the
interactions corporations have exclusively with each other, especially the
voluntary organizational concertation" by which organizations interact
in "today's bargained economies."
The idea of a fourth mode suggests what might be called a corporate
social ethic in a "society" made up of corporations. This is slightly different
from what is meant by a "corporate citizen," which refers to a corporation's
responsibility to society in general. The multimodal capabilities of Catholic
welfare corporatism necessarily involve interaction across sectors. But the
rights and responsibilities which corporations have to each other,
especially in the field of welfare work, may call for a different ethic of
competition. Catholic organizations explicitly commit to a Catholic moral
standard toward those receiving welfare services. The spirit of Catholic
corporatism would suggest similar standards of ethics regarding
competition among welfare providers.
6
Among political scientists corporatism is somewhat notorious for its
sprawl of definitions. Why does this study now propose to attach the words
Catholic" and "welfare" to corporatism?
Early Cdrppratism and "Catholic " cornorari.sm
When corporatism first emerged as a modern political concept in
Europe at the end of the nineteenth century, it was largely due to the 1891
papal encyclical Rerum Novarum, in which pope Leo XIII recommended
vocationally based mutual aid societies as a way to rescue labor from the
abuses of the industrial revolution. Rerum Novarum 's inspiration for these
"Worker Societies" was taken from the renaissance guilds of Florence, a
favorite model among corporatists. The guilds suited the Church's new
notions of social doctrine because they symbolized the peaceful integration
of workers and merchants, rather than the class conflict which the era's
Marxists pursued.
Expanding on the guild idea, corporatists of this time planned to divide
a nation's work force into about a dozen special "corporations," each
defined by a particular category of economic activity (e.g., manufacturing,
agriculture, intellectual arts). Each widely inclusive corporation would
gather together all the businesses, labor and professionals involved in a
particular field to negotiate with government on nationwide economic
goals such as income levels, production outputs and employee benefits.
Each corporate group would be the only one of its kind authorized to
negotiate with government for its sectoral interests, and each was expected
to have the power to 'deliver' its membership as a unified whole in
7
response to bargained outcomes. Each would furthermore be responsible
for implementing their own regulations in their own sphere of work.
Corporatism would thus mobilize whole sectors of economies, leading
workers and bosses to collaborate with unitary efficiency. Variations on
this basic scheme were eventually put into place in a number of countries,
with mixed results, and elements continue today even in the US, depending
on how corporatism is defined.
Implicit in Catholicism's leadership of early corporatism was a
critique of the liberal state, the individual-centered, electoral democracies
which since the Enlightenment had not treated the Church kindly.
Catholics preferred corporatism's "intermediary institutionalism," that is, a
system which emphasized organizations which, like the Church, operated
between the individual person and the state, and which represented what
Black describes as a milieu moral, obliged to give their fellows '"mutual aid'
as 'brothers' or friends.'" 5
Among the early advocates of corporatism who appreciated this
moralistic type of intermediary role were G.W.F. Hegel, Emile Durkheim and
John Maynard Keynes. ^ Hegel felt the primary quality of the (corporatist)
corporation was moral: "As the family was the first, so the Corporation is
the second ethical root of the state, the one planted in civil society." ^
Durkheim saw in the "corporation or occupational group" a normative
power capable of containing individual egos, something which he felt the
state was unlikely to achieve because it was too remote. ^ Durkheim
thought only a group formed around a shared vocation could achieve
certain types of discipline, "regulated only by a group intimate enough
8
with it to know its functioning, feel all its needs.
.
9 in 1927 Keynes
similarly recommended economic units which lie
somewhere between the individual and the modern State
.
. . semi-
autonomous bodies.
. . whose criterion of action within their own field
IS solely the public good as they understand it ... a return, it may be
said, toward the medieval conceptions of separate autonomies." 10
"Medieval conceptions of separate autonomies" is what nineteenth
century Catholic corporatists meant to inspire by using the Florentine
guilds as their guiding precedent. The idea of institutional autonomy was
consistent with the Catholic Church's feelings about the state, especially
since the Church had been compelled to dismantle its own medieval trade
guilds in the Papal States shortly after the French revolution (the last guild
was closed in 1801). Thus, the Church's corporatist project at the end of the
nineteenth century was a Catholic reasserting of anti-liberal, intermediary
institutionalism, fostered by its understandable concern about a giant, all-
enveloping state.
Joseph Schumpeter, the eminent Harvard economist who in 1919 was
Austrian finance minister, was also among the advocates of corporatism
evoking the Church's brand of hostility to liberalism: 1
1
This [liberal] system of ideas, developed in the eighteenth century,
recognizes no other regulatory principle than that of individual
egoism
. . . this principle of irreligious (and also perfectly
stupid) rationalism imposed itself on a long line of thinkers.
. .
express[ing] only too well the spirit of social irresponsibility
which characterized the passion, and the secular, or rather
secularized, state in the nineteenth century.
9
Sympathetic to industrial self government, Schumpeter at first
presented corporatist ideas under the rubric "socialization" which
Swedberg interprets as "neither that the state should be running the
economy nor that the workers should. What was needed was some kind of
intermediary socialist agency." surprising that at the time
corporatism was touted as the "Third Way" answer to capitalism on the one
hand and communism on the other. Corporatism became a Catholic answer
to Marxism, packaged in the culturally traditional form of the guilds,
ottering instead a Christian doctrine of economic justice which reconciled
labor unionism to capital without renouncing God or private property.
Ihc bf CiUholic corporatism and the rise of noornrnnrntism
Nowadays Catholic corporatism is at best an informal term, completely
unofficial as tar as the Catholic Church is concerned, for at least three
reasons. First, it refers to a category of corporatism whose association with
the Church, though extensive, was never referred to explicitly in a papal
encyclical (an encyclical is a pope's official letter of policy). Second,
Catholic corporatism contains some outright contradictions, including
conflicting interpretations by Fope Fius XI and the Oswald Nell-Breuning,
the original drafter of Quadragesima Anno. But the third, most grievous
reason for Catholic corporatism's unofficial status is its ill-fated
convergence with Mussolini's Italian fascism, after which the Church
abandoned any use of the term.
Because of the Italian fascist connection, corporatists of all types.
Catholic especially, were regarded with great skepticism (even though
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Mussolini decided to rename his version corporativism.) After the war,
corporatism's guilt by association with fascists was partially alleviated by a
vigorous effort to recast corporatism in different terms. Ncocorporatism
discovered a "societal" strain of corporatism in modern, mostly northern
Europe (e.g., Sweden, Switzerland, Netherlands, Norway, Denmark) which
featured good-faith coalition bargaining between the freely formed
interests of industry and the advanced-democratic state. Societal or "social"
corporatism provided a sharp (and hygienic) contrast with "state
corporatism, a category which Schmitter links to authoritarian,
neomercantile political cultures with little more than token democracy. 14
Neocorporatism's "societal" distinction was an expansion of
Manoilescu's 1936 subordonne/pur typology, which had concerned itself
with how corporatism comes to be instituted, either freely rising up from
civil society and therefore constitutive of the state ("societal corporatism,")
or imposed - typically with a heavy authoritarian hand - "top-down" by the
state ("state corporatism"). 15 Many Latin Catholic countries were lumped
into the category of "state corporatist" and, combined with the Church's
pointed indifference. Catholic corporatism has thus been marginalized or
forgotten since World War II.
Old-school corporatism before the war - which necessarily included
Catholic corporatism - tended to think in terms of a basic change in the
structure of government, so that it amounted to an entirely distinct
political form, on the order of "socialism" or "monarchism."
Neocorporatism instead speaks of political bargaining techniques among
interest groups, so that its traits can be observed in a variety of regimes
and social orders. Thus another neocorporatist approach which Catholics
never consciously adopted was to emphasize corporatism as a process,
rather than as a formal structure.
The flexible, process-minded emphasis of neocorporatism allowed a
new offshoot, mesocorporatism, to address the techniques of corporatism in
the context of smaller or more regional circumstances. Whereas early
corporatism envisioned twelve nationwide corporations, each representing
the grand, system-steering concerns of entire economic sectors,
mesocorporatism instead is suited to "more restricted intervention into
specific sectors" on a more circumscribed range of issues, according to
Cawson. Mesocorporatism may be helpful in evaluating Catholic-
sponsored welfare services because Catholic facilities are more accurately
thought of as a sub-sector of the "welfare production industry," not as an
entire field on their own. Also, even though Catholic services might be
considered a nationwide affiliation, there is a great deal of regional
variation which is based on the personal inclinations of the local bishop,
and even more narrowly, on a given institution's corporate status under
canon law.
Neocorporatism's shift in emphasis is important because few political
regimes exist nowadays which can be described solely as "corporatist."
Corporatism is mostly employed as one of a series of adjectives which
describes the secondary, rather than the primary traits of a political
system. Analytically, it orients the investigator by identifying one of the
qualities which underlies a system, or which colors the dealings of political
actors. However, it has been corporatism's lot to be regarded as some sort of
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affliction or syndrome which is detected in the body politic, rather than
prescribed as a therapeutic regime - its original purpose among Catholic
corporatists.
Were there to have been a Catholic-neocorporatist discourse, however,
a key issue would have been the nature of an "interest group." Whereas
contemporary (corporatist or pluralist) politics understands industry
councils and professional associations to be vehicles for the groups' own
lobbying interests. Catholic corporatism and later organizational ethics
orients toward wider public good, transcending a group's "personal"
ambitions.
Unfortunately, because of the Church's renunciation of their
corporatist project after the war. Catholic corporatism has been virtually
absent from neocorporatist discussions. The Second Vatican Council (1960-
63) deeply affected how Catholic institutions deal with politics, yet there
has been virtually no neocorporatist analysis applied to its innovations.
Using Catholic corporatism to analyze the representation of interests
among Catholic-sponsored organizations working for the US welfare state
is, therefore, something new.
Corporatism's current predicament
Though neocorporatism has advanced corporatism's use in political
analysis, corporatism as a practical method is a shadow of what it once
seemed for Durkheim, Keynes and Schumpeter. In fact it recently has
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provoked some bleak - if not explicitly negative - comments from its
founding fathers.
Howard Wiarda recently wrote, "after several decades of experience,
we know that Latin American corporatism ... has run its course." He urges
its dismantling because "praetorianism abounds; venality, conflict-of-
interest, and double- (or more!) dipping are widespread; the system is
profoundly corrupting,"
In 1965, Shonfield had used the word "corporatist" to mean public-
spirited economic planning by an "organized group of producers, instead
of leaving the outcome to the clash between individual competitors in the
market." Shonfield however also conceded that corporatist organizations
"bypass the ordinary democratic process" to avoid "throwing their own
deliberations open to the public [or] subjecting the bargains struck
between the centres of economic power to regular parliamentary
scrutiny." Presumably this was the price to pay for corporatism's
efficiency and for the compliance of private interests. However, mixing
state power with group interests often looks like a rigged game run by
elites, where clout rather than democracy prevails. US politicians are
typically embarrassed by any suggestion of special interest politics, and
steer clear of corporatism's brand of explicit and purposively empowered
representation.
As Mancur Olson has noted, claims on the state by organized interests
are expensive. He warns that advanced Western democracies suffer a
worsening "institutional sclerosis" caused by ambitious interest
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organizations which exist to lobby the state, and which thrive in an
increasingly well-funded industry of policy persuasion. 20
But beyond the difference between sectoral interests and the good of
wider society, there are structural distinctions between corporatism and
lobbying. Interest group lobbying" is conducted among an unlimited
number of agents and agencies, in an "open market" of influence
bartering. Corporatism instead is typified by a finite number of official
representative groups which the government deals with exclusively,
rather than involving numerous overlapping and redundant agents. Also,
though corporatist deliberations are not entirely public, its "corporations"
are at least established and conspicuous, representing large economic
sectors whose issues are sufficiently large ("encompassing") that they are
necessarily wedded to the interests of their political communities. Finally,
corporatist associations represent the interests of groups, not of one or two
huge business firms.
Theodore Lowi complains that America illegitimately treats lobbying
groups as though they deserve the same rights as individual persons, an
approach which he calls "interest group liberalism." 21 He calls the US
government "corporatist," which by his reckoning means that it is
abandoning its policymaking to private organizations. He says there is
little distinction between today's US Departments of Commerce and
Agriculture and the corresponding councils of German and Italian
corporatist regimes during the era of fascism. But if what Lowi says is true
- that the US treats groups as though they were persons - is it really such a
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departure from American principles? Consider Howard Wiarda's 1981
definition of corporatism;
A corporation" may be defined as an entity or body
. . . recognizedin law as constituted by one or more persons and having various
rights and duties as a juridical person whose relations with the state
are governed by both informal understandings, and oftentimes
ormal contracts. Corporatism" refers to a system of interest
intermediation and national socio-political organization based upon
these entities, and governing the relations between the state, with
its licensing and regulating powers, and various societal groups. 22
There are at least two elements in this definition which open the door
to a Catholic corporatist answer to Lowi's concerns. First, the juridical
person is part of the modern legal definition for all corporations, though it
is not frequently cited in definitions of corporatism. It allows the flexibility
to involve a variety of corporate bodies in the process of interest
intermediation, including towns and universities as well as business and
labor organizations. But it has particular significance for Catholic
corporatism because the legal origins of the "juridical person" can be
shown to have roots in the theological reasoning of Catholic canonists in
the Middle Ages.
The canonists' notion of the juridical person was formative of
Catholicism's expansive view of the corporation as a vehicle of social
reconciliation, beyond its commonplace meaning as a business firm. It has
further relevance for religion-based organizations whose identities - or
corporate personalities - claim rights of religious tolerance, just as
individuals do. The inclusion of the juridical person in Wiarda's definition
therefore permits a link to Catholic corporatism's fundamental notions of
an institution's public mission. For Catholics, one of the ways in which an
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organization can be made analogous to an individual person is in the sense
that both are called to transcend self interest for the good of the
community. This is especially true in the case of public benefit services.
A second element of Wiarda’s definition of corporatism allows
corporatist relations with the state to be seen as sometimes governed by
"informal understandings." This neocorporatist emphasis on process
rather than structure is also relevant for Catholic-sponsored welfare
services, because their relations with the state, though contractual when
providing secular services, must necessarily be informal in matters
regarding their Catholic religious identities, due to the First Amendment of
the US constitution (the "establishment clause"). Thus in Wiarda's
neocorporatist approach, political space is allowed for Catholic corporatism
to recapture the normative spirit of public trust originally expressed by
Durkheim, Schumpeter and Keynes.
The answer to Lowi is not to entirely refute his point that some
corporations don't deserve the full panoply of rights due individual human
persons, but to suggest instead that - subject to "the state, with its licensing
and regulating powers" - some organizations might be acceptable as
welfare-state surrogates, even if (and perhaps because) it includes
spiritual distinctions which an individual person might have. Note that
"spiritual distinctiveness" is offered here as a very relative term whose
links to professional behavior is a matter of degree.
It is important to note that the modern business usage of the term
corporation frequently implies a joint-stock corporation, which is made up
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of shares which can be bought and sold as alienable bits of participatory
property. This is dearly at deviance from Catholic notions of corporate
integrity, in which individual "members" of the body of Christ are human
beings intended to be joined inseparably and eternally as one with the
Church.
This is not to say that Catholic understandings of the corporation - and
by extension, corporatism - are antithetical to commerce or institutional
self interest. Michael Novak's Toward a Theology of the (.orporation fits
religion into his conception of the business corporation, yet does so
without losing the medieval canonists' dimension of community as part of
the identity of the juridic person. 23 Novak writes, "The development of
corporate law opened human history to the action of social institutions
freely entered into.
. . these 'mediating structures' which are larger than
the individual but smaller than the state, make possible the flowering of
human initiative.
.
." 24 Paraphrasing Weber, what Novak finds interesting
"is the rise of communal risk taking, the pooling of resources, the sense of
communal religious vocation in economic activism." (my italics). 25 what
Novak seems to suggest is that Catholic constructions of juridical persons
permit a healthy self interest, but manage also to retain a special sense of
community as part of the corporate personality.
There are of course profound dangers in what a group is capable of in
the name of its own truth. Reinhold Niebuhr reminds us that groups cannot
be expected to act with the same moral conscience of individuals, and
believing that they do can have tragic consequences. But this does not
exclude the possibility that some groups can be expected to be more
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"personally accountable" than others, especially when those groups are
granted public powers in fields which involve the needy.
Welfare corporarism
We have seen corporatism as a system of institutional intermediacy.
But what institution represents the welfare state to the state? Thsit is, who
represents the industry when the industry is the state? Williamson writes,
The key issue that arises is that in the welfare sector much production is
carried out directly by the state itself, posing certain conceptual issues
about how appropriate the idea of intermediation is." 26 Williamson then
adds, welfare production does appear to raise a number of important
questions about the corporatist model, particularly in regard to the state."
22 He says that so far the corporatist analysis of welfare has been similar to
other corporatist studies, which focus on business and labor topics. But this
overlooks the bigger issue of welfare production's redistributive
economics. Welfare therefore deserves special attention as an economic-
sector with a peculiarly direct effect on the entire capitalist system. Adding
to its importance moreover, is that welfare is seen by some as radically
contradictory.
Offe says the welfare state is contradictory because it leads the state to
act in ways which are anti-capitalist, even though the state is supposed to
support capitalism. That is, welfare subverts a system which is
"commodified" by providing "non-commodified" goods. 28 Williamson says
this "places welfare corporatism in the domain of broad political sociology.
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rather than that of policy studies as has emerged in the
, . . industrial and
training spheres," like conventional corporatist analysis.
This study will show that there is a precedent which addresses Offe’s
welfare contradiction among the historical roots of Catholic corporatism.
In the "charitable vocation" of the Church’s medieval monasteries, there
was a "gift economy" which was half-way between Offe's opposites of
"commodities" and "non commodities"(see Chapter Three). In that gift
economy, when a gift was given, some sort of gift was expected in return,
so that there was in fact a type of trade. But it was not a cut-and-dried
transaction in which property was completely "alienated," like a
commodity which can be sold or transferred to whomever and then
forgotten. When medieval benefactors gave a gift, they embarked on an
ongoing social relationship with the monastic community. Recipients of
gifts would likewise be socially obliged to the community, or at least
accountable to a spiritual Providence.
This precedent has an immediate relevance to modern welfare, for
which many prefer the involvement of spiritualized "family" communities
over a faceless bureaucracy and a check in the mail. The medieval
monastic gift economy required reciprocal involvement and accountability
from both givers and receivers (who in turn would become receivers and
givers). Furthermore, corporatism is reflected in the medieval monasteries
because they were primitive welfare-producing corporations in
bargaining relationships with the secular ruling power.
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What Offe sees as contradiction, others see as a benign paradox - the
welfare state supports capitalism by keeping its workers healthy and
skilled, even if It does provide goods tor "free." But even s.i, the business of
welfare is not always business, it is as Williamson says, a type of "political
sociology" as well as industrial policy. The question then becomes, how is it
that the state must predominate in welfare delivery? To what degree should
the state control the style of welfare distribution as well as its financial
arrangements?
Otte s believes that one ot the ettects of corporatism is
"reprivatization," which diminishes "state-capitalist tendencies toward
'global regulation.'" 31 Thus corporatism restores to society what has been
sectioned off by the state. For Offe, corporatism means "an increase of the
social character of politics within capitalism, a dissolution of the
institutional separateness, or relative autonomy of the state, the withering
away of the capitalist state as a coherent and strictly circumscribed
apparatus ol power." 32 Welfare corporatism, therefore, can alleviate the
welfare state's capitalist/anticapitalist "split personality" by dispersing its
delivery through a more varied array of institutions.
The application of corporatism to welfare runs counter to the general
impression of corporatism as a limitation to modern, especially American,
notions of individual enterprise. Corporatism's association with large,
exclusive, protective guilds draws criticisms of inefficiency, price fixing
and wasteful patronage. But in the case of welfare, if there has been a
monopolistic arrogation of power, it has been in the hands of the state. The
net implication of welfare corporatism is the breaking up of that state
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monopoly. Relatively speaking it is a "privatization" of what has become
the exclusive domain of the state. So that paradoxically, unlike other
arrangements of corporatism. Catholic welfare corporatism promotes a
plurality of welfare agencies, (comparatively speaking) without
completely relinquishing some aspect of scope, finance and integralism
which the state precedent has developed.
Certainly corporatism has some contradictions of its own, particularly
when it relies, says Keane, "upon arcane and highly inaccessible elite
negotiations
. .
.
[which] erode the institutional boundaries between 'civil
society’.
. . and the state." 33 gut Offe adds that corporatism also has the
potential to break down the "bourgeois definition of politics as the struggle
for institutionalized state power
. .
.
politics now transcends state
institutions - new arenas of resistance are opened up." 34
What Offe means by the "social character of politics" is revealed in his
description of new social movements, noting that these "post industrial"
movements believe in part that "processes of modernization that rely
exclusively on instrumental and strategic rationality are inherently
counterproductive and destructive." 35 Qff^ says the movements are not
necessarily opposed to modernization, but simply want checks and controls
on the "perverse self destructive consequences of technical, military,
economic urban, and social policy modernization." 36 This could easily be
an excerpt from the National Conference of Catholic Bishop's Economic
justice for All. 37 The Catholic Church, though more traditionalist than the
movements which Offe describes, has the demonstrable capacity for
22
updated approaches to social welfare which suit Offe's notions of
corporatism and social politics.
"Catholi c welfare cornorari<;^7^"
To summarize, this study combines elements of Catholic corporatism
and welfare corporatism to suggest a new analytical framework; Catholic
welfare corporatism. (CWC).
"Catholic welfare corporatism" is relevant to today's faith-based
welfare services because (1) Corporatism addresses the idea of state
surrogacy, that is, the authorizing of public powers and duties to
organizations outside the formal apparatus of the state and (2) Catholic
corporatism - construed in its original intent as social witness -
understands certain organizations to have corporate identities defined by
systematic principles of social responsibility which precede, and in some
ways transcend the state. Thus Catholic welfare corporatism is presented as
an analytical framework for the purposes of assessing independent,
religion-sponsored social services, health care and education which are
funded by the welfare state.
In general. Catholic welfare corporatism can be defined as a method
by which religion-sponsored welfare services, including education and
health care, are regarded as a vocational sector which is empowered by the
state yet distinct from it. Catholic welfare corporatism depends on
continuing financial commitment from the state (it is "privatized" only in
the sense of its delivery apparatus, not in the state's financial role) and
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relies on the concerted interests of government, nonprofit, religious-
sponsored and investor owned corporations. Catholic welfare corporatism
pursues regulatory latitude for diverse methods and research, including
certain religion-based therapies and curricula, consistent with standards
defined and regulated by relevant professional disciplines.
How the rest of the study nrocoods
Part Two is a study of the medieval Catholic construction of "the
corporation. Canonist glosses on ancient Roman administrative law
legitimized a separate type of sovereignty for the Church's realm,
expanding on Augustine's conception of "two cities," the worldly and the
spiritual. It is richly expressive of how institutions outside the state can
nevertheless claim roles and resources - especially in morally justified
remediation of the disadvantaged - comparable to that of the state.
In Fart Three, medieval negotiations of distinct fields of economic and
professional function are seen as consistent with the corporatist social
initiatives taken by the Church to define its role in the 19th and 20th
century world of democratic politics. The corporatist idea of self-regulating
vocational organizations says much about what the Church hoped for its
own security in a post-enlightenment world of secular democratic rule. By
extension it laid the groundwork for other forms of interest group
representation in their bargaining with the state. Part Three includes a
review of late 19th century Catholic social doctrine, its development into
the corporatist program epitomized by the 1931 encyclical Quadragesimo
Anno, and its ultimate corruption by Italian fascism's "corporativism."
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Part Four begins with a brief summary of the Church's political
posture in American society, highlighting the National Conference of
Catholic Bishops, a corporation of Catholic bishops who contribute to the
identity of Catholic sponsored work as an identifiable, integral segment of
the welfare industry. It is followed by a look at the business details and
doctrinal particulars of contemporary Catholic sponsored work in social
services, health care and education. Chapter Five includes a summary and a
conclusion, followed by a list of Selected Works Consulted.
The Church's earliest corporatist remedies were justifiably eclipsed in
the 20th century by overwhelmingly successful government-run social
benefit programs. But as this century closes, the welfare state is in
transition. A renewed consideration of Catholic corporatism is timely then,
if not as a complete answer to the future of the welfare state, then as a
source of questions about the how the welfare state might be more
effective.
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CHAPTER 2
JURISTIC CONSTRUCTIONS OF THE CORPORATION
Introduction
This chapter explores the deep roots of Catholic corporatism which are
revealed in the interplay between Church and state in the Middle Ages.
First, it details the Church s canonical justification for setting the Church
apart from the state, a legal reasoning which turned on the Church's
conceptual metaphor of an organic, collective, corporate "person" - the
Mystical Body of Christ. While borrowing heavily from Roman law, the
Church added refinements which amounted to our modern understanding
of the corporation and has implications for the special corporatist notion
of the corporation which is central to Catholic welfare corporatism. Next,
this chapter shows how medieval monasteries operated as corporate
institutions prototypical of the "multimodal" qualities described in Chapter
One, mixing finance with politics and philanthropy. Finally, this chapter
reviews the Investiture contest as an attempt by the Church to define its
vocational boundaries in the field of what was, at the time, the equivalent
of social service, education and health care.
In these ways the medieval Church provides the genealogical baseline
for Catholic welfare corporatism - in the organicism of its corporate
religious-legal imagery, the multimodality of its practice, and the
subsidiarity of its institutional autonomy.
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Lanc>n law and "the corporation
The modern legal definition of a corporation includes these key
characteristics, as [IJ an "artificial person or.
. . body politic.
.
. 12J having a
personality and existence distinct from that of its several members.
.
. [3J
with the capacity of continuous succession ..." 1 American jurists cite 19th
century case law as standard precedent, but these three criteria can be
seen coalescing as a legal conception about a thousand years ago, when the
Roman Catholic Church began to refer to itself as the corpus mysticum -
the "Mystical body of Christ." ^
How the Church arrived at the term corpus mysticum was as ambitious
and convoluted as the politics of the era. For nearly nine centuries the
Pauline metaphor corpus Christi had been used to refer to the Church as
the universal assembly of all Christians, but by Carolingian times corpus
Christi acquired a second definition, as the communion bread. ^ Corpus
mysticum was then introduced as a better way to describe the miracle of the
Host, but by pope Gregory VII (1073-1085) there was another switch, related
to the burgeoning growth of monastic organizations. ^ Corpus mysticum no
longer exclusively meant the Eucharist - the evocative phrase was now
applied to the institutional church, including, Kantorowicz tells us, "the
Church as the 'corporation' of the clergy." 5 The corporatist rationale
becomes important as the anchor by which the Church hoped to hold
ground in the shifting political tectonics of the Middle Ages.
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Eolitical imp]irf^r ion.>> of the rf^nonical
Simultaneous with the Church’s self-conception as an institutional
corporation - in the modern sense sketched above
- political thought
extended the Church’s "corporal" notion of organizational autonomy to the
nation-state. According to Ladner, "It is only from the era of Gregory VII
(1073-1085) that the states were seen as bodies politic, while at the same
time the Roman Catholic Church developed its institutional-corporational
side as one aspect of its being the Body of Christ." 6 For its part, the papacy,
"in a world of nascent sovereign powers, had to emphasize the role of the
Roman Church as a ’corporation,’" intending to establish itself in political
and sociological terms as concretely as the secular powers. 7
In their search for a rationale for the autonomy of the nation-state
from imperial rule (and, ironically, the pope), secular rulers derived from
the Church’s construction of a corporation what Gierke called the
"corporational or body politic theory of the state." ^ According to Tierney,
from 1250 on secular rulers began to use the term "mystical body of the
commonwealth"
-corpus mysticum reipublicae. ^ Tierney adds that the
"idea that Christendom was made up of an assembly of states that recognized
no temporal superior.
. . was not invented by Grotius himself of course, nor
by the fifteenth century civic humanists, nor by Bartolus ... It goes back
to the works of our early Decretists." 10 {Decretists are experts in Pope
Gregory VII’s revised canon law of 1 140, explained below).
When Simon of Toumai wrote, "Two are the bodies of Christ; the
human material body which he assumed from the Virgin, and the spiritual
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collegiate body, the ecclesiastical college," he marked the beginning of a
new era of political reasoning. H Christ's human and divine natures were
well established, but this was something new, this was a differentiation of
bodies, applied to an institutional collectivity. Kantorowicz tells us, "Here, at
last, in that new assertion of the 'Lord's Two Bodies' - in the bodies natural
and mystic, personal and corporate, individual and collective of Christ - we
seem to have found the precise precedent of the "King's Two Bodies," which
took hold in Elizabethan England nearly four centuries later. 12
Though originally symbolic of Christ as God, the figurative use of the
body by the Church and the Decretists allowed "the clerical corporational
institution of the corpus ecclesiae iuridicum to coincide with the corpus
ecclesiae mysticum and thereby to 'secularize' the notion of 'mystical
body'". 13 Thus the "corporation of the clergy" had legal consequence in
the ascending world of secular jurisdiction. The Church's "fictional person"
- the made-up collective person which, figuratively speaking, was the
worldly manifestation of Christ - could be the basis by which the Church
could be construed as a legaJ personality. Kantorowicz writes:
Here the mysterious materiality [of] the term corpus mysticum
. .
.
has been exchanged for a juristic abstraction, the 'mystical
person'
.
. . synonymous with, the 'fictitious person,' the persona
repraesentata or ficta which the jurists had introduced into
legal thought and which will be found at the bottom of so much of
the political theorizing during the later Middle Ages. 14
Thus the institutionalist rationale represented by the "Mystical body"
became not simply a device of vocational self-determination by the
"corporation of the clergy," but of political legitimacy leading to a modern
concept of the state. Out of this context medieval jurists developed a hybrid
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of Roman law and clerical collegiality to formulate an updated version of
the universitas, a bedrock concept of political sovereignty. 15
I-hc digion of rulgp^hin in classical Romo tho rh„rrh
There is a term from chemistry - enantiomorph - which Jungians
have applied to the behavior of rivals who take on each other’s
characteristics. 16 The Church and state were enantiomorphs during the
Middle Ages, such that it is difficult to identify what behavior originated
with whom. In the time of Gregory VII (1073-1085), apparently the state
found it useful to mirror the Church. Ladner says, to the extent the secular
nations envisioned a "community of people consisting of rulers and ruled
. It can hardly be accident that in Christian times before the Gregorian era
it was as a rule not applied to the state but to the Church." 17
However, neither is it surprising that the Church's thinking on
behalf of its own institutional boundaries and legitimacy should also bear
the seeds of imperial Roman political administration. Though the Church's
arguments about the legitimacy of corporate bodies was arrogated by the
state for its own purposes in the Middle Ages, the Church had derived much
of its own basic legal concepts from classical Roman law in order to adapt it
to the needs of the Middle Ages.
Most of the medieval advances in administrative theory, most
importantly the monk Gratian's twelfth-century canonical milestone
Concordance ofDiscordant Canons (the Decretum - commissioned by Pope
Gregory VII and published later in 1 140) were based on a rediscovered text
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of the (Christian) Roman emperor Justinian’s Corpus Juris Civilis (528-38).
>8 But Imperial influence on the Church’s thinking can be found even
earlier, in the late fourth century St. Jerome’s "Vulgate” translation of the
Bible which Ulimann tells us ’’coincided with the first manifestations of the
papacy as a governmental institution." 19 The Roman influence is
pronounced. Every biblical theme, thought, imagery, or event was
depicted in Latin.
. . the Bible was seen through Roman and Latin eyes.
Jerome had used terms and concepts taken from the language of Roman
administrators, Roman officials, Roman lawyers, and the like.
.
." 20
Roman legal tradition was also embraced by St. Ambrose (c. 340-97), a
contemporary of St. Jerome, and an aristocratic Roman scion and governor
of Milan when he was also named bishop there. Norman Cantor writes that
St. Ambrose "played a large role in moving the church toward a legalistic
style of ecclesiastical life and toward the establishment of canon law as a
system based on punishment, duty, office and obligation." 21 His
compendium of instructions to Christians, De officiis ministorum, was based
on Cicero 22 and its approach "crystallized the new concept that bishops
were authoritarian figures quite separate from ordinary lay people. A
bishop dictates, decrees and pronounces edicts." 23
Ulimann contends that the Old Testament notion of power descending
from God to king as presented in the Latin Bible constructed a "thoroughly
Roman notion of imperium." 24 jhe papacy was then able to cite Latin-
couched Roman models which in turn "might have appeared to corraborate
and confirm the bible." 25 Biblical values expressed in the language of the
Roman Imperium served the ambitions of secular and religious
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monarchism such that "the tenor, language and orientation of the Bible
came to show, if not an affinity, at least no substantial difference with the
themes of government exercised in the late Roman Empire." 26
Church corpor;^tiQn$ and Roman procedent romp^irod
Classical Rome's great innovation was private law, which Chroust
describes as the first "practical expression of the
. . . irreducible worth and
dignity of
. . . individuality." 27 p- conferred upon the individual male
Roman citizen head-of-household a "legal personality." Though some
groups had a crude notion of legal personality, Roman classical law "had no
concept of the corporation," in Nicholas' words, because the "Roman law of
corporations" failed to fully apprehend key corporate traits, namely, an
independently constituted artificial person, a personality distinct from its
members, and "immortality" (in other words the capacity for continuous
succession). 28
Roman corporations as creatures of the state
Among the imperfect ways in which classical Romans recognized
collective persons is that they were considered little more than extensions
of the state. According to Gierke, "[n]o Roman corporation existed that had
not at first been recognized by Roman constitutional law as a political unit.
. .
" (my italics). 29 However some groups did have the rudimentary traits
of legal personality, and in rare instances the Corpus juris civilis used the
word "person" to refer to municipalities and law courts (but these were
departments of government). ^9 Gierke adds that classical Rome's
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incomplete notions of collective personhood lacked the "image of an
external legal association," independent of state creation. 31 u was the
Christian Church, interacting with Germanic tribal custom, and subsequent
to the Investiture contest, which was to formalized the missing dimension
as an entirely different type of collective personality, one which
considered itself, in Gierke's words, a "transcendent associative unity"
whose existence was God's will, not a statutory fiat of any territorial or
imperial state. 32
The Roman Societas as partnership, not true corporation
A frequently cited precursor to the corporation found in classical
Roman law was the partnership association called a societas (a blanket
term which referred to virtually all joint agreements). The majority of
societates were legally analogized as fraternal relations, 33 especially the
societas omnium bononim, which was usually an agreement among heirs to
merge all assets and thus avoid the breakup of inherited property such as
contiguous farmland (cf. the "indivisible totality" of Roman inheritance
mentioned earlier). 34 jhe form grew to accommodate unrelated individuals
in common purpose other than agriculture, 35 (e.g., to preserve open
space, or share travel expenses) 36 5^ ^^0 5 omnium bonorum was mostly
geared to farming arrangements between family members, and amounted
to a commonly held property title which did not constitute its own
corporate personality. 37
However, the societas publicanorum was recognized as having a
certain personality independent of its members although it still bears the
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charactenstic Roman juristic mark of a state enterprise, 38 One of the ways
s. publicanorum was "its own person" distinct from its founding members
was that it offered limited liability investment opportunities, so that losses
experienced by the societas were distinct from the owners' personal
accountability (other than the amount invested). Nevertheless s.
public3.norum existed as a state subsidiary, created by the state.
The publicani (originally, "tax farmers") paid the state for permission
to commonly exploit public resources (e.g., the state salt works or with the
s. argentariorum
,
silver mines.) The publicani expanded s. unius
negotiationis into a new form as instrument of a "powerful capitalist class"
which engineered large scale, complicated deals with the state. (Livy wrote
of a s. publicanorum which supplied the provisions for the army in Spain).
39 Though there is no evidence that investment "shares" could be traded,
(a way in which a corporation could be alienated from its members) though
some partners "contributed capital and shared in profits without taking
part in management and without risking more than the amount invested."
40 Some societates would stipulate that one of the partners be excluded
from any losses, though all parties were required to make some
contribution of capital or labor. 41
The Christian notion of corporate immortality
We have just noted how Roman corporations did not arrive at the
Catholic idea of a corporation with a separate legal personality
transcendent from its individual members, nor as an association wholly
separate from the state. Another capability which the classical Romans did
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not imagine for a corporation (other than the state itself) was immortality.
The most significant feature of the personified collectives and corporate
bodies was that they projected into past and future, that they preserved
their identity despite changes, and that therefore they were legally
immortal, 2 Beyond the obvious case of the Resurrection, Aquinas' view
of immortality also applied to the "Corporation of Christ" 43 in the tradition
of Augustine’s City of God, a "’mystical society of all the elect, past, present
and future." 44
However in the manner of enantiomorphs, it is no surprise that the
Roman Empire ("eternal Rome") served as a model for the sempiternity of
the Church. Kantorowicz reminds us that Justinian’s law held the "empire
was founded by God directly; that the empire was ’forever;’ and that,
therefore, as Andreas of Isernia put it, ’the Church does not die and is
forever, like the Empire. ' 45 idea of an eternal empire appealed to
certain popes and canonists in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, who
imagined the Church as the vehicle destined to accomplish Roman
immortality, with the pope as its new type of emperor. 46 Consistent with
the mirror relationship among these ideas, the basis for Rome’s assumption
of immortality was the Bible, 47 in which Jerome interpreted that the final
(and everlasting) of Daniel’s Four World Monarchies was Rome. 48 Aquinas
pursued this thought, saying the end of the Hohenstaufen empire had
transposed the Roman Empire from the "temporal to the spiritual order and
infers that the prophecies concerning its eternity now apply to the
Catholic Faith of the Roman Church." 49
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The Church seemed as inclined to describe its immortality in terms of
empire as the empire was to wrap its perpetuity in the righteousness of
religion. But in the context of the politics of the Middle Ages, the Church as
corpus mysticum was arguing tor its own sovereignty as a corporation
which was constituted independent of the state, including the Roman
imperial state. Kantorowicz writes that as the nations made their case for
sovereignty, the new territorial, quasi national state.
independent of the Church and the Papacy, quarried the wealth of
ecclesiastical notions.
.
.
placing its own temporariness on a level
with the sempiternity of the militant Church. In that process the
idea of the corpus mysticum, as well as other corporational
doctrines developed by the Church were to be of major
importance. 50
Other than for the imperial state itself, the Roman law precedent for
the immortality' of a self constituted corporation is scant. Cicero once
attempted to argue (in a case of contested inheritance) that partnerships
were not necessarily ended by death, but there is no evidence of any legal
structure which was in place which defined corporations in those terms. 51
However, in the historical tangle of imperial and religious notions is a
trace of institutional perpetuity found in the custom of religious property
which Gilchrist finds "drawn almost entirely from the Roman Law" 52 on
which rents, fines and 'fifths' were dedicated revenue for the religious
community. 53 xhe Church would not fail to exploit this precedent during
the Investiture contest, but strictly speaking the property in question was
the sacral property of the pagan state religion, which was treated under
the jus sacrum
,
which in turn was a subset of the jus publicum, so we
arrive again at the state as proprietor. 54 yet there was still another
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enantiomorph in store, as the concept of inalienable church property
would return as a model for the secular state in the form of the fiscus, or
the inalienable "holy" treasury.55 (The Church as a justification for
taxation is an idea taken up later in this chapter).
The organic collectivity and pluralism
To paraphrase Voltaire, "God created Man in his image, and Man
returned the compliment". Similarly medieval organicism took the single
most certain reality of life - our own bodies - and projected it on to society.
This incarnational fact of life, writ large, in turn inspired other analogies -
just as the Church was the supreme universe, so there were other, smaller
universes (universitates) held together by organicist gravity, yet in orbits
of their own by virtue of their individual corporate identities. Within the
all-encompassing corporation of the Church were similar corporations,
each a body' unto itself, in the spirit of Catholic corporatism.
It is easy to imagine that Church organicism intended to form a
monolithic society, but its effect was a comparatively pluralistic, a "mediate
social articulation" to use a neocorporatist term. This pluralism is
epitomized by the monastic corporations - which mirrored in diverse ways
the corporate model of the institutional church. Undeniably the array was
authoritarian. As Chroust found, organism's principium unitatis exalted
God as the Absolute One before and above plurality, and "every particular
group, gild, estate or social organ held a definite place within a strictly
hierarchical order extending from the lowliest individual to the supreme
single whole." But this did not preclude plurality, rather it reified it.
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Diversity was a wholesome effect of this ordered unity. Augustine took the
image of an all-encompassing God and made it into a recursive analogy in
which "every particular being in its infinitely-varying individuality
appears as a replica of the universal whole 'in order that all men might
serve as images of the single universal administration of all things.'" 57
Using God (our miraculous self) as the code and the Church as the
prototype, medieval civilization replicated its ideal form in countless new
corpora.
State organicism versus Church organicism
John of Salisbury's organist tract Policraticus in 1 159 pictured a body
politic composed of members and organs with specific functions. 58 But
when Salisbury likened society to a single body whose head was the state
and heart was the church, his version of organicist imagery marked a
significant restatement of hierocratic theory. "Along with the traditional
hierocratic theory, he admitted that the end of the state is the perception of
truth and the rewarding of virtue.
. . This is a subtle but highly significant
departure from political Augustinianism; John's modification of hierocratic
doctrine would have infuriated Gregory VII." 59 it maintained that the state
must serve the church, but his apportionment of the cognitive function to
the state gently subverted the Church hierarchy. That there should be a
division of labor within the body of society was plainly organicist. But
Salisbury's nascent nationalist organicism deviated from a position that the
Church had carefully constructed since Gelasius, whose fifth century
doctrine asserted the absolute sovereignty of auctoritas sacra over the
regalis potestas of royal power.
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Within the hierarchy of social functions the church was the organ
with the ultimate claim on interpretive analysis, especially as to who plays
what role within that hierarchy. That God "exalts some above others so that
the beauty of order would the more shine forth among men" was the
quintessential religious core of descending power. Cantor tells us
Salisbury's organicist (and prescient) solution "was to ascribe moral
qualities to the state, thereby preserving in theory the ethical foundations
of the social order. But to do so was to give the state moral sanctions and
implicitly to increase its authority." 62 jhe implications are far reaching
and of contemporary relevance. To what extent moral consciousness is an
explicit mission of the state, or the business of institutions other than the
state continues to be a problem central to political thought and to Catholic
welfare corporatism.
Church organicism and collegial decisionmaking
A likely modern assumption is that whatever uniformity there was
among medieval Catholics was a matter of highly authoritarian papal
imposition but there is another side to organicist unanimity. As early as
Gregory the Great (590-640) outcomes reached in the deliberations of
general councils of prelates had the force of ecclesiastical law, in part
because their deliberations were taken as unanimous. Tierney writes, the
"canons of the early general councils were always to be preserved
inviolate because they were established by universal consent (universali
consensu ). [Gregory] added that anyone who went against the canons
'destroyed himself and not them.'" 63 church eventually developed a
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"Doctrine of Indefectibility" which held "that the church as a whole would
always adhere to the true faith when it acted tosether, as a corporate
entity." M The outcomes of these councils were obviously not a product of
universal suffraj-e, but neither were they monarchical dictates - unless the
deliberative body itself could be considered the monarch - a prectKious
notion tor the end of the sixth century.
In yet another refinement of Roman legal precedent, the canonists
took a phrase from Roman classical law - Quod omnes tangit ah omnibus
approbetur (What touches all is approved by all) and turned it into a
constitutional doctrine of corporate consent. Among other things, Quod
omnes was construed by the Decretists lluguccio, Manus and
.) . Teutonicus
to mean that on matters of faith, even laymen should be represented at
councils. Further, because a commonwealth amounted to a single entity, its
nature transcended a mere collection of individuals, therefore
"accordingly any assembly representing the single personality of the
commonwealth must also be a corporate body." ^5
Until the Decretists Quod omnes, as with the other Roman law
precedents cited earlier, had been no more than a technicality of private
law with no application to corporations. The canonists gave it
constitutional significance by using it in regard to "corporate bodies,
explaining that here the approval of the corporation as a whole was
required, not that of each single member. They found new applications for
it."
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Executive accountability awoke around 1200 when the Decretists
applied quod omnes tangit to explain the nature of general councils, which
Tierney explains meant that "A matter that ’touched' the whole community
could be approved by a representative assembly acting on behalf of all." ^7
Mentioned above was distinction which the "King’s Two Bodies" made
between office and officer. It was not long before the same logic would
reach the pope. The eponymous Refinus (c 1160) wrote "in a case which
touches the whole church the pope can be judged by the church" and
elsewhere, in dealing with an erring pope, "just as what touches all is to be
approved by all if it is good, so it should be rejected by all."
Ultimately, the Church was not spared the new impulses for self-
justified sovereignty which it had originally used to expertly in its own
interests. Cynus of Pistoia foreshadowed Marsilius and the humanists in
eventually bypassing the Church entirely: "Nor is it absurd that the empire
should be derived from God and the people: the emperor is from the people,
but the empire is called divine from God." 69 Kantorowicz notes, "the co-
agency of an eternal God and a sempiternal people made the cooperation of
the Church as superfluous as it had been in the fourth and fifth centuries:
the Church was practically frozen out, as the continuity was achieved para-
ecclesiastically by the powers of God and the people or "nature." 70
Review of Chapter Two
Compelled by the Investiture struggle to stand apart. Church and
empire internalized each other’s characteristics and in the process
reconceived relations between ruler and ruled. But it was the Church
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which first imasined itself as a transcendent legal personality constituted
apart (and above) any other temporal power. Based on a Christian
vocabulary of body metaphors, the inventory of ideas from the
corporation of Christ" helped medieval politics to fully visualize the
juristic corporation. By extension, elementary legal concepts about the
modern nation, as well as the organizations which intermediate between
state and society, were similarly inspired. As the rationale of the modern
independent nation strengthened, the Church needed a technique of
institutional boundary protection and professional self definition. This
became the essence of Christian corporatism and its progeny, the
Renaissance guilds.
We next turn to the era's lullillment ot "mediate social articulation" in
the form of the monastic corporations.
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CHAPTER 3
THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF MEDIEVAL MONASTICISM
The medieval monasteries are a particularly useful baseline for
Catholic welfare corporatism because their vocation was largely social
service, performed by means of what were in their time quasi-
governmental corporations, with the authority to redistribute vast
resources. As practiced by the monastic corporations of the Middle Ages,
the good business of welfare redistribution was an economic necessity
which both mobilized resources and built a 'non contractual foundation of
contract' - to paraphrase Durkheim - that is, a general atmosphere of trust
which encouraged more specific obligations. Thus, the primitive welfare
corporatism of medieval monasticism was among the "genetic precursors"
of modern political economics.
Centuries before the trade guilds of the early Italian Renaissance, the
Church's "charitable vocation" amounted to a professional class, shaped by
conciliar legislation and coordinated with the coercive abilities of the state.
Also, medieval monasticism's use of charitable gifts - its "gift economy" -
was a prerequisite to modern finance and market economics, and an
outstanding example of "multimodality." ^ The gift economy was part of an
intricate mix of cultural and productive motives which anticipated many
later instruments of capital mobilization. These also ran the risk of
corruption - "simony" - a complication of charity which continues today.
Though this chapter focuses on the medieval monastic gift economy as
a precursor to modem welfare state services, it should be noted that
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monasticism’s culture of gift exchange and obligation had a precursor of its
own in the writings of the ancient Roman statesman and philosopher
Lucius Annaeus Seneca (c 4 BC - AD 65). Seneca's concept of the gift was to
play a significant role in the regency of the Infante D. Pedro of Portugal
(1439-1447) whose model of state and society, according to Greenfield, was
"almost a prototype of what political scientists and others today refer to as
the corporate, organicist patrimonial state," with an additional emphasis on
distributive justice and "the reduction and elimination of poverty ..." 2 o.
Pedro's innovation was to apply Seneca's personal morality to an
institutionalized system of gift exchange, in which the wealthy were
encouraged to share their abundance with the less fortunate. Though exact
reciprocation was presumably not required, some response from the poor
was expected - usually in the form of a Christian kindness to others and a
diffuse commitment of solidarity with the political order. Gratitude in all
cases was first to be shown to God in the form or prayer or piety,
undoubtedly an effect of the widespread custom of monasticism throughout
Christendom. 3
All charity may involve a calculation of reward, but some calculations
are less selfish than others. A monk's choice of (relative) poverty may
have been more fulfilling for him, but that does not mean that such a
choice was politically indifferent. Based on ethical choice, monasticism had
a profound impact on economics and culture for centuries. When it
periodically degenerated into greed and simony, the Church's means of
coercion was not the police power of the state, but moral constraints based
on fictive kinship. These were made politically real through a primitive
type of organic corporatism. Medieval monasticism's use of the family, writ
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large, and its multimodal scholastic, legal, productive and commercial
skills, generated a bedrock compendium of Western regulatory standards
Any blueprint of Western social regulation must include this building
block of corporatism.
Ihs charitable vocation and its rnrnorate
For centuries monasticlsm was the most innuential cultural force in
the medieval West. Little writes, "A map showing the centres of power,
iurisdialon, communications and erudite culture in Europe in the 10th and
1 1th centuries should not emphasize cities but rather the great monasteries
..." 4 Because of their virtual monopoly on literacy and education, monks
were keystones to secular and religious power. Medieval abbots were "star
administrators" many of whom became enormously influential popes.
Beginning with Gregory 1 ("the Great," 590-640) monks led the Church into
an era of worldly power for the papacy. Gregory Vll (1073-85, formerly the
monk Hildebrand) is considered by many to have been the Church's most
powerful pontiff. Popes Stephen IX and Victor 111 were former monks from
Montecassino, the originating monastery of Benedict of Nursia whose Rule
shaped the Benedictine order. Great leaders also arose from the abbots of
Cluny and Odo; reformist monks included St. Damian, the cardinal bishop of
Ostia, and many others, epitomized by the ultimate reformer, Martin
Luther.
Economically, the monasteries equaled or exceeded many feudal
estates. Cluny housed as many as four hundred monks. 5 As early as the
eighth century, the 150 monks of Bobbio had acquired twenty eight
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neighboring farms with thirty eight buildings for their serfs. 6 Some
monasteries empioyed numerous peasants and conuersi
,
an auxiiiary ciass
of monk introduced by John Cuaibert (995-1073) at Voiiambrosa, 7 Hoiton
notes that the conversi "protected [higher-ievei monks] from the
distractions of routine work" by handiing daiiy operationai tasks. »
Medieval monasteries did exceiient business, ieaving a biueprint for
modem commerce which inciuded trade fairs, sales expeditions and
mortgage iending. Some monasteries were so powetfui that they minted
their own money, prociaiming, writes Giichrist, "the wise doctrine of a
stabie coinage" and creating reserves of capitai. Giichrist adds, "The great
achievements of medievai civiiization of the 1 l-13th centuries would not
have been possible but for the learning, example and progressive
character of the clergy and monks of the time." 9
Mindful of St. Augustine s admonition that charity was the perfect
manifestation of justice, the monasteries were concerned for a panoply of
have-nots which came to them - widows, orphans, travelers, exiles, lepers,
prisoners, the unemployed and the sick. In the early days of the monastic
movement, a monk’s motivation was mostly to withdraw from the world
either as a solitary anchorite or part of an autarkic cenobite community,
but some, because of their charitable callings, necessarily were drawn into
neighboring secular communities. 10 There are endless examples of
medieval outreach ministry," sometimes far beyond immediate
neighborhoods and towns. In the twelfth and thirteenth century, toward
the peak of monastic influence, Franciscans and Dominicans exceeded the
traditional rule which kept monks close to the cloister as they began to
travel (and preach) widely, especially in the new urban centers.
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The deliberate effort on the part of monks and nuns to make a career
of serving the needy was part of their personal calling, but the structural
means to do so was accomplished through the deliberate organizational and
legislative will of the Church. As early as the fifth and sixth century, the
Church's welfare state was constructed through canon laws which
mandated funds from bishop's revenues, the so-called "Bishop's chest."
From a quarter to a third of bishop's funds were dedicated to poor relief. 1
1
From c 400 on, apostolic constitutions specifically required that bishops to
provide clothing and food for the poor. 12
Scholars of the church call attention to the fact that the Church's
social legislation was not the result of monarchical pronouncements, but of
bishops who would meet to formulate policy in a corporate, "conciliar-
decisionmaking process. Though bishops had a great deal of independent
power, beginning in the early Frankish era they acted as colleagues and
council members, meeting as representative bodies to formulate policy as a
corporate body. 1
3
At first, the extent to which these policies were effective depended
solely on the sanctioning power of the Church. Social policies bore the
weight of canon law, at first an unevenly enforced default-authority at
best, though not insignificant. The Council of Tours in 576 specified that
tithes be paid for use of the poor and the redemption of captives, without
widespread results. The Second Council of Macon in 585 threatened
excommunication to those refusing to comply with compulsory donations to
the Bishop s chest for relief of the poor: "Let anyone who scorns these most
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beneficial statutes be severed for ever from the limbs of the Church." H
(Though excommunication may seem less than frightening today, it proved
sufficiently powerful to set at least two emperors on their knees). By the
eighth century, by force of Pepin’s law (as king and head of the state
church), compulsory donations for Church purposes were required by the
state in the form of tithes, in effect a tax to fund welfare.
Centuries of Church and monastic records reveal an extensive
apparatus for welfare delivery. Lateran decrees refer, in passing, to the
scope of what was done. Almshouses and leper houses had special tithe-
exemptions, (Lateran 111. 23) as did pilgrim centers (Vienne 17); there were
special provisions for education (Lateran III. 8 and IV.II); the
establishment of monastic hospitals (Vienne 30; Lateran V. Sess. IX, Bull of
the Reform 5) all of which were, Ullmann writes, " signposts to a vast
system of medieval poor-relief. We are only just beginning to understand
and to mark out its precise nature and extent." 15 y^fter the eleventh
century, monasteries frequently included an infirmary or hospital
(particularly for children) as a basic part of their complexes, and lodgings
for destitute travelers ("xenodochia," later "hospitals"). 16 Standards for
assistance were periodically established to control chicanery and fraud.
The local poor were offered help "except where it would do harm;" the idler
was denied charity but "discrimination on religious or moral grounds was
out." When in doubt, Johannes Teutonicus advised, "it is better to do too
much than to do nothing at all" 17
However, the self renunciation and charitable sacrifices of the
monasteries of the Middle Ages met with a conspicuous and awkward
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material success. These institutions of voluntary poverty were frequently
as prosperous as the richest of secular estates, sparking periodic waves of
monastic reform to impose renewed ascetic disciplines. St. Francis at first
Dominicans in 1220 pledged absolute mendicant poverty. Subsequently a
distinction was made between ownership and use of money, as in the
decrees Quo Hongate (1230, and Or.inen, vesrrum,1245, which consented
to use intermediaries for financial matters. (The "owner" of record for
Franciscan property was declared to be the Papacy,.l8 But often these
measures only improved efficiency, and combined with innovation and
managerial skill it added to an embarrassment of riches. Such obvious
wealth provoked accusations of ecclesiastical corruption (simony)
particularly acute in the period 1000-1150.
Ihc Monastic Gift Fmn^mv: Thp r.ift
How the monasteries functioned as productive organizations
resembles a primitive form of Catholic welfare corporatism, consistent with
Its three basic traits. Local monastic orders can be seen fitting into the
organic whole of the Church, while enjoying some of the independence
which the modem corporatist principle of subsidiarity suggests. They were
furthermore able to perform in multimodal ways, demonstrating
impressive "business" acumen through innovations which drew on their
simultaneous roles as community centers, hospitals, schools, banks and
family advisors.
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Central to the political economy of medieval monasticism was its
dynamic exchange of which circulated in a community. Sometimes
called a "gift circle," this type of economy relied on a practice in which a
gift was customarily met with a return gift, so that the process became a
system Of trade. This "gift economy" generated many financial innovations
.ncluding some of the most cherished devices of modern capitalism, in gift
economies like that of the Middle Ages, the Church took gifts, gave gifts,
and thus was part of the gift exchange, which necessarily involved it in
’
the secular material world and a host of material temptations.
We have noted how Roman classical law prohibited the conversion and
alienation of pagan church property. Simony is the Christian term which
describes the violation of the principle that faith, as well as the Church's
property, was not a thing to be purchased or sold. The biblical basis for
simony can be found in Acts 8: 20: "But Peter said to ISimonJ, 'Your silver
perish with you, because you thought you could obtain the gift of God with
money!'" Clearly God's gifts were not intended for commerce, but the
tangible gifts of men and women offered an intriguing middle ground.
Contributing to the confusion was that the difference between a good gift
and evil simony mostly turned on the spirit in which a gift was given, but
this was a distinction not easily defined by written rules.
Consistent with gift economies, gifts which were given to medieval
monasteries were often passed along to others, sometimes to the needy, but
other times given back to a wealthy benefactor, frequently with an
increase in value. In time, gifts given to monasteries and churches
included the tithe, a percentage of income derived from an endowment
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such as a granary or vineyard. Tithes became a main source of operational
resources for religious communities, originally given as a gift, but then
traded or ultimately sold to other monasteries or churches. Thus the already
hazy bounds of simony became blurred.
Medieval monastic cartularies (written records) further confirm that,
rather than one-time-only gifts, a significant amount of what was given to
a monastery or church was either given back to the original donor (or
their family) in some form of another, or given to a temporary proprietor,
and then re-donated back to the church or monastery. Rosenwein's
computer analysis of centuries of Cluny gift transfers revealed a continual
loop of claims and quitclaims, gifts and counter gifts in which the same
parcels of land, granaries or fishing rights were presented time and again
as entirely new donations.
In gift economies, an etiquette is developed to assure ethical gift
exchanges and to discourage tendencies for gifts to remain the permanent
possession of one owner. Malinowski describes 20th century Pacific
islanders in which each gift-receiver becomes in turn a gift-giver, with
the understanding that each recipient is required to move the gift along to
someone else before long. 20 recounts a folk tale from Kashmir in
which two Brahmin women "tried to dispense with their alms giving duties
by simply giving alms back and forth to each other.
. . When they died, the
returned to earth as two [poisoned] wells.
. . No one else can drink from an
the ego-of-two." 21
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Priests and holy men frequently appear as mediators in gift
economies, as third party guarantors of genuine gift-circies. ilyde notes
that Maori hunters return part of their kill to the forest, out of
appreciation of nature’s bounty, but leave the offering with priests who
take on or incarnate the position of the third thing to avoid the binary
relation of the hunter and the forest." 22
^hus, assuming the spirit of the
gift was upheld, the participation of monasteries in the medieval gift
economy was central to the community as a type of extended family or
special community, bound by charity and reciprocal good will.
Breaking the Gift Circle
Although gift economies were not meant solely for one's immediate
family, neither was it intended for those outside a bounded society. Lewis
Hyde portrays the community created by the gift circle in terms
reminiscent of Catholic corporate imagery. "1 have come to think of the
[gift] circle, the [community or] container in which the gift moves, as its
body'. " 23 For Hyde, the circulation of the gift gives life to the communal
body and is therefore as essential, and sacred, as blood. Gifts are therefore
not alienable commodities to be bought or sold, but something which
necessarily must be kept within the body of the community.
The gifts that flow through a gift economy define it as a community.
The Christian liturgical parallel is the Host of the Eucharist, a gift which
defines the collective body of Christians. According to the Bible in 1
Corinthians 10: 16-17, "The cup of blessing which we bless, is it not a
participation in the blood of Christ? The bread which we break, it not a
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participation in the body of Christ? Because there is one bread, we who are
many are one body, for we all partake of the one bread." Thus in gift
economies and in Christian communion, the "body" of the community is
defined in terms of the gift with which it is conceptually organic and
inseparable. 24
A problem arose however when the monasteries, out of practical
efficiency, needed sometimes to handle gifts as though they were
commodities. For example, a monastery might receive a gift in the form of a
piece of land, but the land might include a vineyard in a distant town,
something which may have been impractical to cultivate at a distance.’ At
that point it made sense to sell the faraway property in order to focus on
more convenient holdings. Or perhaps a particular monastery was more
adept at cheese making than wine making, and would prefer to specialize,
and therefore trade the original gift for some more suitable possession.
This was made more complex when the gift was not a title to real estate,
but instead a tithe as a right to the income derived from a piece of land or
productive asset. (This concept of a tithe as a percent interest of revenue is
employed among contemporary organized religions, notably the Mormons,
whose adherents presumably devote a tenth of their income to their
Church). When it became prohibitive to directly collect relatively small
revenue amounts, e.g., "one eighth of the candle offerings of a distant
church," these nghts to income became tradable as well, at first among
religious organizations, then to benefactors, and ultimately to the public at
large which in turn traded amongst each other. 25 Once so conveniently
packaged, (much like modern financial instruments) tithes were
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particularly susceptible to conversion and simony, eroding the notion of
"Church property" and becoming just another commodity.
AS these endowments of Income became propetties-in-themselves
they soon slipped out of ecclesiastical hands, usurped by landlords and
gtven, sold, and enfeoffed (made a fief) in the same way as any secular
property. By the tenth centuty the tithe became in effect a seigniorial duty
and rent on land, losing much of its spiritual significance. 26
Sylvester 11 ,999-1003) as abbot of Bobbio complained of how the entire
patrimony had been granted away. The crisis reached a fevered pitch in
1054-8 when Cardinal Humbert of Silva Candida published Libri tres
adversus simoniacos
,
warning of the economic ruin of the Church due to
simony.
It should be noted that this abstract conceptualization of property as
income was far ahead of its time. In the hands of monastic scribes and
administrators, monastic economics thus developed the framework of the
negotiable instrument, a title to income derived. The tithe was a right to
revenue which became a property itself, an abstracted right (just as
licensing fees and royalties today) which could be flexibly manipulated and
consolidated, though not without with mixed results as we have seen.
Although some sort of return is anticipated in either the case of a gift
or a commodity, a distinction can be made about the degree to which such
an expectation is counted on, that is, how closely a return is figured and
fixed upon. (See Appendix One for an elaboration of the distinction between
gift and commodity). Gifts are supposed to be 'freely given and freely
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returned,' with no specific obligation or schedule. The informal custom of
gift exchange however was at odds with the monasteries' practical
Similarities to profit trade. In cases such as estate distributions of
inheritances, the entry of a family member into a monastery, or
interacting with others as one of the community's large landholders,
monastic corporations were both mediators and principals, beneficiaiy and
benefactor. Besides, the cleric's stock in trade was written accountancy,
which typically involved the exact quantification of value. 27 p ,
professional position which constantly challenged their principles.
On the occasions when the monasteries were victimized by castellans
and others who simply usurped church property, monastic attitudes to
property were not so spiritual that they simply quietly acquiesced. Though
many monasteries, notably the Cistercians, refused to make claims through
litigation because they thought it excessively worldly to do so, their
alternative was to "clamor to God", which may have been even more
effective. Since they believed that stealing Church property was an affront
to God Himself, the monks spared their victimizers no peace as they
embarked on raucous and persistent demonstrations of their anger and
woe. Prominent among the techniques was the humiliation of relics -
taking their own cherished mementos of their predecessors and throwing
them rudely on the ground - to portray how they felt they were being
treated. This was followed by the monks throwing themselves prostrate and
"commencing to clamor." There were times when the relics which were
humiliated included those of a previous bishop, an effective means of
involving the incumbent Church hierarchy. 28
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Mauss calls gift economies a "total social movement" whose multiple
activities are "economic, juridical, moral, aesthetic, religious, mythological
and socio-morphological ..." 29 Kosenwein found the gifts in Cluny's
monastic cartularies gathered together a universe of emotions and values
which "expressed love, subordination, enmity, compensated for crimes, tied
together estranged families" and even promised to bring Saint Peter into
the family (gifts to a monastery or church were done in the name of the
appropriate patron saint). 30 writes,
recognition and prestige. And gifts, in turn, however removed fromp ices and precisely reckoned profits, nevertheless are the result ofculations about return gifts, material benefits, and/or services.
^
Ihg inventions ^nrj ri§ks of monastic assot rnanagpmont
As a precursor to today’s Catholic welfare corporatism, the medieval
monasteries combined multimodal skills in business and finance with
philanthropy and public service. Here is a review of some of the ways the
monasteries operated, and the risks they ran by attempting a combination
of religious faith and worldly practicality.
Estate distributions
Among the most successful of the services provided by the
monasteries in the Middle Ages were those which expanded on the Church's
63
traditional presence at "threshold" events such as birth, ntarriage and
especially death. As modern medicine and estate attorneys might suggest,
there are few events more money-intensive than death. Monks as spiritual
guides, recording secretaries, trustees, social workers, health care
providers, gerontologists - and beneficiaries
- became specialists in the
final voyage, and took careful watch over what was left behind. In
response to donations, monasteries offered burial rights in the abbey,
listings in the abbey’s martyrology, anniversary masses, feast days,
chanted masses and memorial alms to the poor. 32 Many civilians would
decide on their deathbed to join a monastery, adopting the monk's habit as a
talisman for burial.
Death was also the major transfer event for property. At such
moments, the monasteries were present, trusted, and frequently named as
heirs themselves, so they developed a conspicuous role as large scale
landlords. 34 Many monasteries, in order to maintain contiguous farmland,
would buy out shares of estates from local families who were in the process
of settlement. 35 As the monasteries grew, they functioned as local bankers
who could offer financial liquidity for heirs-to-be, offering mortgages
(hence the name morr-gage, from death-pledge, i.e. money offered in
advance of an expected inheritance). 36
Leases and lease improvements
When direct operations of intact and ongoing real property proved
impraaical, one of the methods of indirect control was the precarium, a
way for the Church to lease properties to lay people with the
64
understanding the estate was
-recoverable at will'. 37 The precariun, was
Similar to, if not formative of, feudal tenancy but, as precarious as its name
implies, it ran the risk of simony. 38
Suspicions were raised by a proliferation of "precarial donations"
between the more prosperous monastic houses and their wealthy patrons.
In gift economies when one gives a return gift, there is usually an added
increase.39 At first, monasteries received material gifts and returned only
spiritual services. Precarial donations, however, reversed the monastic role
from beneficiary to benefactor - what they gave back was more than what
they got, and the increase could be measured i n material, not simply
spiritual terms. In the hands of the monks, land was made more productive,
dairies and wineries more profitable and livestock herds made more robust,
with great gain returned to the original grantor (frequently a relative of
the abbot). It invited some question about whether these were donations or
some other form of transfer.
The ambiguity over leasehold improvements and percentage
reimbursements - in either direction - leaves lots of interpretive room for
both "gift increase" and "commodity profit" explanations. Monasteries
might grant a "life estate" to someone who was better suited to defend (or
cultivate) a piece of property, with the understanding it would ultimately
revert back. {Emphyteusis referred to a long term lease, usually a grant of
uncultivated land which the tenant improves). Other times a gift would be
given to humble folk with the understanding that a portion of the proceeds
(or other fragmented asset) would be apportioned to the monastery and that
eventually a portion of that land, once cleared and cultivated, would also
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return to the monastery. 40 But the title could also be easily obscured in
these affairs through matronymics, carrying the deed on the books
through a Wife's family name. 41 clerical marriage was banned in the mid
eleventh century with an eye to this practice, although Lateran 111 15
allowed goods from a benefice to be willed to others by a cleric holding that
benefice. 42
Duby concludes that precarial donations "helped to create some of the
great lay fortunes In the region." 43 Rosenwein found that at Cluny "most
precarial donations gave back hereditary lands that had once belonged to
the family of the recipient." 44 jo what extent virtue or greed played a role
m those fortunes was the basis which determined simony, and whether the
monasteries exploited - or were exploited - a gift so that it was converted to
a commodity or a pretense for a type of embezzlement. It also perpetuated
serfdom, though the monasteries presumably represented a more altruistic
purpose than private feudal accumulation. At the very least, however, the
gift economy as mediated by the monasteries facilitated the productive use
of property otherwise unavailable to the economy.
Though a gift is never fully owned, there is a benefit from controlling
it. Rents and tithes are essentially retums-on-equity and technically
contradictory to the Church's ban on usury, though there is some room for
biblical interpretation, based on Deut. 23: 19-20: "You shall not lend upon
interest to your brother, interest on money, interest on victuals, interest
on anything that is lent for interest. To a foreigner you may lend, but to
your brother you shall not lend upon interest.
. .
"
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Eventually, especially as the Crusades needed financing, the Church
found the business of loans of money with interest irresistible. When it
came down to competition with Jewish ienders, the Church finessed its way
out of the limitation against usury entirely, as antisemitic friars (the
Brotherhood of Man) set up Christian pawnshops (called Monte d/ Pieta -
mounts of mercy) which charged interest of 2<B4-50% above principal. 45
There were some 87 momi approved by Pope Leo X in 1 S 1 5 who argued their
charges were "not usura, but compensation for damn et interesse " i.e„
potential damages and losses. It was also argued that the bible prohibited
interest on loans to one's brother, but allowed lending-charges to
"strangers". Monasteries more customarily made large secured loans on
the basis of a 7%-12% return, 25%-30»/« on smaller ones, with one to nine
years repayment. 46 Canonists developed similar accommodations to the
notion of "just price." 47
Tax exempt status
Another benefit from passing a gift into monastic hands, and then
receiving it back again later, is that property transferred from lay
benefactors would become tax exempt for the time it was under monastic
care. During the Crusades or any period in which taxes presented a
problem, land and other property could become "monasteries" and as just
noted, remain on the books under a wife's family name, frequently
increasing in value all the while.
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The modern political relevance for church tithes is that it was a
prototypical tax which produced enormous revenues for the purpose of
what we would call welfare. According to Poschl, tithes were "the most
important tax in the economic development of western Europe" with no
equal in "duration, extent of application and weight of economic burden"
T8. The tithe originated from biblical times as a tenth-part payment (or
Ttrst fruits") to the Church 49, gy the fifth and sixth centuries, tithes were
well established in old areas Christianity in the West, especially the
Frankish kingdoms in southeastern Gaul and in some parts of Visigothic
Spain before the Moslem conquest.
Monasteries at first were not qualified to collect tithes - only churches
- but after time monks won the right to immunity from tithes and then
were allowed to received dedicated and fixed tithes. 50 Nevertheless some
monastic orders refused tithes altogether, rather than risk worldly
entanglements. 51 Tithes as endowments were given as gifts to churches
and monasteries as well as levied by canon and secular law as an
ecclesiastical tax.
Medieval property ownership: Group, qnd
Roman classical law had set the precedent for the exclusive ownership
of property by individuals, but medieval attitudes toward property -
informed by Germanic custom - were substantially different from this, in
ways which are especially germane to corporate notions of ownership. 52
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Embedded in the monastic gift economy were an ambiguous mix of
collective ownership and kinship. Property
was structured in a way White describes as
ownership in the Middle Ages
"unknown to modern law,"
managing to mix extended family and group possession. 53
m.ertwined with these formative versions of property ownership was
monasticism's fictive kinship the "brothers” and "sisters" and
godparenting that the monasteries represented offered new avenues of
property accumulation, apprenticeship to trades, and class mobility in the
limited, static social structures of the time (See Appendix Two).
Medieval property was intermediate between the individual and the
group, a hybrid, says Gierke, of the "Romanist principle of proprietary
individualism and the Germanic principle of proprietary
communitarianism ..." 54 Germanic property
custom incorporated public and private law into one realm, so that the
"Roman division of law into the domain of the state on the one hand and of
the autonomous isolated individual on the other was rejected." 55 Thus we
see an early affinity for corporatism's Intermediary qualities, presented as
a modern alternative to the "liberal state."
The most prominent way in which medieval Germanic property
possession demonstrated this group-owned quality was in the
administration of family inheritances by fictive (and factual) relatives in
monasteries. Monastic cartularies appear to confirm that (as is appropriate
for gift economies) medieval property was not as entirely alienable as it is
in the twentieth century, especially in the sense of it being in one person's
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power alone to dispose of, 56 The many participants shown in the
cartularies suggest a group-owned phenomenon in which communal
ownership, rather than Individual, was the norm. 57
The laudatio parentum: Guaranteeing bequests
A more precise explanation for the array of participants which
characteristically crowd monastic property records was the laudatio
parentum, a means by which testamentaty bequests to monasteries would
be Witnessed by benefactors’ relatives in order to avoid later challenges to
the will. 58 Magnates were entirely capable of giving tithes and gifts to one
abbey, then change their minds, take it back, and give it to somewhere else
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As poetic as gift economies might sound. White tells us”[g]ifts to saints
should not be viewed as untroubled, conflict-free feasts of familial and
religious solidarity." 60 Accordingly, monastic transactions involved
elaborate rituals comprised partly of Roman contract law, partly of stylized
altar ceremony, all recorded by the clerics in handwritten duplicate as a
witnessed testament.
The procedure (and the lawsuits they provoked) testifies to the
inextricable, ongoing bonds of family and community which underlie
certain European notions of possession, and which are embedded in
Catholic corporatism.
70
Joining a monastery for a price: Religious entry
AS part of their multimodal talents, the monasteries were in the thick
of medieval 'family values,' especially as the monasteries boomed in
popularity as an alternative lifestyle for wealthy scions. As the monasteries
experienced a steady stream of applicants, especially in the eleventh and
twelfth centuries, acceptance into the monastic life became increasingly
selective. Benedict's «u/e in the mid sixth century excluded no group from
potential acceptance into the Benedictine monastic community. 61
the eleventh and twelfth century, Steven White tells us the Benedictines
were typically "recruited from the same restricted circle of upper class
landholders." 62
Keligious entry merged with tithes and gifts in a growing currency of
monastic interaction with the secular world. Bargaining brought old debts
and new needs into play. Since the monastery was an undying corporation,
a person's monastic entry meant feudal lords lost his or her rights of
marriage, wardship and escheat (property reversion absent an heir), so
this too became a matter of negotiated compensation for their assent to the
subject's entry. 63 jhis might be offset if the lord had a prospective monk
among his own offspring. Many claims against the property of a religious
house was settled by counting it as an entry gift of a relative's entry into
that house. 64
Wealthy entrants were likely to receive higher level positions in
prospective monasteries. Considering the almost absolute power which
rested in the hands of the abbot, there was an obvious way of recouping the
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".nvestmenc," particularly if the original Uonation came from the abbot's
own family, m 787 St. Wadrille's - a huge monastic farm of over ,70,000
acres, made a gift of over 60,000 acres - to the abbots own relatives. 65
Institutional refuge: The infirm and the divorced
But perhaps the best demonstration of monasticism's marriage of
social service and economics is in the institutional refuge it provided the
old, the infirm, and those disinclined to marriage. "What emerges from this
consideration of the pra«ice of receiving the old, the injured, and the ill to
religious life is that it was a social institution that always involved
negotiations and conditioned agreements."
Given the traditional moral prescriptions of marriage and family - not
uncommon in our own day - it is striking how many religious communities
were built by Catholic priests and nuns who instead "marry" (symbolically,
by ceremony, the Church and Jesus. An example from the seventh century
is the founding of Notre Dame de Homblierers. Subsequent to the pope's
annulment of her marriage engagement, a young noblewoman named
Hunegund led Irish missionaries to France, financed by her frustrated
fiance's would-be dowry (her suitor later joined a monastery as well).
However, about 940 the monastery of Homblierers is mentioned as a
community of nuns in need of reform because of lapsed morals." Efforts
by the archbishop of Reims to assign an overseer named Bertha ultimately
failed after which the facilities were instead given over to a group of
monks.
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Virtual weddings were not limited to those in religious orders.
According to Bolton, at the iiospital Santo Spirito in home a procession was
held once a year to celebrate a "mystic wedding," attended by 1000 local
paupers and 300 hospital inmates. Each would receive a small gift of money
and a meal. The analogy of marriage became a favorite of those who would
analogize their emperors and kings as "grooms" of the nation, a
comparison borrowed directly from biblical references to Christ. 68
The idea of linking religion to rather innovative notions of marriage
is not limited to the Middle ages, of course. Modern variations on the theme
include the Shakers, Quakers, Mormons, Oneidans and Christian Scientists.
To a far greater extent than today, medieval monasteries were a popular
alternative to the sometimes-messy matters of marriage and youth. Further,
because clerical marriage was so closely associated with simony, it was in
the Church's organizational interest to reimpose standards of celibacy.
In the sixth century, Justinian considered religious entry the legal
equivalent to divorce, allowing the remaining spouse to remarry after one
year. Gregory I felt this eroded the permanence of marriage, but during
the eleventh century, as controversies over clerical marriage reemerged,
the preferable outcome was for both spouses to each join religious houses.
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Adults with dependents were not prevented from following the
popular trend to an apostolic life of poverty and seclusion, because the
sons, daughters and elders of new entrants were accommodated by still
other monasteries. Peter Waldo (aka Valdes, also leader of the" Waldensian"
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movement) put his daughters in a monaste.^ to accommodate his caiiing as
a wandering preacher. 70 p^^er Abeiard favored the founding of adjacent
doubie monasteries, one for each gender, especiaiiy so that a man with
dependents couid give his children over to nearby communities.
These children (so-called oblatil or nutriti ) were more than mere
boarders
-they were obliged to become permanent monks by Benedict's
Rule, reaffirmed by the Council at Worms in 868. 71 Consequently these
children became a major source of monastic entrants, ostensibly because
they were "offered to God" to fulfill a vow or atone for sins (usually of the
father). Others were simply orphans. Aside from motives of piety religious
entry of children began to develop into a controversy, in a not particularly
charitable mood, Ulrich of Uirsau complained in 1079 that "if any of those
children is lame or maimed or hard of hearing or blind or humpbacked or
leprous.
. . indeed they offer this one to God with very eager vow so that he
may be a monk." 72
In religious entry for adults and children, and as Intermediaries for
family traditions, medieval monasteries effectively used the tools of
business and law in their vocation. Not surprisingly, these also ran risks of
abuse and neglect.
Review of Chanter Throp
We have seen the medieval monasteries as a fundamental part of
Western political economics whose "gift economy" and professional roles
contained formative traces of Catholic welfare corporatism, showing ( 1
)
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or«anicism in their ties to the Church; (2) subsidiarity through their iocai
and regionai missions; (3) muitimodaiity in the extensive variety of sociai
services and productive work, performed in the arenas of state, market and
community.
The baiance which the monasteries struck among these three roies
provides a famiiiar background for the modern Catholic welfare
corporatism, particularly in its challenge to keep principles of service in
line with social accountability and economic survival. Much of what the
monasteries experienced centuries ago bears a striking resemblance to the
opportunity and risks of what nowadays is nonprofit enterprise. How the
monasteries threaded the 'eye of the needle' so to speak, by handling the
great wealth which came their way either as direct gifts or as an extension
of their professional roles, provides an elaborate blueprint for modern
counterparts.
Most of the evidence which survives from this era is in the form of
official documentation - the equivalent of bookkeeping records,
accountancy statements, or statutes of the Church or civil authority. The
extent to which religious culture provided moral constraint on a daily basis
is somewhat less certain, but we know that simony became a major ethical
issue, subject to periodic reforms. Therefore, we see religion as an
influential normative force which participated at the highest levels of
productive enterprise, presumably the type of economic regulation which
the nineteenth century corporatists had in mind when they imagined a
moral role for vocational corporations.
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But to What extent did the medieval Church - and the "welfare
function" of its monasteries
- operate not as a snh.^ h-c subordinate part of the state
but as an independent state of its own7 To argue ,in the corporatist sense)
’
that the Church was a constitutive component of the state rather than its
own transnational domain, requires a closer look at Church-state
Interaction. The modern state is partly defined by how effectively it both
absorbed and marginalized the Church, a development illuminated by the
Investiture contest, an epiphenomenon of the proprietary church system
Also occurring in parallel during this era was the Church’s own intra-
organizational dynamic with the monasteries, such that the monasteries
emerged as the true intermediary institutions of the time, rather than the
centralized Church. Chapter Four next investigates how the Church and
state negotiated their distinct realms of jurisdiction, and provided
additional cultural precedent for the corporatist vocational associations of
the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.
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CHAPTER 4
HE INVESTITURE CONTEST AND VOCATIONAL JURISDICTION
The corporatist significance of the Investiture contest (c, 1050-1130)
lies in how the Church and its monastic corporations retained some
measure of self determination while various states
- particularly German -
attempted to usurp the Church's power to appoint religious leadership.
Chapter One noted that the distinction between
'state' and 'societal'
corporatism lies in the level of determinative control by the state. Though
the general perception is that Catholic corporatism is a form of "state-
corporatism - where the creative authority aas from the top down - the
Investiture contest can be seen to suggest some embryonic elements of
societal" corporatism as well. This is to say that the Church in general and
the monasteries in particular represented collectivities which were formed
independent of (and prior to) the "state" - such as it was eight centuries ago
- rather than as creatures of some secular political process.
However, in much of the dynamic between the Church and the state in
the Middle Ages, the two realms of authority frequently acted as a matched
pair. The issue during the Investiture struggle was not limited to right of
kings to appoint bishops, but also included the power of the pope to anoint
emperors. The quid pro quo of the papal anointment of kings for the royal
confirmation of popes served their mutual interests from at least as early as
the eighth century, when the Church’s blessing helped the Carolingians'
dubious claims against the established Merovingian French monarchy
prevail. The genetic traces of societal corporatism find an even better
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precursor in the struggle for control between the Church and its own
subsidiary organizations, especially the monastic corporations and the lay
religious communities which foreshadowed the Protestant reformation.
There are a number of analogies from this period which can be drawn
to characteristic traits of corporatism. The Investiture contest forms a
procedural prototype for the sort of leadership selection which turns up in
Schmitter's definition of modem corporatism as ".
. . functionally
differentiated categories, recognized or licensed (if not created) by the
state ... in exchange for observing certain controls on their selection of
leaders
. ,
.
"
I The institutional interplay between the Church, the state,
and the growing number of monastic and lay religious orders also
anticipated the trait of multimodality in Catholic welfare corporatism.
Additionally, the bid for self direction by these local organizations suggests
subsidiarity, vocational interest representation and the mesocorporatist
quality of regionality.
The theme of government fiscal regulation is also woven into the
Investiture story. This was an era in which taxation was increasingly
justified by what, in those times, resembled social welfare spending.
Frequent tax revenue collection had been commonplace in the Middle Ages
because of the "extraordinary" expenses related to the Crusades. But public
revenue collected on a systematic yearly basis went primarily to fund the
era s brand of social service, using monasticism as its vehicle, and the
clergy as its agents. The system was not without arrogation by the usual
suspects of private and public actors, another part of the Investiture story
83
as we shall see, all part of an era of particularly rich Illustrations for the
notion of "devolved" social service as a surrogate for the state.
Beenkirrhnn
The Investiture contest was as much about economics and power as it
was about faith, popularly symbolized by the submission of emperor Henry
V (1050 1106) to pope Gregory VII (bom Hildebrand, 1073-85) at Canossa in
1077. Henry had condemned Gregory's selection of bishop for Milan,
preferring his own, and the emperor attempted to nullify Gregory's
election. The pope subsequently excommunicated the emperor, at which
time Henry's coalition of German bishops collapsed. Gregory's forgiveness
was largely the result of the intercession of abbot Hugh of Cluny. an
enormously popular monk whom Gregory could not afford to offend. But
matters degenerated further as Henry IV at the synod of Mainz in 1085
deposed two archbishops and thirteen bishops and replaced them with
imperial appointees. Gregory's response was to absolve Henry's subjects of
any loyalty to their king, a move which precipitated widespread rebellion.
As we have seen, the Church and its monasteries were economic
engines of enormous impact, so the power of appointment to Church and
monastic offices had profound implications. The Lateran synod of 1059 had
aimed to reverse the custom of German lay appointment of bishops, an
office which the secular rulers had come to confer on elite government
clerks, rather than men of any theological training. Almost immediately
upon his election in 1073, Gregory, mindful of Henry IV's record of
removing three popes from office, published DIctatus Papae which
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proclaimed that the pope was beyond the judgment of any human,
including the emperor (whom he would eventually excommunicate).
Among his pronouncements was the right of popes to free election by their
own college of cardinals, and that the dismissal, transfer or reinstatement
Of bishops was to be done exclusively at the pope's discretion. Thus, the
issue became professional autonomy, a key aspect of corporatism.
The essential dynamic was that the emperor would seek to subsume the
Church, against which the Church argued that it transcended the state.
This would continue in crisis over the next 175 years, growing particularly
incandescent during the reigns of llenty IV, Frederick I Barbarossa and
Frederick II. Never again would the Church be as politically predominant
in the West as it was during this stand
the papacies of Gregory VII and Innocent III.
against the state, an era marked by
Beyond the drama of dueling personalities was the political economy
of the German proprietary church system (Bgcnkirche). The proprietary
church system is important to welfare corporatism because it was the main
source of institutionally-based, publicly minded economic power for the
ascendant German empire, and because it came primarily in the form of
monastic corporations on charitable missions. In multimodal fashion, the
corporatist monasteries were fundamental to political power on three
levels - the universal church, the imperial state and the local community.
As early as 742 the Concilium Germanicum attempted to come to grips
with the impositions and outright confiscation of churches by Charles
Martel (714-41). Under Pepin and Carloman, there were to be stable and
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regular endowments established for churches, with the manorial lords
denied their traditional power to unilaterally dismiss
Without the bishop’s consent. 2
or appoint clergy
As the monastic movement in Germany continued
income, Church finances continued to be subject to the
to grow in size and
manipulations of
territorial lords (Grundherrschaft). Though not originally a monastic
privilege, over the years monks eventually acquired their own churches
where they either hired or served as priests, taking the income for
themselves, in time, the busy acquisition of churches by monasteries
resembled modern corporate takeovers. Constable tells us, "Such a
relationship between ecclesiastical institutions, by which one church or
monasteoi held another as its property was later called incorporation.
The tithes and entire revenue of all these [dependent] churches were paid
to the ruling monastery. " 3
The reason the manorial lords had such powers was that a proprietary
church was built on a rich man’s land, who also had rights to adjunct
income such as "the offerings, the first-fruits, the dues levied by the priest
... and later the tithe." 4 The crux of the threat posed by such investment
income was that eventually included in the revenue stream were the
simoniacal "sale" of holy sacraments for burial, baptism, marriage,
communion, confession, and unction, in exchange, the territorial lord
defrayed operational expenses, and presumably protected the poor, but if
there was a profit, as there usually was, the lord was empowered to take it
for himself.
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The scrussle for control over these valttahle economic en«i„es
cd the interplay of pope, royalty and nohility, as well as lay and
C.hurch-appointed clergy. What was drawn from thU
shaped into corporatist forms.
is crucible was largely
IllC mpnasterv at nimy
In what Catholic welfare corporatism would interpret as a
combination of organicism and subsidiarity, some monasteries and
Churches devised a long-distance papal protection to keep local potentates
from excessive meddling in monastic affairs. I'rototypical was Cluny
(founded 9 1 0), which simultaneously exploited the protective, organicist
benefits of the centralized Church while pursuing subsidiarist measures
establishing Cluny and its satellites as a distinct subtype of the monastic
movement. Bolton writes that Cluny's concept of liU-nas aimed to avoid
worldly influences and sought to distance the more aggressive members of
the surrounding lay community by using "two cures: to escape localism it
placed itself directly under the pope and to escape the association with
noblemen and their way of life it restored the need for communitas." 5
The Cluny notion of community departed from the cloistered tradition
and instead began a system in which representatives of various Cluniac
abbeys would visit other monastic houses to exchange prayers and compare
experiences. Uuny was also responding to an increasing need for a
common set of statutes and organizational cohesion in order to moderate
the tendencies of many monasteries to go off on their own interpretations
of the Benedictine Rule. ^ Cluniacs were not particularly bashful in their
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technique of bringing wayward abbeys back into iine. Abbot Odo of Cluny
(926-944) ordered his men to retake the Abbey of Farfa by physicai force. 7
It was a first step in cuitivating a corporate Identity among the severai
houses.
Cluny could afford its independence from localism because of its great
sir,e and the huge number of donations which came from relatively far
away. One of the Cluniac reforms instituted by Peter the Venerable was to
restrict donations to a maximum of 50 per day. 8 ciuny's conspicuous
success and leadership formed a coat tail of similar "cluniac" houses, in a
rough affiliation centered around the Cluny mother house.
Kome expanded the Cluniac model of papal protection to the Ilirsau
monasteries, which became the Vatican's answer to the German
proprietary churches. By the third quarter of the tenth century there had
been over one hundred abbeys operating in Germany, probably all of them
attached to the crown. By 1075. the number had shot up to seven hundred,
many of them papal or so called "Koman" monasteries. However not all
were sufficiently wealthy to afford to ignore local benefactors.
Ironically the new "Koman monastery" system was led by Pope Leo IX
( 1049-1055) who had been appointed by his close relative the emperor
Henry 111 "the Black" (1002-1024), who had already deposed three popes
(none of whom were his relatives, however). Adding to the irony was that
Leo IX’s most influential advisor was Hildebrand, who would later become
pope Gregory Vll, perhaps the empire's most formidable adversary. Kome
had been requesting permanent Church appointments by formal acts of
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investiture, but the Germans insisted on beneiicium grants
- gifts- made by
local magnates. 9 m response, the "Roman" monasteries were established
with papal (Roman) sponsorship and protection written into their
constitutional charters. Located in the regions of Swabia, Bavaria,
Franconia and Burgundy, the "Roman" monasteries were also referred to as
abbatia libera
,
or a monascerium liberum and arose in "conscious
opposition to the proprietary rights exercised by the laity," according to
llirsch. 10 It was an arrangement fostered by the mediation of Cluniac
monks who promoted the idea of an episcopatus iiber (free church) inside
the courts of the Salian (Franconian) rulers, another example of the
multimodal skills of the monks.
The Right m
To make matters even more complex, the local magnates persisted in
including themselves in the new "Roman" monastic trend, exploiting the
distant and virtually abstract rule of Rome while simultaneously moving
the monasteries away from royal control. Cluniac charters intended no
tribute or service to pope, emperor or diocesan, but there was a new
creature in the political forest, the Vo^t. 1 1 Henry IV in the Hirsau charter
of 1075, while placing free direction of monastic properties in the hands of
the abbot, set apart the crucial power of finance, placing it among the
administrative powers of an individual called the advocate or vogt. 12
Besides fiduciary direction over revenues, the charter granted the vogt
jurisdiction over criminal matters of life and limb, a fixed income
percentage from the operations and participation in the deposing of abbots
Furthermore, the office of vo^f would remain hereditary in the family of
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the contributing noble (the Count of Chalw,
The vogt was nominally an elected post, bu
a limited pool of counts or peers and in real
,
in the case of Ilirsau 1075).
of the older proprietary right which the lord had exercised in his
churches, the heritage of the proprietary lord inevitably passed to the
advocate and not to the pope. " 13
Flaying the tension between pope and emperor, the dynasts used the
office of the advocacy to maintain their rights while ostensibly
surrendering their monasteries. 14 Additionally, ties with the papacy
established the independence of their foundations from the Reichskirche,
impairing rights of the crown. However the Hirsau abbeys ultimately
legal rights. In practice - and the Curia eventually recognized this - the
vogt needed a royal grant of jurisdiction if he was going to exercise high
criminal justice. 15 The vogt and other seigniorial offices were beginning
to be drawn up into the realm of government rights, legitimized by a new
style of civil law heavily influenced by the Germans, led by the
Hohenstaufen, the great imperial adversaries to the papacy.
Mindful of welfare corporatism's emphasis on "mediating structures,"
German monasticism worked itself amidst all sorts of arrangements -
financial, political and organizational - which created new types of work,
and experimented with new balances of financial and administrative
needed the consent of the crown to have a permanent exercise of their
Mpnastgries as multimoda l mediating .stnirtnrpQ
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power. 16 Monasteries - with a mission to serve the poor - matte spate for
themselves on several sides of the action, royal, papal and noble. 1
7
The monastic story is one of succeeding waves of reform, each besun
as a conscientious elfort to return to the humble origins of the apostolic
life, each becoming in due course successful, worldly and decadent. At first
the appeal of Cluny was based on the genuine piety of its members - no one
was allowed into the order who had not divested of their private property.
Nevertheless as with other monasteries, it fell somewhat victim to its own
success (provoking the vigorous criticisms of the Cistercians) which
motivated Cluny abbot Peter the Venerable (1 122-1156), to re-impose the
disciplines of fasting and silence and rededicate the abbey's mission to
concern for the poor. Somewhat more grandly, though, he planned to build
the biggest church in Christendom" part of which would be for the
exclusive use of monks "where they might pray and mortify themselves as
in a hermitage far from the sight of men."
L'istercinn.s
As Cluny meant to be a reform of the Benedictines, so the Cistercians
saw themselves as a reform of Cluny. 19 The Cistercians began as a fringe
movement reaffirming the vita apostolica, in imitation of Christ's simple
poverty. At the beginning the Cistercians were isolationists, renouncing
populated areas, pointedly avoiding competition with other monks for
endowments, tithes, rents, or services.
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In regard to corporatise development, the Cistercians mark a definite
advance beyond Cluny's loose affiliation of monasteries. The Cistercian's
Charter of Charity (Cana CarUas) formed a true corporation of abbeys and
priories with a New Monastery of Citeaux iCistcraum) at its center. 20
Bolton writes, "The real founders of the Order of Citeaux may have been
those abbots who, in the General Chapter of 1123, renounced some of their
autonomy to a new corporate body within the Church, so bringing ii
existence the first monistic order."21
nto
Although Cluny had opened the door to interaction among various
monasteries, the Benedictine forms prior to the Cistercians were
comparatively atomistic. In the Cistercian order there was a direct single
chain of authority radiating from the hub at Citeaux which included
additional mother houses, a regular system of mutual visitation by which
the proceedings at each site were monitored, and a supreme legislative
body instituted at Citeaux which every three years held a General Chapter
of ail Cistercian abbots. 22 Among the matters decided were procedures by
which unwonhy abbots could be removed by decision of their monks.
Although at first making a point of shunning lay magnanimity, one
form of lay involvement which considerably furthered the Cistercians
efforts were the conversi - illiterate half-monks which provided the basic
labor force of the order. In some areas conversi outnumbered full monks
by two or three to one, and by 1 1 90 there began to appear evidence of
overworked and underfed conversi. 23
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The Cistercian method of regular and systematic visitations and
General Chapters was adopted by the pope and applied to ali monastic orders
by the Fourth Lateran in ,215. There were other ties between the pope and
the Cstercians. The Cistercian's frontier ethos made for a ciose aliiance
With the pope. 24
^
Cistercians became the leading crusade agents of the Papacy" 25 x^gi^
evangelizing zeal and a proclivity for quick condemnation of heresy
earned the Cistercians the dubious distinttion of leading roles on the
second, third and fourth crusades.
Knij^htly Orders am] tho Templart:
The organicist dimension of corporatism can be seen to coincide in the
medieval monastic and military discipiines. Though the eariiest crusading
orders - "soidiers of Christ" - accompanied the Crusades as support services
and physicians, they rapidly became paramilitary and reached a peak with
the Knights Templar (The Poor Brothers of the Temple of Jerusalem). The
Knights Hospitalers (Order of St. John of Jerusalem) were rivals of
Templars whose original intent was as a medical corps of the crusaders but
who also became a purely military order.
Eventually the Templars yielded to same temptations as the Cistercians.
Innocent 111 especially encouraged the Cistercians to give up some of the
joys of contemplation in order to carry on evangelical tasks and
presumably compensate for the notorious corruption of some clergy.
However the Cistercians by then were no strangers to rich clothing and
lavish spending, and commonly came to use horses, which they did not in
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their ascetic early days. Cantor notes that particularly during the mid
twelfth century economic expansion
"HJt was difficult for any effective
corporate group not to make money, and if the corporation was also
dedicated to divine service, it received endowments from all sides." 27
with many monastic orders, they became skilled at wealth transfers and
asset management "and by the thirteenth century they were the greatest
bankers in Europe, with the papacy and the French kings as their clients.
The Templars constitutes one documented case of religion playing a part in
the rise of capitalism" 28
HrofcStSipnal Houndariov Pri nsr.svs mnnVc
The Investiture issue was never really resolved, but the issue of
leadership persisted, particularly in light of simoniacal abuses by clergy,
lay-appointed or otherwise. One of the repercussions of simoniacal reform
was to resurrect the Donatist view that unfit priests should stand to be
removed by the people. 29 implicit in this was yet another, even more
significant feature of the monastic corporations - a strong undercurrent of
lay organization, in the name of faith, but in the form of corporate power.
Here can be seen a streak of primitive meso-corporatism and subsidiarity,
contrasting the steeply hierarchical universal Church with regional, self
constituting semi-autonomous organizations.
Long before the monk Martin Luther would famously challenge the
Roman Church hierarchy, there had been long-standing tension between
monks and priests. Gregorian reformism was based on impatience with the
simoniacal Church hierarchy, and a fervor for ascetic devotion to one's
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personal principles. Benedict himself was not ordained, but instead a "lay
religious," and many of the Augustinian canons were plainly
individualistic in their approach to faith. Many monastic communities
amounted to systematized lay practice, with considerable anti sacerdotal
tendencies, dating from the time of Constantine's conversion. Bolton
believes "the monastic movement could be interpreted as a form of protest
by the laity against the curtailment of former freedoms and privileges." 30
Bolton adds that Benedict's Rule required that a "priest should not be let
into monastery too easily and once there, must be made to obey the Rule as
did all other monks." 31 Priests were allowed to say mass at a monastery
only by permission of the abbot.
The Rule was designed for autonomous communities but there was a
supervisory provision for the Church, a role for intervention by the local
bishop for internal affairs. In practice however the Benedictines had some
notoriety for lassitude and excessive independence, addressed by
succeeding tides of reform, but the rivalry between priest and monk was
real and growing. ^2
Ihe Ministerialos nnd lav orders
Earlier the idea was raised of medieval monasticism as a primitive
form of societal corporatism, a self-defining vocational movement from
below, rather than imposed as a preconception from above. The Catholic-
Church's attempts to restrict and standardize the priestly profession made
short term gains relative to the state, and thus appears as an early form of
corporatism's technique of protected, distinct professional sectors. But the
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way that it was intposed was typically hierarchica, and rigid, in the "top
down" style of state corporatism. In many ways the hierarchical Church
and rts priestly profession was more a state than it was a corporation, at
least in the intermediary, meso-corporatist sense which we have associated
with Catholic welfare corporatism.
The lay appointments which were the crux of the Investiture contest
was only part of the erosion of established, priest-dominated Church power
The momentum of the future was with the monastic corporations and their
imitators, the grass roots orders of lay religious who prefigured the
Protestant Reformation. These organi^ations, from the "bottom up" as it
were, attempted to claim their own distinct identities, eventually with some
success. The professional monopoly which the priesthood had enjoyed was
now assaulted on all fronts, not simply by the monastic orders, but by other
groups of lay religious, as well as by an associated growth of the
ministermles. the new category of lay public administrators.
Norman Cantor has pointed out that the power of the Germans and
Normans in the tenth and eleventh centuries was substantially founded on
control over the Church, and in particular the Benedictine monasteries.
The aid which the Church gave them included not only revenue, but
knights and administrative personnel. 33 Henry 111 had marked a turning
point at which the royal dependency on Church clerics began to evolve a
class of its own, and for the royals this aimed for a more reliable
alternative. Part knight, pan serf, ministeriales were stewards in manorial
centers, revenue officials, castellans or simple knights whom the
monasteries, bishops and higher level knights needed. The ministeriales
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system was an effective means of class mobility for the formerly
unpropertied, anti came to mean the emancipation of peasants, serfs and
bondsmen from personal dependence. At the
took over government, the ministerisles
holdings, and began to cultivate their own separate estates. Hy the eleventh
century benefices held by mm/stenate become hereditary and
subsequently became less subject to their lords will, free to leave their lord
providing he left his former housing at the lord's disposal.34
moment the Ilohenstaufen
emerged with new wealth and
As the Idea of ministeriales flourished, so did the proliferation of the
communities of religious laity. Though not monastic corporations in a strict
sense - in many cases they were heretical collectives - these bodies of non-
ordained, privately religious "amateurs" were pious and ostensibly poor,
similar to the monasteries, but with a pronounced willingness to interpret
and preach the gospel on their own.
The Waldensians and llumiliati personified the twelfth century lay
passion for religious life, many of them ministeriales from Metz. Along
with St. Francis and many others of the time whose faith and renunciation
defied the disproportionate wealth of the privileged, Peter Waldo (Valdes)
was from the wealthy classes, a rich merchant from Lyon who about the
time of the 1176 famine, sold all his worldly possessions, sent his wife and
daughters to a convent and assumed voluntary poverty in imitation of
Christ. He produced a vernacular version of Gospels and of other books of
the Bible, ultimately provoking papal condemnation for taking it upon
himself to preach.
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Waldo's delegation to pope Alexander 111 in 1 179 was denied official
recognition. Waldensians were ostensibly allowed to preach, but only with
permission of a priest, which amounted to a virtual ban. By 1 184 the
Waldensians were anathematized for 'thrusting their sickle into the
harvest of others'
- preaching without authorization, violating the
professional monopoly of the Church. Hence both religious laity and the
growing bureaucratic class were crowding the Church's traditional
dominance in its vocations and professions.
The heavy hand by which the Church dealt with lay religious
movements is the sort of the approach which earned Catholic corporatism
its modern identification with "state corporatism." It was the beginning of
a dark era of decline by the Church into repression and worse. The
Englishman Walter Map dismissed the Waldensians as idiotae et illiterati
who presumed to preach in the absence of a knowledge of Latin. The
Waldensians further affronted the Church hierarchy in 1 199 when the
group was accused of reading from a French translation of the Scriptures.
The books were declared heretical and burned.
The Humiliati, also anathematized along with the Waldensians in 1184,
showed traits which can be considered forerunners of Catholic welfare
corporatism. Writes Bolton, "This lay group had as its framework the
fraternity, an organization which by providing mutual aid and benefits."
The Waldensians made elaborate arrangements for the sick and dying,
providing simple rituals at funerals, performing on their own what was a
major Church specialty and source of income. Forerunners of the
Dominicans, the Humiliati were mostly upper class Lombards who offered
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the choice to men and women to either live in conventual communities or
practice a limited form of voluntary poverty within own families, thus they
were not, strictly speaking, corporate in their organization, however
corporate they might have been in spirit. 36
The Franrit^rpnc:
One group which managed to succeed in formal acceptance while also
managing to push the limits of self-administered faith - and the implied
risk to the prolessional class of priests - were the Franciscans, Cantor
informs us, "The whole tenor of Franciscan teaching replaced traditional
sacramentalism with a religion centered on personal experience. This was
the kind of religion that the bourgeoisie demanded
.
. 37
-phe tremendous
power of the independent urban movement - a trend which eluded both
pope and emperor in this transitory era - was not lost on the Franciscans
who preached in marketplaces throughout Europe, allowing the bourgeois
to entertain the notion that if one was faithful to the Virgin and Child, and
lived abstemiously, he might reasonably equate himself spiritually even
with the pope.
The Franciscans achieved papal acceptance virtually at the last
moment of the Fourth Lateran of 1215. 38 Though St, Francis did not intend
his followers to form into a corporate group, they eventually did under the
guidance of Innocent III, holding property corporately. 39
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^ ^fu nrlls 1 t7Q,
The reactionary (over „1 ,l,o Tftird [.aloran Council under [.ucius III
( n 8 1 -I 1 85) led to a sweepinK anathematization ol many ol the new
religious ttroups. The zAd ah«/enda,„ ol I I «4, ur^ed hy an anti-here.ical
campaign ongoint! in Toulouse, justilied conriscatiuK Uie possessions of a
host or presumed heretics, ne8lecli„R to statins what the ollendins
doctrines were. Its techniques prelisured the Inquisition. Accordins lo
Holton, "Any three respectable people in each diocese could denounce, on
oath to their bishop, those who held secret conventicles or who dillered in
their way ol lile Irom the railhlul." 40
As the Fourth I.ateran Council approached, Innocent III attempted to
incorporate some disobedient groups into the hierarchical church. Making
a distinctio between irrevocable heretics and the merely disobedient, he
allowed "tertiary" Ilumiliati to preach about their personal experiences, so
long as they did not presume to teach doctrine. However, the Fourth
Lateran Council which convened on November 1, 1215 degenerated into a
tumult ol agitated attendees where one bishop was crushed to death and
others suffocated. 4
1
Although Innocent III is characterized among the most powerful
popes of the Middle Ages, primarily for effectively reaffirming Gregory
VIFs pronouncement that the pope recognized no human superior. This
was a claim which the llohenstaufen emperor Frederick II took as a
personal allront. As his predecessor Henry IV learned in his clash with
Gregory VII, the twice-excommunicated Frederick found himself on bended
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knee and in sackcloth begging the pardon of Innocent. However Frederick
II was to make war successfully against Innocent, although Frederick died
before he was able to consolidate those victories.
Innocent's personal style was pointedly unlike royalty, and
conspicuously in service to the poor. Following the manner of Diego and
Dominic in Languedoc before him, in 1207 Innocent gave up the rich
vestments of papal privilege and changed to a simple tunic of undyed wool.
Innocent III also advanced the agenda of social service for the embattled
Church by creating, writes Bolton, "one of the most interesting religious
corporations of the early thirteenth century by combining his new
hospital foundation of Santo Spirito with the old church of the Saxon school
... of Rome. One of his first acts as pope was to praise the Hospital of
Saint-Esprit in Montpellier for its corporal works of mercy - welcoming
strangers, feeding the hungry, clothing the poor, tending the sick, 42
Such progressive tendencies notwithstanding, the Fourth Lateran's
major finding was that no new orders would be allowed (with the notable
exception of the Franciscans whose lawyers claimed earlier oral approval).
A shred of reformism survived in the form of what could be considered
corporatism Canon XII introduced a Cistercian-like system of triennial
General Chapters, to be attended by all the house heads with the power to
legislate as a body. But the degree to which the Universal Church sought to
rigidly impose its own monolithic will was to ultimately number its days as
a world power.
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As Innocent III represented a peak in the imperial Church, so his
contemporao^ Frederick II Ilohenstaufen marked the apogee of the
imperial state. However it was Frederick who personified the coming age in
which the moral legitimacy of the Church was transformed into the
iiupreme authority of the state. Frederick II was grandson of Frederick I
Barbarossa (1152-1 190) and philosophical descendent of the Salian emperor
Henry IV (1056-1 106) - of Canossa fame as we have noted. 43 |„ year of
the Fourth Lateran, Frederick II Ilohenstaufen was careful to take the cross
at his coronation (at Aix) even though historically the Ilohenstaufen
represented the quintessential royal lineage of anticlericaiism.44
Kantorowicz's words, "The 1 lohenstaufens became a speciai imperial race -
the royal houses of Europe may be princely families but the Waiblings had
become stirpes caesarea, the imperial race of Rome". (The "Waiblings" are
also know as "Ghibellines" and form the other end of the
Ghibelline/Buondelmonti factions of Shakespearean fame).
It was Frederick II who personified the new era of state rulership,
becoming the ruler who would by his own definition "make all things new
again," deliberately paraphrasing St. Paul’s characterization of Jesus. The
phrase would turn up again three centuries later in Machiavelli’s
description of rulership in the Prince
.
45 Frederick II revoked all
privileges, grants, gifts and titles - including those held by the Church -
thus making all possession subject to his personal renewal. 46
personified the emerging reality of the centralized, secular state, and
exploited the years of simony which separated the Church's authority from
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its own ecclesiastical hierarchy. Renowned for his scientific abilities (he
produced a systematic research study on falcons) and linguistic abilities, he
.s considered a pioneer in modern administrative technique.
Years before Frederick's reign, during the time of Henry HI, the
ministenales had begun to replace the clerical bureaucracy, which
Frederick 1,'s grandfather Frederick 1 (Barbarossa) expanded, Frederick 11
perfected this new categoty of administrators, scientists and bureaucrats,
training secular replacements for Church administrators who were driven
off by the Investiture controversy, lie allowed them to be entirely
independent of Church education by the founding of the University of
Naples in 1224, a major milestone in government secularization of what
were originally Church functions.
But Frederick did not stop at developing a statist alternative to the
clerical profession. Frederick intended to absorb into his rule the Church's
divine claims of legitimacy, appropriating the legalistic notions and sacred
imagery which had been refined by the Decretists. Kantorowicz writes,
Frederick's self-definition as 'father and son of Justice' becomes
eaningful, since his claim to mediatorship in matters of Law
resulted from, and fell in with, the political thought of his centuryf Justice was the power 'intermediate between God and the worM’’
Academia de la Historia: Madrid, 1807) 11
) the Prince as the /ustitia animata necessarily obtained a
combined efforts of Roman Law andj^istotle, of legal and political philosophies, supported by traditionaltheological maxims. Justice and Prince as well as their mutual
relationship appeared in a new light. 47
The Hohenstaufen era not only usurped ecclesiastical office by the
usual means of simoniacal secular appointment, but more elegantly they
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nourished their ruiership as a new kind of "priest"
- priests of the iaw. a
"compiement and anti type to the ecdesiasticai order" adds Kantorowicv,
Arrogating much of the Church’s ruiing technique, the ilohenstaufen used
canon law diction for a legalistic theology of rulership, reconstructing the
Prince as the living law, the lex animata.
Cantor tells us that Bishop Otto of Freising did much to introduce this
new hybrid language of moralistic secular government by writing of his
nephew, Frederick I in Deeds of Frederick Harharossa. an "extremely
optimistic, highly emotional celebration of the moral and messianic
potentialities of imperial authority". 48 preising originally was harshly
ludgmental about secular power's propensities to coopt the Church, a
surprise coming from a Ilohenstaufen, even though a bishop. Yet Freising
came genuinely to believe in the potential of the charismatic hero,
inspiring the political mood in which. Cantor adds, "(tjhe twelfth century
state was absorbing into itself moral, emotional, and even divine qualities
to buttress legal absolutism and administrative power." 49 Freising is
compared favorably to his contemporary John of Salisbury, who similarly
advocated the moral sanction of the state (previously the domain of the
church) but many feel Freising was clearer in his vision, a true "Ipjrophet
of the independent self sufficient state."
After attacking and taking Ancona and Spoleto, Frederick II
personified the themes of his grand-uncle Freising. According to
Kantorowicz, Frederick seized on the coincidence of Christmas and his own
birthday (December 26th), and declared "Arise! direct your eyes to see the
wisdom and might of the Empire! And know ye us, your prince and gracious
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possessor. Prepare ye the way of the lord
that your Caesar may come.
.
." 50
take the bars off your doors
Not surprisingly Frederick II had a terrific group of fans among the
Nazis of the 1920s and 1930s. (A popular modern biography of the emperor
was published in Germany 1927 with a swastika on the cover). Frederick's
Caesaristic arrogation of spiritual leadership was to reappear in fascist
guise, in a reiteration of corporatist history, as we will seen in Chapter 3,
Monastic intermediation and Frederick II
The intermediary nature of the monastic corporations is clear in their
collaborations with Frederick II. The Salians and Hohenstaufen followed an
extensive Norman tradition which encouraged monastic scholars from the
Rhine land and Northern Italy to improve the Norman churches, and to
build and endow monasteries. The Cistercians in particular proved valuable
to the emperors' interests. Immediately following his Coronation at Alx
(where he took the cross) Frederick II courted Cistercian favor, making
many gifts to the Cistercians, appointing them to run castles, breed cattle,
and practice their skills as builders and architects. Kantorowicz' biography
of Fredenck says "The Cistercians were to act as 'Preservers of the
harmony between the Emperor and Pope' a scheme which had proved
fruitful under Barbarossa and Otto IV" 5 1 Prodigious farmers and steady
pioneers, the Cistercians were not just ascetics but impressed Frederick
with their 'passionate love' for the Virgin' free from earthly disturbance
and earthly broils," writes Kantorowicz. 52
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The affinity between religious and military discipline found an
ardent sponsor in Frederick II. Among the many connections between the
Grey Monks and spiritual Knights were those Spanish Cistercians who took
arms when Calatrava was threatened by the Moors. Frederick II traced the
origin of the spiritual knights and Cistercian monks to St. Bernard.
drawing the comparison between the Templar knights' romantic devotion
sobriety to Bernard and his order.53 The Templars' new knightly
inspiration was no longer centered on a mistress but on God himself
Frederick especially furthered the Teutonic knights - heavily
investing in this otherwise neglected group, and making a point of
attributing the original founding of the Teutonic order to Barbarossa.
According to Cantor, "The monastic form imbued them with corporate
efficiency and fanatical zeal." 54
Frederick exploited the tension between the regular clergy and the
orders. Some Franciscans and Dominicans were open supporters of the
Emperor against the clergy. "In opposition to the prevailing belief that the
Antichrist would come from without to attack the church, many saw the
destroyer within the bosom of the church herself" writes Kantorowicz. 55
While crossing the Tuscan Alps, Frederick II met the Minister General of
the Franciscans, Brother Elias of Cortona, which was, according to
Kantorowicz, the "first indication of the secret sympathy which united the
Franciscans and Ghibellines." 56 Brother Elias was a disciple of St. Francis,
who picked Elias as his successor. However Elias was removed from his post
in the spring of 1239 and joined up with Frederick, consulting and
informing the emperor about the confidential plans of pope Gregory IX. 57
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Frederick II had made much of ecclesiastical corruption, and managed
to direa the popular hostility toward ambitious priests at pope Innocent IV.
The pope had been forced to sell off fiefs and peddie high church offices in
order to support his war With Frederick issnina •ri ucncK, u g promissory notes on the
next available benefice or see. 58
Following a string of military defeats which Frederick had imposed on
the retreating papal forces, and on the verge of an unprecedented alliance
of secular rulers against the pope, Frederick II fell fatally ill, 59 on his
deathbed at the age of 56 (Dec. 13, 1250 in Foggia) he joined the Cistercian
order, donning their grey habit, asking for absolution and preparing a
generous will which restored to the Church her possessions (on condition
they 'render unto Caesar' as appropriate).
Review niscussion
We have seen how medieval Catholic canon law has contributed to the
modem legal definition of a corporation, particularly in the concept of a
jundic person. The medieval Church furthermore analogized the sacred
imagery of Jesus's body in order to justify the self-sufficient legitimacy of
the institutional Church, as the "Mystical Body of Christ." The Church's
juridic reasoning reveals the indelible mark of classic Roman law,
reformulated by the monk Gratian's Decretum, and so it has a particular
affinity for the claims to public authority which the Church used for
purposes of its institutional autonomy over and against the state.
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Although the Church's efforts to protect its priesthood and controi of
Church revenues antounted to creating a protected vocational category -
one of the definitive characteristics of corporatism
- the Church in its
broadest and most universal
"imperial" sense was not the most telling
corporatist example from this period. For the purposes of Cathoiic welfare
corporatism, the legal concept of an organic corporate "body" is more fully
revealed in the Church's subsidiary monastic corporations, rather than the
overarching state-unto-itself which the Church virtually was during the
Middle Ages. The Church at the level of the papacy sought to become its
own state, and in that sense, the monarchical Church's interpretation of
corporate-ness was as much a project of nationhood as it was a corporatist
phenomenon, A more fitting illustration from this era, in terms of Catholic
welfare corporatism, is the intermediary role which the monasteries
played, as a lesser part of a greater political unity, whether that greater
collectivity was the Church or the state. 60
The religious orders - both the fully acknowledged monastic orders
and the 'outlaw' lay orders - suggest an embryonic form of Catholic welfare
corporatism's mesocorporatist, sub-sector qualities. These organizations
were intermediate-sized regional groups whose work was varied and
versatile. They display primitive "multimodality" as social service
agencies, schools and hospitals, with professional roles in finance,
productive enterprise and technology. Their public administrative
capabilities, linked to the Church's traditional authority, rivaled the state
Itself. The organizational skills of orders like Cluny and the Cistercians,
their systematic coordination of subsidiary houses and their consolidation
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of land and productive enterprise, provide much of the foundation ior
many modern institutions of market capitalism.
The monasteries' approach to finance was a precursor to all modern
business corporations, but especially to nonprofit public welfare
organi^ations, including the often complex, nuanced and tempting realities
of work in a world of ambition and greed. The gift economy which the
monasteries participated in, with its characteristic family enmeshment
endowments, testamentary agreements, and implied "return" rewards iin
which simony had a major role), shared many of the traits of modem
philanthropy. Furthermore, much of the work for the monasteries was
what can be described in today's terminology as welfare production: social
service, medicine and education. The financial wherewithal to practice
these professions attracted the outright usurpations of the medieval state,
but in their most basic origins, they can be seen as fundamentally the
business of the Church and related societal agencies. Thus what nowadays
IS considered a devolution of the state to the Church is from the perspective
of this history quite the opposite.
Eventually the newly self-sufficient state, pioneered by the
Hohenstaufens, claimed much of the Church's realm for itself - notably
with help of monks as intermediaries - while borrowing heavily from
ecclesiastical notions of legitimacy. The medieval state's arrogation of the
Church's public status was to be repeated in the early twentieth century, in
the very name of corporatism. A corporatist vision of social unity, though
first conceived in good faith by the Church, and expressed in a language of
vocational sovereignty grounded in medieval Church tradition as we have
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seen, was to be once again absorbed and subordinated to the political
ambitions of the dictatorial state. This is the focus of Part Three to which we
now turn.
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CHAPTER 5
the historical context of rerum NOVARUM
Lntrodnrrinn
John Coleman writes that modern Catholic social teaching is both
"anti-capitaiisf and Tooted in the distinction between state and society/' l
Though anti-capitaiist" is perhaps too strong a term - the Church criticizes
capitaiism and condemns its abuses, but does not reject it outright -
Coieman is correct to assert that the Church stands as a counterpoint to the
state, both in the Catholic social teaching which emerges in the late 19th
century, and in its medieval origins. The institutionai distinction of the
Church from the state is part of Cathoiic tradition, defined during the
Middle Ages as we have seen, in a process which is made more apparent
using the eariy "genetic traces" of corporatism as a guide. From the traces
of corporatism which were visibie in the Middie Ages we now turn to the
late 19th century, in which corporatism emerged as a concrete politicai
idea and a vehicle for Catholic social teaching.
Chapters 5 and 6 will analyze the Church's approach to corporatism
both as a structure to respond to the social needs of the time, and as a
technique to serve the Church's own institutionai interests. It also
addresses the failures of corporatism in these purposes, and how the
Church failed corporatism as well because the Church was unable to fully
and realistically comprehend two new developments of the era: capitalist
business and party politics.
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Chapier Five explores the Catholic social doctrine tsynthiisized by I’ope
iini, with an emphasis on how ihe
Leo XIII’s encyclical Kcrum Novnn
medieval ituilds Iranted the corporatist rentedy ior tite
"workin^ntan's"
«ru«ttle with industrialization. Chapier Six traces ilte Church's
entansientent with the era's partisan political process and how l^ascist
politics ultintately absorbed and betrayed tiatholic corporatisnt. alon« with
a related movement, syndicalism. It includes a rellection on I'ius XI's
(luadraKcsinw Anno, a key 1931 encyclical written in secrecy which
became the .source ol much misinterpretation about Catholic corporatism.
This is lollowed by a brief look at corporatism in an international context
and as a special interest technique implicit in the conllict with fascism
over Catholic Action.
liiit.Kt’round ot Novnntj^^
By the nineteenth century the repercussions of the French revolution
had swung the political pendulum far away from Gelasian's 'two swords'
concept of dual rulership by Church and Empire to a post-Enlightenment
world in which the Church was on the run from the confiscatory
aggressions of the individualist, liberal secular state. Among the
repercussions of the French Revolution was the elimination of long
standing strata of intermediary institutions, in favor of the new vision of a
centralized state.
Among those intermediary institutions were the network of worker
guilds, which had survived from the thirteenth century. The new political
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fashion of Che tinces had little sympathy for the guilds' costly habits of
pnce fixing, craft secrets and resistance to innovation, in France, the
decree of Ailarde in March of 1791 declared that every person was "free to
do such business, exercise such profession, art or trade as he may choose"
but on the condition that they obtain a license from the government. 2 The
Le Chapelier law of June 14, 1791 banned all forms of economic coalitions.
Whether among labor or capital or combinations of workers and employers
and furthermore prohibited strikes or lockouts.3 The closing of the French
guilds spread rapidly from France to the rest of Europe, including the
Church's own guilds in the Papal States, the last of which (the bakers) had
been compelled to shut down by 1801, Thus an institutional layer of
independently constituted groups which mediated between the individual
and the state disappeared.
Napoleonic legislation of 1803 required that all workmen carry a
certificate (livret) administered by the police and contingent on a
satisfactory work history, verified by previous employers. Though capital
was presumably subjea to similar Impositions by the state, typically it was
labor which found itself substantially at a disadvantage and without
bargaining power. Though the Napoleonic repression was partially
repealed in 1848, the demise of the guilds for the Church was richly
symbolic of an expansionist state which arrogated to itself what once was
the realm of independent, intermediate, institutional Church. Thus the idea
of institutional autonomy which re-emerged as part of the Catholic
corporatist vision after the mid-nineteenth century was a Catholic
reasserting of anti-liberal, intermediary institutionalism, fostered by its
understandable concern about a giant, all-enveloping state.
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The revolutionary climate of 1848 precipitated a reactionary mood at
the Vatican, ultimately driving its approach to politics back to a pre-1789
status ^uo ante. Pope Pius IX ( 1 846-78) was forced to seek relume outside of
home, causing him to erase some of his early optimism over the prospects
of electoral democracy. 4 Keturning in 1850, accompanied by a French
expeditionaor force, Idus IX (Pio Nono) thereafter began a series of shrill
authoritarian protests. 5 m his 1 864 Syllabus of Errors he attacked freedom
of the press, universal suffrage and religious tolerance, as well as short-
sightedly dismantling a promising Catholic liberal movement by
condemning
"clerical liberal societies" and excommunicating its key
leader, Abbe Felicite de Lamennais (1782-1854). & The pope was
unashamedly backward: "if anyone thinks that the Roman I'ontiff can and
should reconcile himself and come to terms with modern civilisation, let
him be anathema." ^
The First Vatican Council in 1870 epitomized Pius IX’s empty
expressions of superiority by resurrecting the long dormant notion of
papal infallibility, claiming that the Church was owed an absolute
jurisdiction superior to any state on matters of faith, it was a feeble
reasserting of the Imperial papacy which Gregory VII and Innocent ill
had invoked so effectively centuries earlier. That very year the Kingdom of
Italy forcibly overtook the last of the papal states, confiscating extensive
Church property. As Rome was made the capital of the Italian nation, all
theological faculties in the Italian University system were abolished. The
petulant pope refused his state pensions and "retired" to his few remaining
acres, sulkily reterring to himself as a "prisoner" in the Vatican.
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in.
.ucce.s.,r Lo„ X,„ represented a sea change fn.n. ,n„st of Ute
C.hurch's ,.th centuo. intransigence, at.e,nptin« to en«a«e the
.nodern
world, although not without some wariness of its politics. Leo XilLs 1 89,
encyclical Kerum Novarum attempted to come to terms with secular
nationhood and its worldly politics, reformuiatins Ute Church’s nhssion to
involve itself concretely with the needs of common society rather than
persist in a fruitless legalistic battle about its special competence as a
temporal authority. Leo's papacy and the Catholic reform movements of
the time attempted to adapt corporatist ideas to the serious social needs of
the time. The expropriation of the Papal
.States, (the "Homan (Question")
though hardly forgotten, was now replaced by the urgent post-Marxist
"Social Question" - what the Church planned to do in the real world for
oppressed industrial workers and their families.
Leo had several nineteenth century precursors in his efforts to serve
the disadvantaged through the organized pursuit of justice, notably
Frederic Ozanam (181 3-53) who founded the St. Vincent de I'aul Society in
1 833. Lamennais was another major figure whose liberal critique of
industrial capitalism held it accountable for the widespread misery of
workingmen some seventy years before Kerum Novarum and twenty five
years earlier than the Communist Manifesto.
The image of a sodctas pcrfccta (a self sustaining community
independent from the rest of the world) endured in the corporatist vision
of self-directing vocational realms at arm's length from ruling secular
power. Serving both moral principle and its own institutional survival, the
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Church applied corporatism to the "Social Question" by reasserting a
medieval vision of an ordered organic unity, using the medieval Florentine
guilds as its model. Though not deeply wedded to the idea of actually
reinstating Florentine guilds, the notion of vocationally-based guilds
running the state, rather than being run by It, must have appealed to the
Church's wounded pride.
Neither socialist nor capitalist, individualist nor collectivist, the
Church cast a broad net, criticizing and synthesizing the political trends of
the times. When the Church took a confrontational position, it correctly
assessed the democratic signs of the times and took the side of the masses.
Identifying with the losers and the marginalized in the capitalist game, the
workers who were oppressed by the new forces of industrialism, the small
shop owners and tradesmen intimidated by vast business monopolies, and
the landed aristocracy who found their old form of power suddenly
inconsequential, just as the Church was shoved aside by the new state.
Ilarmoni/.ine Labor ;^ nd Canital
Leo XIII’s 1891 encyclical Rerum Novarum,{Rerum), subtitled "On the
Condition of Labor," was dedicated to the "large majority of very poor
working men, isolated and defenseless," whose plight had stirred debate
among Catholic social reformers. 8 Among the Catholic intellectuals
involved in the discussion were those who aimed to thoroughly restructure
capitalism and others who wished to simply improve it. One way in which
the groups were divided was by how closely they expected to combine the
powers of employers with the rights of workers.
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Included among the early Catholic corporatists were romantic
reconstructionists led by Austrian Baron Karl von Vogelsand (1819-91
)
Whose complete reiection of capitalism proposed to give iabor a direct ™ie
.n the control of capital, 9 similarly, frele Verem/,un,, a group convened
.n 1883 at the castle of Haid in Bohemia, vowed to sweep away the concept of
labor as a commodity and reconceive it as a true partner in the "corporate"
(organic) reorganization of industry, Vogelsang and his French disciples
Marquis Rene de la Tour du Pin (1834-1925) and Count Albert de Mun (1841-
1914) were among the first to promote the medieval guilds as ideal worker-
owner cooperatives.
The prevailing view however came to be that of Bishop Wilhelm
Emmanuel von Ketteler of Mainz (181 1-77), a meliorist who was wary of
capitalism's abuses but saw fit to stay within the system to criticize its
morals. The first to fight for workers' rights legislation in Germany, Leo
Xlll called Kettler "my great precursor" and embraced his moderate
approach, reinforced by the corporatlst prescriptions of the Fribourg
Union. 10
Intemrcrin^ rhp r.^,iicjc
Kettler and Leo were less radical in their interpretations of the guilds
than were the French aristocrats. Rather than insisting that industrial
capitalism revert to the late Middle Ages - an era no doubt more congenial
to landed gentry like du Pin and de Mun - Leo Xlll emphasized instead that
the associations suggested by the guilds "should be adapted to the
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requirements of the age in which we live." 1 1 The idea was to affect the
quality of reiations between iabor and capitai, not to change the basic
meaning of capital itself.
In Italy, the mood was similarly less revolutionary than among the
Vogelsang followers. The Catholic sociai reform congress Opera del
Congressi in 1874 urged representatives of mutuai aid societies to foliow "as
closeiy as possible" the ancient corporations of arts and trades, without
taking the historical precedent to mean the revocation of the capitaiist
system. 12 In 1877 the Congress at Bergamo struck a benign and familiai
note, proposing (notably In manufacturing) a "fraternal union between
the community of workers and the upper classes, this being the essence of
the Christian corporation." 13 By the time of Rerum Novarum, the question
persisted as to whether a "corporation" shouid consist of a compiete fusion
of boch empioyers and workers, or of worker associations separate from
employers?
Writing in Rerum Novarum of "those institutions and organizations
which afford opportune assistance to those in need," Leo XIII praised
"societies for mutual help; various foundations by private persons for
providing for the workman, and for his widow and his orphans.
.
. and what
are called "patronages'" (orphanages and rest homes). He then states that
"most important of all are Workmen’s Associations," mentioning in the next
sentence "what excellent results were effected by the Artificer's Guilds of a
former day." 14
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Separate
"Workmen’s Associations
The innovative ieap which Kerun, Novarum then makes is to appiy
this reference to the idea of independent iabor associations, a rentarkabie
step tor an institution as conservative as the Cathoiic Church. This almost
didn't happen, except for the last minute influence of Baltimore's Cardinal
Gibbons, who caused section 36 of Remm Novarum to be changed. The
beginning of the second paragraph of section 36 had read simply,
"most
important of all are Workmen's Associations." But according to Mueller.
Gibbons changed a subsequent line to clarify what Leo meant by these
"Associations." The later line now reads, "It is gratifying to know that there
are actually in existence not a few societies of this nature, consisting e/ther
of workmen alone, or of workmen and employers together, but it were
greatly to be desired that they should multiply,
.
." 15 geo was thus
encouraging a trend which he felt was already in existence and
furthermore, endorsed the idea that a perfectly reasonable pan of this
trend were associations consisting exclusively of labor. However it is also
important to note that the context in which he referred to these
organizations were as welfare benefit institutions: there is no specific
reference in this passage to collective bargaining agencies whose main
work was negotiating contracts over wage pricing.
In Germany and Austria the Vogelsang-school anti capitalists had
resisted the idea of separate unions. They wanted the system entirely
changed on the workingman's terms, and preferred the absolute mutual
identification of labor and employer which was implicit in their
interpretation of the guilds. They argued that separate unions for
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workmgmen would incite class hatred. 16 The anti capitalists wanted to
exploit the guild form as a pretext to overtake the capitalist system, and the
employers knew this. (This was precisely Edmondo Rossoni's intent for the
Fascst Corporations). Employers, for their part, were Justifiably wary that
mtegral' corporatism would blur the dominant role of capital.
The guilds and functional representation
in other ways the medieval guilds were an awkward fit to modern
realities. The late thirteenth century Florentine guilds achieved a type of
functional representation which not only had 'self regulating' authority in
their own lines of work, but became the entire community's governing
apparatus, as a type of legislature or magistracy, rather than as an
industry-specific consultative panel, in 1280 as part of a Ghibelline-Guelf
ruling compromise, the so-called Fourteen (guilds) each elected their own
representatives to various government committees which had city-wide
powers, more than those strictly pertaining to their own businesses. This
was more than professional autonomy, this was a overarching system of
representative government. Notably, the system eventually was collapsed
into "one harmonious entity" run by the aristocracy, an arrangement
purchased through the specious "participation" of lower guild
representatives who were appointed to powerless committees. 17
The idea of functional representation in the form of a parliamentary
chamber did appear in Italian Catholic reform circles during the mid
nineteenth century, with a proposition in 1851 to add an additional
chamber to the Italian Parliament made up of skilled professionals from
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var.ous economic sectors. Interestingly, the corporations were expected to
be very large economic classifications with societywide impact (c.f. Lowi's
encompassing groups"). The hope was that a nation united under the
Catholic religion could reasonably determine which sectors were "the true,
organic parts of society and not the mincemeat interests of 300 or 400
persons represented in the Chamber ..." 18
would be large enough to be Identified with the concerns of the entire
nation, rather than entirely focused on self-regarding issues.
This concept of a vocationally-based chamber of parliament was
eventually instituted by the fascist corporativists in Italy, and in other
countries, notably Portugal. The idea was briefly reconsidered in post WW
II Italy, but the notion of extending the idea of functional representation to
the point of an additional chamber of parliament is not explicit in any
Catholic encyclical, even though it has been associated with primarily
"Catholic" countries.
Traces of Societal Corporatism in Workmen's Associations
It also appears that at this point Rerum Novarum is suggesting
organizational principles more along the lines of "societal corporatism"
than "state corporatism." Referring to worker associations, Leo
distinguishes "these lesser societies [from] the society which constitutes
the State" because they have different purposes and ends. Civil society, or
public society," as Leo puts it, is "concerned with the interest of all in
general" but he seems to say that societies which are formed on the basis of
professional interests are in the state but are not of the state, to paraphrase
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Augustine. He writes in section 37 of Rerun. Novnrum.
"But the societies
wh,ch are formed in the bosom of the State are railed pnVate and justly so
because their immediate purpose is the private advantage of the associates,"
and he contmues in section 38, "Particular societies, then, although they
exist withm the State and are each a part of the State, nevertheless cannot
be prohibited by the State.
. . For to enter into a ’society' of this kind is a
natural right of man, and the State must protect natural rights, not destroy
them.
.
19
This does not entirely arrive at societal corporatism, but it does
squarely place competence for the creative power of association in the
hands of society rather than the state. It could be argued that "formed in
the bosom of the state" suggests that they are creatures of the state, but the
imagery indicates that the state’s role is one of nurturance rather than
conception, and this would be consistent with Leo’s admonition that the
state support, and not to prevent, the spontaneous formation of
associations, other than those which are "evidently bad, unjust, or
dangerous to the State. 20
When Leo states that these "lesser societies" are different from "the
societies which constitute the state" - it can be taken to mean that they are
not constitutive of the state, nor do they have "public" interests on their
mind, but instead are dedicated to the needs of their own professional
communities.21 This is also not entirely indicative of societal corporatism.
With regard to welfare-relief, which is clearly the context in which the
whole discussion occurs, Leo's idea seems at that point to propose
corporations which would "take care of their own" rather than to make
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c.a.ms on government. This is consistent with the institutional autonomy
which Church history has favored, but it was written at a time when the
notion of the state was not yet fully consonant with the "welfare-state "
Foilowinit Bismarck's lead, state welfare relief was about to maritinaiire the
Church and other "charitabie" anencies. Thus, though Leo may not be have
been proposing a "societal" type of corporatist scheme, neither is he
particularly endorsing
"state" corporatism.
There are limits to the clarity which 20th centuty classifications of
corporatism can bring to its 19th century origins, but to the extent that
Kerum Novanim argued a natural law right to self-constituting
associations, it provides some evidence that the original intentions of
Catholic corporatism shared certain inclinations towards societal
corporatism, rather than the capitulation to state dominance Indicated by
state corporatism. The time for capitulation to the state did come to pass
during the era of fascism, but at that point the most the Church was able to
do was make an indirect point (in Quadragesima Anno) of how this departed
from its corporatist principles.
The Guilds and the definition of "workers"
Another problem in adapting the medieval guild model to modern
circumstances was in how "workers" were construed. Mueller points out,
the guilds did not originally comprise employers and employees.
Journeymen and apprentices who were under the protection of the guild
were not 'employees' in the modern sense, but students of a craft.
.
." 22
When Leo suggested that the guilds "be adapted to the requirements of the
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age m which we live” he added little more advice than to say that 1891 was
an age of "different customs, and of more numerous requirements ” 23 Thus
the medieval class of artisans was an inadequate analogy to the modern
wage slave’ whose assembly line labor was easily replaced and
"commoditized."
Medieval nostalgia and aristo.„^|.
The noblesse oblige of the nineteenth century guild-minded romantic
reformers hadn’t yet fully grasped the nature of modem industrial capital,
thinking more in the anachronistic terms of artisans and latifundia than
in the ascendant reality of capitalist finance. 24 More often what the
Church evoked was a moralistic etiquette among the upper classes, a
paternalistic protective largesse for the less fortunate of the Christian
'family'. 25
The body metaphor of Catholic corporatism invites similar problems
with aristocratic diction, in the sense that some parts of the human body
are clearly more important than others and that their special, preordained
roles should not ever be changed. Rerun, endorses ’’natural” hierarchies
(’’unequal fortune is the necessary result of unequal condition”) and
inherited privilege through one’s ’’station in life.” 26 Coleman notices this
aristocratic influence and asks why ”.
.
.
every other name of notables
mentioned in the history books as influencing Rerum was a count, marquis
. .
. or industrialist and that no militant union organizers had any impact
on the document?" 27
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In rejecting socialist proposals to abolish private property Rerun, (in
secuons 4-15) classifies private property as a "natural right" and prontotes
this type of ownership for as many of the working class as possible,
arguing that it is a necessao' aid to parental responsibility. But here again
the idea of property is based on a poetic evocation of hearth and home,
rather than on an economic analysis of productive property in the factory
and warehouse.
atleinpt to reimcrprer the modem
r»rr^rnrl"r
Perhaps the medieval color to Catholic social ethics at the time of
Rerum Novarum was meant to help put a human face on the modern
concept of a "corporation." At the end of the 19th century, the business
corporation represented impersonal commerce, driven by impossibly
expensive machinery, controlled by distant investors. The business
corporation was Industrialization's great vehicle, but what capitalism made
of It was far different from personalistic notions of corporate-ness
enshrined in Catholic tradition. The Middle Ages helped to evoke an image
of simpler, more pastoral times.
In 1953, John Courtney Murray described the cultural understanding
of the business corporation in Leo XIII's era as though
a new master’ had appeared, the corporation. And, as the American
aphorism had it, 'Corporations have neither bodies to be kicked nor
souls to be damned'. They were seemingly immune from the
restraints that conscience had imposed on the old 'master', the
individual, in an age when economic relationships were generally
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personal. The private conscience had ceased to be
of social control" 29
an effective means
As we have seen, Catholicism since the Middle Ages could construe the
idea Of a "corporation" even in sacred terms, as an immortal assembly
termed into the Mystical Body of Christ. By extension, organicism also
informed Catholic ideals of corporate social unity ("organicism" is used
explicitly in this sense in Quadragesima Anno). 30 what the early Catholic
corporatists seemed to be searching for by evoking the Middle Ages and its
guilds was a redeeming vision of the corporation, as a "legal personality"
with a pronounced moral, ethical, Christian orientation, not simply an
"entity." To do this it drew its imageo- from a time before big business and
big government changed everything, including the stature of the Church.
IlK specter of the liberal state- Distrihutists ,nd nomthv
Another modern event which was viewed as frightening and
impersonal was the centralized liberal state. The state, for years hostile to
the Church, banishing guilds and their communities of mutual aid, and now
threatened to absorb all social service. Addressing the "Confraternities,
Societies, and Religious Orders which have arisen by the Church's
authority," Rerum Novarum notes that, "In many places the State had laid
violent hands on these communities
... it has placed them under the civil
law, taken away their rights as corporate bodies, and robbed them ..." 31
Therefore the Church had good reason to hold the state at a certain
distance.
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The Catholic
"Distributivists" of the early twentieth century, led by
Chesterton. Belloc. Eric Gill and father Vincent McNabb. warned of an
emerging
"servile state" whose taxation imposed involuntary burdens on
the middle class, in the name of the welfare state. Pius Xll continued this
critique years later with an equivalent term, "the providential state"
Whose implications threatened to take away many of the roles of the
Church and other traditional mediating institutions. 32 consistent with the
Church's emphasis on property as personal (and agricultural), rather than
industrial, they saw private property - meaning mostly family farms - as
the best remedy for the liberty and self sufficiency of the masses.
Today's persistent cry of less-taxes-more-property echo the Catholic-
populist social prescriptions of Hilaire Belloc's 1912 book The
His and G.K. Chesterton's advocacy of "distributivism" promoted private
property for all so that each could be self sufficient and "fend for
themselves against efforts of governments to constrict freedom through
passage of coercive laws in the name of humanitarianism and social
security." 33 gelloc held that labor becomes "seivlle" when the state
imposes taxes under the compulsion of [welfare state] positive law which is
"performed for the benefit of others who are under no such compulsion
[i.e.. the capitalist oligarchy]." 34 gelloc. another admirer of the medieval
guild system, (an "excellent consummation of humanity") blames the
sixteenth century British expropriation of monastic lands as setting the
stage for the aristocracy's narrow concentration of wealth and its eventual
arrogation of industrial production. 35 According to the Distributivists,
hugely disproportionate wealth "rose upon the ruins of religion" and the
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consequential poverty which resulted finds dubious reme
whose answer is to tax the
dy in a state
masses into
"servitude". 36
Dorothy Day's Catholic Worker movement in the early twentieth
century also promoted an alternative to the modern state, a type of
anarchistic agrarian self-help vision. Her collaborator Peter Maurin
coined the phrase "sreen revolution" for the farming communes he
proposed in order to provide land and homes for the unemployed. They
advocated "hospice houses." houses of hospitality provided in a spirit of
mutual aid, as an alternative to surrendering to the state the works of
loving charity provided by the Church and society. 37
Day's approach had ties to Catholic corporatism in its appeal to
institutional liberty. Commenting on an article by Kob Ludlow, one of the
editors of Ihe Catholic Worker
,
Dorothy Day wrote
both among Catholics and anarchists in general a great deal of
misunderstanding comes about by a confusion of the terms State
society. Father Luigi Sturzo's book Inner l aws!.f
MKiifly IS the best Catholic treatment of the subject I have read liebrings out the point that the State is only one form of governmentWhen you analyze what anarchists advocate (particularly the
anarcho-syndicalists) it really boils down to the advocacy ofdecentralized self- governing bodies. It /s a formTgovernment
The Distributivists and the Catholic Worker Movement both in their
own ways embodied a Catholic response to the modern "welfare state."
Though they were not strictly corporatist, the did share values in the spirit
of the guilds, particularly as traditionalist counterpoints to the emerging
trends of modern state administration.
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Igniolo's lom()rati.t
By the end of the nineteenth century Giuseppe Tonioio's synthesis
finaiiy resoived some of the guiid iimitations by incorporating modern
business concepts into an institutional intermediacy between the state and
the individual. Consistent with Catholic principles, it had a moral tone, in
his words, "a true and proper instrument of defense for salaried labor" ("un
vero e proprio strumento di difesa del lavoro salariato." 39
Tonioio's three-point definition of corporation has both structural and
procedural dimensions: (1, as a representative structure
,2) as a system and
method of claiming rights (as correlates of duty) and (3) as an agency of
promotion, specifically "an autonomous and permanent association.
. . with
the aim of representing, protecting and furthering the various interests
(material and moral) of each class, coordinated with those of other
hierarchical classes of society”. +0 |,e makes the distinction between the
two types of corporations, simple in which the corporation arises from
solely owners or solely workers, and mixed in which owners and workers
enter the same corporation, echoing the old dichotomy sparked by
Vogelsang.
In 1894 (two years after the founding of the Italian Socialist Party)
Toniolo issued a rejoinder to the socialism through the Unionc cattolica per
gli studio social!, endorsed by the Opera del Congress!. Speaking in the
language of modern capitalist finance, he recommending profit-sharing
and stock participation for workers (anticipating (luadragesimo thirty
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seven years later), lie begins with the fantlllar antl-liberal moralist tone,
"These professional unions do not have a merely economic purpose, but are
ultimately aimed at shaping into an organic whole what is now a society
pulverized by wide-spread and pernicious individualism.” Yet he clings to
the Church's patronizing tradition,
"lb]ut if i, is repugnant to the upper
classes of property owners and capitalist to join the lower classes in mixed
associations.
. . the latter will accept that workers join professional
exclusively." 41
unions
The net result was very advanced for the time: the Church was
weighing in on the side of labor unions. The organicists' dream of
"integral" or "mixed" unions would exist only as a figure of speech, a broad
sentiment of fraternal goodwill. Structurally and politically, workers
would contend for their rights by their own representation, rather than
petition for acceptance as part of an organic whole in which capital was
the head and labor did the heavy lifting.
Toniolo’s attempt at a neo-guildist modern corporatism nevertheless
retained the tone of condescension which seems to constantly dog the
Church. Romantic tradition also affected the Church’s approach to electoral
politics, and contributed to the alienation of two politically-minded Catholic
priests, the visionaries Romolo Murri and Luigi Sturzo, fathers of Christian
Democracy.
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CIIAITOK 6
aUADRAGESIMO ANNO AND Till- FASCIST HETKAYAI.
The Church pnrlv pnliljr ;
Catholics were seeking a type of economic regulation which was above
party politics, and corporatism appeared to provide the vehicle. Heinrich
IVsch, ,S.,|„ ( 1 854-1926) the architect of "solidarism," typilled this approach,
envisioning industrial or professional organizations which were neither
labor unions nor political parties, but rather self governing vocational
groupings which presumably would keep politics and government at a
distance. Carlo Francesco Weiss, in describing the Church's discomfort with
electoral politics writes, "l-olitical interests were considered unreal,
political organization a superfluous and malignant excrescence to be
eradicated from the spirit and institutions of the Welfare Community." 1 If
Catholics entered I'arliament, they would have to risk the moral
compromises ol combinazioni, back room agreements with shady
collaborators. What reform-minded Catholics would discover, however, was
that electoral politics would become unavoidable, even in the case of
corporatism.
In 1953 John Courtney Murray wrote that "the Church is not a sort of
industry council' nor one of the ordincs of which IMus XI speaks in
Quadragesima Anno, clarifying Leo XIII." 2 Murray explains that because
the Church s creation was prior to and independent from the state, "the
Church as a society is already 'there'.
. . Her existence does not derive from
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some collective human act of free association
, . .
3
Church - as the universal Christian family - is neither “state corporatist"
oor “social corporatist" but a preordained natural state of htnnan
alMliation. Neither is the institutional Church comfortable with the
suKt-estion that sacred imagery can be reduced to the needs of a lobbying
organization.
Nevertheless as the following account details, the Church as a worldly
institution was fully capable of acting corporatistically for its own
vocational interests, with self-regulating autonomy as its goal. This is not
what modern Catholics usually mean by the Mystical Body of Christ, hut it is
conceptually related to the institutional Church’s relations with the state.
In the early to mid twentieth century, so ambitious was the Church to
achieve its ends, in fact, that it distorted its own earliest notion of
corporatism in order to assist the partisan ends of the ruling power. The
question was not whether corporatism was political, but in what sen,vfwas
it political: as an principle of social regulation or as a tool of electoral
influence? What began as the Catholic corporatism’s abstemious disdain for
political life turned tt) a fever of political passion over the worst possible
suitor, fascism.
The descent into the political thicket
In 1 886, sixteen years after the expropriation of the Papal States and
twenty two years after the Syllabus of Hrrors, Pius IX decided that the best
response to electoral democracy for Catholics in 1 886 was no response at all
Referring to the use of the ballot, he told Catholics, " Considering all the
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crcumsunces
- it Is not expedient" (non 4
.eforntist successor
Leo xm was iess hostile to eiectorai poiitics but stiii very skeptical about
the calls tor a Catholic political party, commenting that "to tie the Church
to a party and to expect, moreover, that she should offer assistance in
overcoming one’s political opponents is grossly to abuse religion". 5 This is
generally where the Church stands in 1998. but the reason that it does
relates directly to what befell the Church politically in this era of early
corporatism.
For all the posturing about apolitical purity, moral advocacy by
Catholic corporatist groups had unavoidable political repercussions,
especially when it specified social remedies. Catholic social reform
movements soon represented big numbers: by the 1890s there were 4000
parish groups, 700 workers societies, twenty four daily papers and 155
periodicals. 6 The disingenuousness of the non expadiev,^ not lost on
Komulo Murri, who recognized the power of vote abstention as an active
weapon against the state, lie considered it a device to buy time while
organizing a new type of Catholic political party, one which was free of
ecclesiastical authority. ^
The "Opera del Congress! " the Catholic Congress, begun in 1 874 was
among the broadest-based of the Catholic intellectual movements in Italy.
Basically it was an auxiliary of the Holy See which convened
representatives of mutual aid societies and religious groups to study social
reform. Similar to the corporatist Fribourg Union and other Catholic study
groups, it was to have a portentous role in the Church’s encounter with
party politics. Though first conceived in the early corporatist pose as an
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"apohtical" social remedy, it plainiy served the institutionai speciai
interests of the Church. The Opera delCo„, Webster writes, was
second,ng the aspirations of Pius IX & Leo XIII towards more or less
integral restoration of the rights of the Church." 8
The pope and the bishops were invested in a conciiiatory working
relationship with the state, whiie some members of the Cathoiic Congress
were laying the organisational groundwork for a mass Catholic party. Don
Luigi Sturzo shared Murri's sense for the poiitical impiications of Cathoiic
association, though more astuteiy playing on what amounted to the
Vatican's clear party disaffection, stressing the "need to form a social
conscience
... to prepare the masses for the struggle and triumph over
socialism." 9 this way Sturzo was technically anti-political, against the
Socialist party.
The Opera del Corigressi 's position as a political activist group with no
partisan agenda would prove difficult to maintain, as would its other
intended limitation, namely, subordination to Church hierarchical
direction ("confessionalism"). Murri had received a hesitant approval from
Leo XIII to use the expression "Christian Democracy" to describe his
movement, which was partly framed in terms of reviving the medieval
alliance between the papacy and the guild-dominated Italian communes.
This was largely Toniolo’s vision, but Murri eventually put his youthful
emphasis on radical transformation. Leo's approval stipulated the group's
submission to Bishops' authority, but when Murri and other young radicals
overtook the Opera dei Congress!, Leo's successor Pius X dissolved it in 1904.
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Murri went on to form the Lega Democrarir^ m ,H ut t ca Nazionale in 1905, not as
a Pontical party but ostensibly as a proletarian anti youn, peoples' outfit.
This t.me though Murri promised independence from ecclesiastical control.
P.US X was meanwhile preaching a tripartite approach for Catholics, a
coordination of popular, electoral, and economic Catholic lay forces, but
Murri saw it as another attempt by the Vatican to subordinate all Catholic
politicism to the Church hierarchy, 10 M^rri was ultimately
excommunicated, accused of Modernist leanings, and his League
condemned, llis close colleague Don Luigi Sturzo was instructed never to
contact Murri. On the day of Murri's excommunication. March 19, 1909,
Murri was elected as a deputy in the Italian Parliament.
The question at the time of Pius X was not whether the Church should
«ay out of politics, but who should control the politics of Catholics, In 1904
a year alter his installation as pope, Pius X allowed Catholics to use the
ballot in "emergencies," which virtually delivered an electoral victory for
the liberal democrat Giolitti, whose rise was indiscreetly brokered by Count
Gentiloni, the head of the Electoral Union of Catholic Action. 1
1 (The
electoral "throw weight" of Catholic Action was later seized upon by
Mussolini, which marked the beginning of the end of his rapport with Pius
XI). By the election of 1913 Filippo Meda warned the pope that he was
selling votes as the head of an electoral organization. The Church organ
Osservacore Romano persisted in exploiting the anti-socialist political
rationale, describing Catholics as the 'safety anchor' for Liberals in the
struggle with the Socialists. It attributed 228 seats won in Parliament to the
effect of Catholic voting.
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OUtHjrfmcsimn Anrif)
The Single most far reaching public statement at a pope's disposal is
the encychcal letter, and more than any other encyclical. Quadra«es/mo
^ttno
,"aA" or
"Quadra.es/mo'O is the central document ot Catbollc-school
corporatism. 13
^ad inevitable political repercussions, but because of its
(and the era's) political naivete, and because of the narrow intellectual
circumstance of its drafting, Quadragesima's attempt to chart a middle
course between socialists and
"individualists" fell prey to fascist distortions.
Quadragesima was conceived as a continuation of Leo XlII's Rerum (its
name refers to the forty years since Rerum's publication) but it is also a
telling example of the limits of papal politiclsm, despite such an illustrious
pedigree. Because of Pius XI's isolated, cloistered perspective Quadragesima
has been subject to wildly divergent interpretations, and although at times
It is truly inspired, it was not immune to the contamination of its era.
Nell Breuning’s original draft of Quadragesimo Anno
Thirty years after the drafting of Quadragesimo Anno its ghostwriter,
Oswald Nell-Breuning commented on a section which he says "bears the
chief blame for the total misunderstanding of the picture of order, or
rather outline of social order, developed in QA. . . " 14 Nell-Breuning, who
worked in strict secrecy after meeting Pope Pius XI exactly once, was
responsible for writing the entire encyclical with the exception of a key
passage, paragraphs 91-96, which were written by the pope himself and
given to Nell-Breuning to incorporate into the text verbatim. The pope
apparently intended the paragraphs as a "benevolent nod" to Mussolini
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who the pope feared (correctly) would be infuriated by a message the pope
planned to release a short time later ( ’Non Abhiamo Bisogno ") which
deplored the Fascist assaults on members of Catholic Action. >5
Nell Breuning was "completely dismayed" when three years after the
release of Quadragesima the pope publicly praised what he called the "QA
state" established in Austria's constitution in May 1934. For Nell-Breuning,
the term "QA state" was a contradiction of terms. He writes in 1971," The
encyclical wants to establish no specific form of state: the state should
merely be relieved of tasks that are not its business. What should be curbed
IS capitalistic class society, centered on the labor market; it should be
converted into a class free society.
. .
" 16 Nell-Breuning disavows the
statist impositions of those regimes calling themselves
"corporatist" - a
disavowal which the Pope never made. Nell Breuning states flatly that Pius
XI never really understood the phenomenon of fascism. " 17
Nell-Breuning traced the statist misinterpretations of QA to the deeply
anti capitalist prescriptions of Vogelsang and Ignaz Selpel, which were
thought at the time to have influenced QA. According to Nell-Breuning, no
Austrian cooperated on the development of Quadragesima, instead Nell-
Breuning credited the thinking behind QA to the Konigswinter Group, a
group he frequently participated in and whose discussions he reports were
based chiefly on ".
. . the 'extremely liberal' thinking of Gustav Grundlach.
Ills was the expression used by Nuncio Pacelli (later Pius Xll) 'harmonious
cooperation of professions,"' >8 Such "harmony and cooperation" was some
distance from the state-centric, radicai restructuring of the control of
capital which some Austrians were advocating, (and many fascists)
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although Q_A found itself open to lust surh n e .j such a radical interpretation by its
ambivalent conception of property rights, which some saw as
"cryptosocialist." 19
Nell-Breuning blames another key misunderstanding about
Quadragesima on the encyclical's use of the Latin expression
"curatio"
(management), which had enormous implications for (iA's position on the
role of labor in the ownership of capital. Apparently this lost a great deal
in the translation from his original German version, so that what he
intended as "sharers in management" resulted in "sharers in ownership."
lie writes, "The German version of QA that 1 prepared
. . . lets you
recognise unambiguously that it understands
'sharers in ownership ' and
sharers in management' are two different concepts
. . . 'sharers in
management' meant 'sharers in administration.'" 21
The offending sentence about capital "ownership" appears in sealon
65 of Quadragesima, although § 64 does explicitly reject the idea that "the
wage contract is essentially unjust." Nevertheless, § 65 advises that the
wage contract "when possible, be modified somewhat by a contract of
partnership" so that "wage-earners are made sharers of some sort in the
ownership, or the management, or the profits." The poetic ambiguity of
sharing ownership - "somewhat" and "some sort" - left open a variety of
interpretations, profit sharing among them. But many interpretations
defaulted to what were to become extremely aggressive interpretations of
state intervention, characteristic of the socialist and fascist programs of
the time.
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Quadragesima's position against fascism
Quadrages,mo Anno, especially in the context of 1931 Italy, attempted
to ob,e« to fascist statism, although not hy name, and in passive voice only
In obhquely addressing the Vidoni Fact, by which the Fascist party
absorbed ail labor syndicates and corporations, Quadragesima addresses the
"legal monopolies" which the state grants to "special cooperative
corporations" so that "it alone can represent workingmen and employers,
and it alone can conclude contracts and labor agreements." 22 Maintaining
third-person passive grammar, Quadragesima comments, "there are some
who fear the State is substituting itself in the place of private initiative."
imposing a new version of corporative institutions which are "excessively
bureaucratic and political.
. .
" 23 This adds evidence of Catholic
corporatism's departure from "state corporatist" values, in the sense of a
pronounced state dominance of vocational corporations, although
(understandably) it was not stated confrontationally.
Earlier in Quadragesima, the position toward the state is more directly
critical, centering on a clear exposition of subsidiarity. The passage makes
no mistake about its context: "When We speak of the reform of the social
order it is principally the State We have in mind." 24 Then appears the
definitive statement of subsidiarity:
".
. . it is an injustice, a grave evil and a
disturbance of right order for a larger and higher organization to arrogate
to Itself functions which can be performed efficiently by smaller and
lower bodies. Here is the bedrock concept of subsidiarity, conceived
essentially as a barrier against excessive state involvement, underscoring
its "societal" corporatist qualities.
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But the Vatican's insistent attack on the "twin evils" of individualism
and collectivism
- meaning liberals and socialists - blurred Quadra.es,mo's
ascst cr.t.que, such as it was. Laying blame primarily on
"Individualism "
aA ntakes a point which on its face is innocent enough, in fact it continues
m Cathohc and communitarian social doctrine almost sixty years later
namely, the necessity for mediating institutions between the state and the
ndividuahsm, QA contends, damaged the organic links among these
once nourishing institutions (e.g„ the medieval guilds) "leaving thus
Virtually only individuals and the State. Social life lost entirely its organic
form. The State, which now was encumbered with all the burdens borne by
associations rendered extinct by it, was in consequence submerged and
overwhelmed.
. .
" 26 The fascist state at the time of Quadra.es,mo is thus
spared accountability or blame, described mildly as "ovenvorked," although
such careful deference to fascist sensitivities is understandable
considering the repressive climate of the time.
The problem was that charting a middle way between the evils of
Individualism and Collectivism were not only the Catholic corporatists, but
the Fascists who aped them as well with their version of corporatism,
"corporativism". Quadragesima Anno does its best to define its concept of
association as "in a true sense autonomous," and one which preexists and
transcends the state (a point sharply made weeks later in Non Abbiamo
Bisognio when referring to Mussolini's predations against Catholic Action).
27 But QA's vaguely conceived antipathy toward liberal capitalism left the
door open for a non-socialist, hierarchical and authoritarian statism.
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Quadr.,c.s,Vno. idea of social justice and the activist state
In its can for social justice, QuacJra,esln,o strikes some familiar
Marx, St notes, though without giving credit to Marx. QuaUr.,c.l„o
describes two widely divided classes in dramatic terms, "The first, small in
numbers, enjoyed practically all the comforts.
. . The second class,
comprising the immense multitude of workingmen.
.
. oppressed by dire
poverty.
. ."
impoverishment of the many was
quite sat.sfactoo' to the wealthy, who looked upon it as the consequence of
.nevitable and natural economic laws." 29
^1 furthermore softens his
position on socialism, naming it "much less radical" than communism,
allowing that "it even mitigates and moderates,
.
. class warfare and the
abolition of private property." 30
There are several passages in Quadragesimo which amount to a
Catholic "labor theory of value," although again, there is no credit to Marx
First quoting Leo Xlll's Rerun,, "Tt is only by the labor of workingmen that
States grow rich,'" Pius continues, "The huge possessions which constitute
human wealth are begotten by and flow from the hand of the workingman.
" 31
The problem was that in Quadragesima, Pius' reflection on the role of
the state and the nature of property ownership also inspired some
egregious fascist excesses. Pius reserves to the State the right of "certain
forms of property" which "carry with them an opportunity of domination
too great to be left to private individuals.
.
.
" 32 p|„s acknowledges that
capitalism "is not vicious of its very nature" but in his remedy declares
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that ,t
.s "Whe State which should be the supreme arbiter, ruiin* in kin^iy
fashron," and therefore is the state action which must bear the 'standard of
social iustice." 33 Written in a time of flagrant dictatorship, it is this vision
Of a "supreme’' and "kingly" state which earned Catholic corporatism part
Of ,ts authoritarian and "state corporatist" reputation, it is to Pius' enduring
thscredlt that in recommending an agency by which labor rights should be
enforced, he should turn so forthrightly to the state, which at the time was,
obviously, fascist.
Were it not for the blatant presence of fascism, Quadragesima
's call
for government to meet the challenge of social justice would appear as
activist as what was unfolding in the 1930s in the United States, in fact,
there were ties between the Italian government's statist remedies and
’
economic measures in the US which were plainly corporatist and, if not
explicitly fascist, then openly in praise of Mussolini.
Nowadays, in a far more fortunate context, the Church's idea of an
expansive vision of the state in the pursuit of social justice continues to be
a principle of Catholic politicism. There is a passage in Quadragesima which
easily could appear in a recent release from the National Conference of
Catholic Bishops in support of the continuation of Aid to Families with
Dependent Children. Quadragesima states the Church's fears that the
burden of charity might be entirely abandoned to the Church: "[The upper
class wasj content to abandon to charity alone the full care of relieving the
unfortunate, as though it were the task of charity to make amends for the
open violation of justice." 34 Quadragesima marks the Church's explicit call
for justice, rather than simply loving caritas, which is due the
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disadvantaged (the expression
"social justice" did
earlier in Rerum Novarum).
not appear forty years
Quadragesima's call for social justice significantly sharpened focus of
Catholic social doctrine and it has served progressively bolder positions
since then. The problem at the time of Quadragesima y,as that
interventionist
"justice" when enforced by the fascist state, was incurred at
a prohibitive expense of freedom.
But Quadragesima's apparent effort to straddle the fence of both
socialism and liberalism could have been taken to encouraged the fascists,
Who were notoriously facile in appropriating other philosophies to justify
their immediate needs. In Quadragesima Pius holds that, "the right of
ownership
... is not absolutely rigid
,
.
." and says the Church has "never
denied or called in question the twofold aspect of ownership, which is
individual or social accordingly as it regards individuals or concerns the
common good. 35 Though in personal terms Quadragesima holds that
Man's natural right of possessing and transmitting property by
mhentance must be kept intact and not be taken away by the State from
Man," it reserves to "the public authority, in view of the common good, [to]
specify more accurately what is licit and what is illicit for property owners
in the use of their possessions," subject to natural and divine law. 36 This
was not a timely message to send to Mussolini or Hitler.
In 1937, Amintore Fanfani, a onetime apologist for Fascism and future
leading Christian Democrat, characterized Corporativism’s approach to the
State s jurisdiction over productive property this way;
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owner's P™P«y
ill Will, These coLeptf brSZ'^L^S “’T*'"the Fascist corporative doctr ne ^nH h Jh "'""'’''I character of
»'S.™s
preaching for centuries. 37
Though Nell-Breuning has left us his criticisms of Pius XPs
misinterpretations of fascism, he does not reflect on his own contribution
to QA's rather open ended speculations on the State's power over property.
Though aA IS magisterial, such a document would have benefited from more
than the opinions of one man - or two- under the signature of a religious
monarch with the stature of the Roman Catholic pope.
The Fasri.st betrayal
Pius XI attempted to be adamantly in control in an era of authoritarian
personalities, but he missed opportunities because of it. A rapprochement
with the socialists, despite many philosophical similarities with Catholic
social doctrine, was rejected out of hand. Coleman writes that Pius was "firm
- even excessively so-on the issue of hierarchical control of the laity and
the need for an insulating strategy of confessional particularism. Catholic
socialists, in this context, were seen as breaking the desired Catholic unity."
38 By 1931 the pope’s jealousy toward socialism had in a sense become
canonized when he wrote in Quadragesimo, "no one can be at the same time
a sincere Catholic and a true socialist." 39
Pius commitment to control was an expensive passion. According to
Coleman, by condemning Sturzo and abandoning the PPl, the Vatican
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directly aided Mussolini by blocking "a possible collaboration between the
Catholic Center Party and the Socialists in Germany which might have
forestalled Hitler's rise to power.
. .
" 40
The early years of the Parr,to Popolare Italiano (1-Pl)
At first, dealings between the Church hierarchy and PPl founder
Sturzo began optimistically. In 1918, a time rocked by world war and the
Russian revolution, Sturzo met Cardinal Pietro Gasparri to propose a new
political party. The Church was beleaguered by W.W.I. and wary of the
implications of communism and felt a Catholic party it was worth the try,
even to the point of accepting the idea of a party founded by Catholics
rather than a party of the Catholic religion. The PPl was founded Jan. 18,
1919 and the following November the pope formally lifted the non expedit,
allowing Catholics to fully participate in the elections.
As a Sicilian priest Luigi Sturzo had introduced his approach to
Catholic politics eleven years earlier in a 1908 Christmas Eve speech, in his
dual role as mayor of Caltagirone.41 ms approach was more subtle than
Murn, justifying his call for a national party independent of ecclesiastical
authonty not because the papacy was wrong, but simply because the
institutional Church had aims which were different from lay people.
Because of its sacred connotations, Sturzo felt the use of "Catholic" was
inappropnate for the name of a political party (neither was he comfortable
with Murri's "Christian Democrats" at the time) but he recognized that the
party itself would necessarily be both democratic and Catholic. 42 sturzo, as
with Murri, was sternly critical of capitalism and had in the manner of
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Catholic reformers before him stressed grass root remedies,
smaii rurai banks based on diocesan parishes and formed a
movement, frequently collaborating with Murri.
He founded
young worker’s
Enter II Duce
As a youth Mussolini has published a novel entitled The CarJinaTs
M,stress, which mocked the Church's moralistic pretensions and in 1908
had described priests as "black microbes who are as fatal to mankind as
tuberculosis germs." 43 gut by 1919, the year of PPl's founding, with the
Fascists fresh from an electoral humiliation (the Socialists had won 156
seats in parliament, the PPl loi, and the Fascists zero) Mussolini set about
to eliminate three of his major competitors: the Socialists, the Liberal
Democrats and the PPI
.
44 The Church would be his tool.
By 1921 Mussolini was arguing that "the Latin and imperial tradition
of Rome is represented by Catholicism [therefore].
. . Italy.
, , ought to
furnish the Vatican with material aid, the material facilities for schools,
churches, hospitals and so forth." 45 „e brought himself to confess that
"(mjy spirit is profoundly religious
.
. . relations between the Italian State
and the Vatican from now on will be very friendly.” 46 gy November 1922
he had called for rejection of Giolitti's tax on the Church, and when in
power he made a gift to the pope of the Ghigi library. When he decreed that
the Catholic catechism be taught in state schools. La Ciustiyi.i swooned,
Mussolini has done more for clericalism in three months than the Partito
Popolare in ten years." 47
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Ouce hoped to portray Sturzo as the Church's insolent son, an
anttpope, declaring, "Oon Sturzo has not got a Ro.an soui. i.e has the
mentality of a pastor and of a Protestant professor like Wilson." 48
mperiahst themes were woven into Mussolini's appeal to nationalist
aggrandizement, he declared: "Don Sturzo disowns the Empire and thus
disowns the history of Catholicism, rejects the Roman and Christian Empire
of Constantine and denies the Sacred Empire of Dante." 49
Sturzo saw this for what it was, dedicating the PPl "against eveiy type
of centralizing pemersion attempted in the name of the pantheistic State
the deified Nation, but his efforts were thwarted. 50 September
1921 Sturzo contemplated an alliance with the Socialists, but the Socialists
were wary of a papist plot. The Vatican had warned through CoM.r.
mmlrn that Catholics would "sacrifice all" If they were to unite with
"atheistic and monopolistic socialism" and "prevent the country from
returning to civil liberty and constitutional normalcy." 51
Clerical fascists and Sturzo's exit
The brutal assassination by Fascist thugs of socialist leader Giacomo
Matteotti in 1 924 caused an international outrage, but the Vatican's OViha'
iMQlm in August rejected Matteotti's martyrdom. Referring to the
Socialist violence of 1919, the Vatican newspaper described Matteotti as a
"victim of the political delinquency which he helped create," and it also
condemned the PPl and other members of parliament who staged a walk-
out to protest the murder (called the "Aventine" secessionists). 52 The
article instead praised the Fascists' restoration of order, its repudiation of
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-»
pseudonym
"Gino Sergi" finally asked the clerical ft. • pC tascists
- of which there
were many - to explain themselves "iwihaf
account f m--
lyou should]
or this intolerable situation
.
. you who o-
•
• give credit and
proclaim such a system ..." 53
n the face of the growing support of Mussolini by the Church
hierarchy, Sturzo had resigned in 1923. On September 9. 1924 Pius XI
declared that the PPl could no longer function as an autonomous body of
Catholics in Italian political life, and by Oct 25 1974 \/ c^ ^2 Vatican minister of
State Gasparri was instructed to convey "the desire nav th„y L uc e, y the command of the
Holy Father" that Sturzo leave Rome. 54
The Lateran agreement of February 1929 was the coup de grace by
Mussolini Which the pope perceived as a resolution of the long standing
Koman auestion," a grievance based on the state's impositions and
expropriations of Church propeny and the Papal States since 1870 Now
Mussolini's state offered to pay indemnities to the Church, and furthermore
reinstated state subsidies to the Church. Catholicism was formally
proclaimed the state religion once again, though the Fascists did not
neglect to enact regulations limiting the Church's role in government. 55
Fascism and D'Annunzio
What Mussolini did not eliminate, he embraced and enveloped.
Particularly relevant to corporatism was Gabriele D'Annunzio, who first
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put .nto operation a corporatise pro^ran, tro. wHicP n,nc,t ot iascis.
corporativism was tashioneU. THe year toiiowin, the hirth ot the PPi the
ta .an
.ma„nat.on was captured by iVAnnunzio's audacious attentpt to
-cep as,de the bieak and unsatistyin, outcome ot Worid War
, tor itaiians.
taly had pretensions ot empire, its colonies were limited to hritrea
captured in
, SS, and Somalia, won in i.io, and the i.,5 war with the
’
C-entra, powers went badly. 600,000 Italian soldiers were lost - Mussoiini was
anton, the returninn wounded
- and Italy had little to show tor its trouble
parttcularly due to President Woodrow Wilson's rejection ot Italy's
annexation ot Dalmatia and the Flume regions, promised to the Itaiians in
the Treaty of London.
(.ompcnsatini- tor this humiliation, on Sept. 8
, 1920, D'Annunzio led
troops in an invasion otFiume and proclaimed a new regime, constituted by
ten "corporations" named corporation: de/te art/ e de/ m/sf/er/, directly
based on the medieval guilds ot Italian artists and craftsmen. Taking the
Church's corporatism a step further, it formed a representative
government based on these corporations and declared in his constitution-
the "Carta della Re^i,ent.a haliana del Quarnaro" - that each corporation
was a "legal person
. . . sending its representatives into the City Council." 56
(Article XX)
In D'Annunzio's domain, membership of ail adult citizens was
obligatory, defined by broad vocational categories. D'Annunzio's corporate
state was organized as follows: salaried workers and small business owners
(corporation # 1 ); skilled technical and administrative of all private
businesses, industrial and rural excepts co-owners (#2); all skilled workers
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Of commercial firms, e.ciuciing partner-owners («); higher ieve.
directors of industry who were empioyees (not sole* ^ ' 'o owners or to owners)
(^4); public empioyees (.5);
.'inteilectual flowers of the people, young
scholars and their teachers" (#6); "those in free employment not otherwise
placed in previous corporations" mi\-. (#7), cooperative producers, workers and
consumers not otherwise representeci i n
)’ all maritime workers (#9 ).
The Tenth corporation, however, was so incredibly broad that it
verged on the hallucinatory, if not preposterous. D'Annunzio was a literary
figure and poet of great renown, but in D'Annunzio's pagan-state
balderdash the Tenth Corporation was "... like the tenth muse... almost a
votive figure
... the complete liberation of the spirit...the civic sanctuary
.
. . from the epoch of the Communes - the spiritualized form of human
work: work without effort.
.
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Mussolini seized on the D'Annunzio's idea of the Corporate State, as
well as D'Annunzio's sense of style: the Fascist black shirts (something
they shared with priests) and the Roman stiff-arm salute were
D'Annunzio's, too. II Duce managed to stop short, however, of D'Annunzio's
brand of unbounded blasphemy, D'Annunzio's militaristic rewrite of the
Sermon on the Mount is typical: "Blessed are those who spurn sterile love,
to be virgins for this first and last love
.
. . Blessed are the youths who
hunger and thirst for glory, for they shall be satisfied,
. . Blessed are those
who come back victorious, for they shall see the new face of Rome." 59
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rnagazine of Siena La Tnrm- "tv, i>
p,., ,, .
" the Cro»tooR the same
Z"". “ —- An e.p.e at once hahanohc, then, tor empire means poH-crand Catholicism truth." «'
Webster also tells us. "A Franciscan psychologist. Father Agostine Gemiliie
analysed how the PulpU and laboratoty could be combined to serve the
’
armed state, studying men in combat proving that their courage was
largely inspired by illusions which could be produced
. , .
61
Fascism and Rossoni’s syndicalism
In the August 10. ,918 edition of
then-socialist
lOurnalist Benito Mussolini reported on the annual convention of the
Unlortc ItaUarta del Lavoro (UIL) whose growing membership (120 000-
137.000) rellected that summer's enthusiasm over UlL's labor rights
campaign. UIL had advocated a policy of "productive democracy" which
would abolish owner absolutism and promote minimum wages, establish
Saturday half hours at full pay, improve factoiy conditions and the
confiscate
"overprofits." UIL executive board member Gdmondo Itossoni
thanked Mussolini for his "almost stenographic account of the proceeding."
62 Mussolini was shortly to coopt most of the union leader's program.
Edmondo Itossoni was a revolutionary syndicalist, which meant that
he aimed to seize control of the government and run the economy by
making the working class its true owners and managers. Ills vision of a
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new government would be organized very similarly to corporatism, in
s.ngle-categoty vocational groupings, calling them
"corporations," whose
mtssion would presumably transcend party politics. In Kossonl's words,
e syndtcahst conception is absolutely antithetical to that of party " 63
He favored compulsory mixed organizations of workers and employers
Which were to include aii Italian capitalist trade associations, but "with his
own bureaucrats sending as final policy makers," says Tinghino. intending
to ultimately deprive the industrialists of their autonomy. 64 «„ j^n. 24,
1922 Kossoni became the secretary general of the Fascist party's
delle
^
un.cn confederacy on the scale of the iWW, sufficient to intimidate the
state and thus control the national economy. 65
Fascism did not turn out to be the instrument of proletarian
empowerment that Rossoni expected, however. Contrary to his vision of a
state ,n service to the proletariat, the proletariat was instructed to se,ve the
state. The Fascists had a different remedy for the
"commoditization of
labor." AS Weik explains:
"According to the Fascist conception, labor loses
.ts traditional character of a 'commodity' freely bought and sold in a
market, and becomes a solemn duty of the individual towards society, a duty
Which must be performed under the safeguard and the protection of the
State."
By the end of 1922 Rossoni became President of the Confederazioni
delle Corporazioni Sindacali Easdsil apparently hoping that the
compelling leadership of the Fascist party would force the CGll
{Confederazioni Ceneraie deWIndusiria Italiana - later Confindustria. the
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leading industrialist’s group), to obey the direction. , n
as"fPrhni ,
of what Rossoni billed
experts" but who in reality, says Tinghino, would be Kossoni’s
and-p.cRed
"highly
,u^ihed secretades who have a dehned econontic
Confindustria would in no wav stand fnr py for Rossoni appointees takiny
over the national economy under the guise of corporatist unity The
Sart, says amounted to "an endorsement by business
classic economic liberalism". 68
and fascism of total
Kossoni’s hopes for Integral corporativism (a derivation of
Vogelsang’s fusion of management and labor) steadily eroded, beginning
With the Chigi palace pact of Dec. 19, 1923, an agreement which within
sixteen months resulted in eighteen separate organizations split amongst
employers and employees, a victory for Confindustria. Thus, the prevailing
authority would not be syndicalism. Furthermore, Fascist Minister of
Justice Alfredo Rocco explained, "The corporation is an organization which
integrates all factors of production [but] the name of corporation can no
longer be applied to the syndical organizations, which are rearranged as
solely with employers and solely workers." 69
that it was through fascist auspices that Rossoni’s integral mixed syndicates
came to be blocked. He claimed that "the hopes for fascist syndicalism, in
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variance with Catholic corporatism, which in Quadragesima Anno and
elsewhere had endorsed the idea of separate worher organizations.
The Vidoni Pact at the end of 1925 established exclusive
compiementaiy
recognition between the CGli and the Fascist corporations
as sole bargaining agents in virtually ail labor contracts. Other worker
representation was either abolished and subsumed by local fascist unions
Hossoni's Plan for fiducciari di fabbnca, factory worker trustees was
scrapped. No strikes or lockouts were allowed. Satti writes, "The CGil
however, remained the citadel of private business" while Fascist
corporativism never arrived at the mythical corporative state, where
production was regulated by representatives
side under the benign guidance of the state
of capital and labor side by
As noted earlier, the Italians did brieHy institute functional
representation. On May 17, 1928 the Italian Chamber of Deputies, the lower
house, replaced its old form of political representation with vocational or
trade representation. 72 gut it was destined to become a powerless chamber,
meant only to rubber stamp fascist declarations. Corporatism joined the a
long list of fascist co-optations, and its presumed integralism, which
Vogelsang and Rossoni had originally intended as an instrument of worker
power, was turned by the fascists into a mechanism of the Industrialist elite
and a pretext to destroy the syndicalism. Mussolini wrote in 1930 in
typically disingenuous style, "It is in the corporation that the Fascist state
finds its ultimate expression
. .
. while socialist syndicalism
.
. . seeks its
ultimate end in the political sphere.
.
." 73 jhe Catholic notion of
162
San... adapted nicCy :o Musso.mrs rhetoric of fascism: is oniy
rough the corporation, that is through the coiiaboration of a„ forces
converging to one singie end - that the vitaiity of syndicaiis. is assured
e Fascsts found the industrialists' ethic of hierarchy and discipline
.ore than congeniai, and afforded big business unique discretion, perhaps
cuahfy,ng as the oniy econontic group with a re.nant of corporatist seif-
regulation. Before fascism, Confindustria was already powerful,
representing 144 industrial associations in eveo^ region except’
Calabria/Basilicata
. After the 1925 capitulation of syndicalism to the
expans,onlst state and Its business collaborators, according to Sarti,
"l,ar
totalitarian, industry remained autonomous." ?5 gy compulsory
cartel law of 1932, the corporatist notion of autodisciplina dell categorie
(sectoral self regulation, had placed decisionmaking into the hands of the
business elites of the dominant firms. Under the pretext of autarchy,
Mustrial licensing based on past performance and status became a
"triumph for economic conservatism" says Sarti, eliminating social
mobility and regimenting the peasantry. 76
It was not without Mussolini's obfuscating touch. On Oct. 6, 1934
Mussolini declared in Milan,
I mean“ orkers
7?" ' ™ean only employers.
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A return of the ancient Roman corporation
The fascst betrayal of Catholic corporatism was made explicit In
Antcle 43 of the
.occo laws of Aphl lh3S. It proclaims that the coloration
JS not have a juridical personality hut Is an administrative or,an of the
•
. t IS very dear that the corporations, since they are organs of the
-te.
.
. (are to he] directed hy a president, chosen hy the Minister of
corporations...
,t was a repeat of history, of the sort cited hy Clerhe.s
explanation of the ancient Roman notion of a corporation.
The Church.s anti-liberalism and corporate organicism also added
materral to the fascist mix of flattery, cooption and imperial pretension
Wrote Rocco,
.'The old Roman tradition, splendidly renovated by the
Catholic church was well inspired by principles of discipline, the
hierarchy of submission of individuals to the state ..." 79 y^e idea of a
corporate personality became now a fascist innovation in Rocco's mind: "
.
.
. fascism is a distinct organism distinct from the citizens. It has its own life
and ends." 80
antiliberalist sentiments of the
Church:
".
. . fascism is not a simple sum of individuals, but an organism.
.
to Which the ambitions and ends of individuals must be subordinated. The
fascist state therefore is truly the social state. " 81
Corporatism for export
Corporatism had admirers beyond Italy as we have noted, and Fascist
propaganda hoped to exploit corporatism as a cover for Italy's clumsy
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proposed
attempts at an embarrassingly late colonial o
expansion in East Africa 82
G'Usseppe De MicheMs' MorUltonka^ion of
—e .ea on >n.nna«o„a. econo.,
re anons" and "an extension of the regulative principles of the itahan
con^orate State." Minus the obvious fascist drawhachs, this idea had
elenrents which proved foresighted. in the for. of si.iiar sche.e of
functional integration in the European co..unity after W W II
exe.plifled by EC precursors such as the European Coal and Stiie,
Consortium and Euratom. 83
A feeble atte.pt to stand up to Hitler briefly involved Austria in an
atte.pt to i.p,e.ent a non-party authoritarian corporatist regi.e based
on Quadrates,mo Anno. (Nell-Breuning refers to this). Atte.pting to
.mpose an authoritarian corporate state on a dissolved parlia.ent, Austrian
pH.e
.mister Doilfuss received initial support fro. Cardinal Innizer of
Vienna after announcing the program in April 1933 to a meeting of
Catholic associations. Doilfuss Incorporated nine of the twenty three
articles of the Vatican's Austrian Concordat in his new constitution of May
1934. 84 But as in Italy, the hint of a political alliance
the Socialists drove Innizer and the Vatican
between Doilfuss and
away, again undermining
another effort to unify against the Fascists. In the previous decade, the
Holy See's political instincts were similarly dim. The Vatican's support of
Chancellor (and Catholic priest) Ignaz Seipel of Austria led to Seipel's defeat
the 1930 elections and the simultaneous withdrawal of 400,000 Catholics
from the Church in Austria. 85
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In the US, General Hugh Johnson contributed to F m-P~ ior the national Industrial
.cover.
^ 1
government licensed
«‘de standards on wages prices and
praalces. Johnson's trade associatio
’
’
Wh -r
“ocia . ns were ostensibly self governing butWhitman tells ns "nn t , ^
a ,h
’ "
the President
... had theut onty to impose such Codes as he saw fit m
th-
' own response tothis aspect of the NIRA scheme was "fEcco un ditatorei' t'RohcAi ^ j-
86 M •
miu .
( Behold a dictator)'"
resigning. General Johnson's farewell speech invoked the "shining
na.e"ofBenitoMusso, ini, but With theinvasionofHthiopialnldj;
American public praise disappeared, as did Cole Porter's lyric, "Vou'. thetop! You re Mussolini!" 87
>n 1936 the National Union for Social Justice met in Cleveland to
ate William Lemke for President. Fifteen thousand followers heard
or. Francis E. Townsend speak of his Old Age Revolving Pension Plan but
the stars were Huey Long's Share-Our-Wealth successor Gerald L. K Smith
and Catholic priest radio celebrity Father Charles Coughlin. With a weekly
audience estimated at 30 million
- (at 10 million it would have been the
largest in the world ) and with donations estimated at $5 million in 1933 his
supposedly «erum-based philosophy called for "state capitalism" and
"public ownership of those things that were "too important to be entrusted
in private hands." 88 gy 1935 his onetime affection for Roosevelt had
turned to hatred. As Coughlin's credibility slipped away, he tried one last
audacious stroke, declaring, "We are at a crossroads. One road leads toward
fascism, the other toward Communism. I take the road to fascism." 89
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Catholic Action and Non Abbiamo Hi.i^isogno
harshly in light of the
There is a temptation to judge the Church
murderous excesses of fascism and the Vatican's deferential tone '
Quadragosin,o Anno. As noted Pius XI "be ,
’ nod" to Mussolini in
sections 91-96 of Quadragesimo should be put in the^ ^ context of Non Abbiamnisogno which followed weeks larpr r ilater, released in Italian to make a show ofdiscretion, but soon translated into English
audiences by Cardinal O'Connell of Boston.
and distributed to American
auadrages>n,o mentions Catholic Action brieHy:
"Our beloved sons
evoted to Catholic Action.
.. aid Us in the solution of social problems "
uc Non Abb,an,o takes up the subject in earnest. 90
and angry, understandably so because the Church's institutional interests
and beloved" personnel had been dealt real and continuing violence The
crux Of the matter is that Mussolini, not without reason, had contended that
Catholic Action was a political organization which threatened the Fascist
Party's interests, and that it had been a refuge for ex-PPl members,
harboring enemies and rivals of the Fascist State (which was true). The
Church's response was a standard one - that Catholic Action was an
apolitical nonpartisan religious study group seizing the community good.
When it became apparent that the Church would not serve Italy's
imperialist ends, Catholic Action became a focus for Mussolini's revenge.
Mussolini was also frustrated by parish priests in Yugoslavia who
thwarted // Ouce's attempts to incite ethnic rivalries, hoping exploit them
with a "rescue" invasion, resolving a crisis which he would create. In Italy,
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the Fascists wanted to denationalize the rrn,^
Venezia Giulia region, but, writes Kent these si™
p»i«i»s-,h„ oy
given m Italian when their
parishioners did not even understand the language." 91
™ad directly to secure his
^rmission for Catholic missionaries to continue work in Abyssinia in a
ear rejection of French and Italian patronage. He warned
"against the
spine Of nationalism" and reiected nationalist propaganda, adding
NationiUism was the scourge of missions and missionaries must keep
-Oh OnAugustS,
.30,theyear aftertheuteran Accords, the
native Ethiopian bishop was consecrated in Rome, making it dear to
Mussoiini that Italian Catholic missionaries could not be included in the
effort for an imperial presence in the colonies. 93
n early 1,31 Mussolini retribution for the Church, noncompliance
with his imperialist ambitions was to punish the pope’s beloved Catholic
Action, accusing it of being in direct competition with Fascist political
organizations, particularly those involving young people. 94 because it was
ostensibly an educational entity, the Church claimed institutional and
jurisdictional freedom. On Dec. 31, 1929 in the eighth year of his
pontificate, Pius XI had published the encyclical
"Christian Education of
Youth" which constructs its argument for institutional liberty. It argues
that schooling "owes its existence to the initiative of the family and of the
Church, long before it was undertaken by the State
. .
. Catholics, no matter
what their nationality, in agitating for Catholic schools for their children.
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arc not mixing i„ ,„r,y
95
J'>ui are t-‘n«a}»eel in ri religious enterprise.
"
i on cducalioii, staling that "u,y p|,,„ .
.,| . .
out
-to Wholly monopniizc the youth u, the
Pan cat rietl
advantage Ola,tarty, Ola regimclisl
,
.
™’'’
I • • . true pa}»an siatolalry.
. .
" 96
Non Ahhkinio liisovnn hwU ir-.. i •
fascists agait, St the(.liLirch until on Sent 2 I9^i inP ’l"'l' the pope linally agreed to dismantle thep“
"T"" -pn-en. or
te Pas rinc l cist Corporations) and restrin r -,.n r> rict (.athohe youth groups to religious
activities only. Adds De Felice "The ill,,.-;I IK illusion ol papal independence had
neen brought to an end." 97
What remained o, Catholic Action nevertheless sutwived to he a
spawning ground lor the luture Christian l,emocratlc Party. Puture Cl,
ioader Alcide OeCasperi lived out the war in the Vatican writing lor the
Vatican himonthly ni.s^r..U,n. Vatfeana under the pen nante ol Kerunt
Senptor. W The seeds were sown lor a resurrected Catholic presence in a
newly conceived political relationship.
Review
C;orporatism rang in Calholicisnfs ntodern era, although more as a
nteliorist theme than as a detailed political theory. Some early propouents
<)t corporatism aimed to take over the state and replace capita, isn. with a
Zrr“ ''” "“ '"' »' “»
«
ntegral corporations, whose fusion of iabor an,i ^d management wouldp—y bring the worker out of bis plight of sub)ectio„ antf into the
airship Of the state. The guiitfs a,so provitfeti a vebiCe for the ffetigiing
a obc soca, doctrine marked by Leo X,„, 1891 encyclical
‘~d in overturning the political
order, in «erunt be offered a constructive and sontetintes
courageous cnt.que of political and economic fundamentals. Leo Xlll
margmabzed the radical reconstructionists by drawing on the spirit of the
guilds - rather than structural detail^: tn «
- o encourage class harmony instead
of revolution. But «entm Novarun, was limited by its aristocratic cy IS notions of
an organic social
'stability" and its implications of a preordained
inferiority among the lower classes.
Rerun, Novnrum attempted to bring the Church into the modern world
by apply,ng Christian principles to emerging political and economic
reality, but the popes during the late 19th and early 20th centuries were
ambivalent about how fully to involve the Church. Ambitious for their own
interests in restoring the Church's special stature in society, but waty of
the state's machinations, the papacy vacillated from inspired vision to
resentful petulance, often misperceiving the nuances of electoral
democracy. The fear of socialism drove the Church to a politics of negation,
culminating in the 1923 rejection of Father Luigi Sturzo and his Panito
Popolare ItaJiano. Thus aided in the removal of his two main rivals.
Socialism and the PPl, Mussolini rewarded papal instrumentality by re-
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establishing Catholicism as the Italian
Accords of 1929.
nation’s Church in the Lateran
;
f-..,
,.u
reckoning, preceded and superseded th,.c c c e state in many ways. The Church
roukh Catholic corporatism, attempted to he .0 the state but not of the'
h
-
-PH- Augustine, personifying an intermediary institution
^
stands independent of the state, creation. This credo of institutional
onomy
,s summed up in the concept of subsidiarity, introduced in
2ut,dra«es,mo 4nno and intended as a device to hold Mussolini at bay
Heyond its momentary practicality, subsidiarity was consistent with the
Church, cyclical struggles with the aggressions of emperors, would-be or
not, and continues as part of the legacy of corporatism.
The central document of Catholic corporatism, Quadragestnto Anno
embodied both the haws and attributes of Catholic corporatism. It is
alternately an inspired vision and a pu.zling abstraction. Its limited grasp
of property as a personal rather than as a productive value, and its
ambiguous notions about the state, role in determining the s
property reduced its usefulness as an econo
form of functional representation and other
Status of
mic remedy. The parliamentary
notions of the ”QA state" do not
appear in the encyclicals Kerum Novamm and QuaJra.esimo Anno, but on
other occasions were vaguely encouraged by Pius XI, who apparently did
not fully understand their implications. But the intentions of QuaU„o
Anno and its founding precedent Kerum Novarum were noble and
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ex.e.e„
.. a„aUve wo..
,jer mature. Co che ,eve, of Ma„>s. o. nbe.aUs., cHe encycMca.s
oughtful challenges to both. If specifics were lacking, it was
perhaps the necessary condition for a document which spoke to hundreds
"
- wo-wide adherents in dramatically different political
regimes.
On behalf of its own institutional interests, the Church acted in
mulnmodai fashion in this era, having real repercussions on the state the
bus, ness world and the community. As an international organization, the
mstitutionai Church attempted to maintain its organic integrity and
.nv.olab.lity by standing up to Mussolini's expansionist foreign policy In
education, it managed to restore itself as a mafor force in Italian schooling
and ,t was ,n this capacity that Catholic Action was allowed to survive the
otherwise undeterred aggressions of the Fascist state. The Church defended
its professional autonomy more successfully than any other vocational
sector, with the possible exception of the industrial elite.
Corporatism's procedural ethic, as much as its substance, represented a
type of vocational sovereignty through which the Church won real
concessions from one of the world's most notorious dictators. The two
clearest stands by the Church against Fascism and Nazism in this period.
Non Abbiamo Bisogno (1931 )and M,t brenncnbcr Sor,e.( 1937) were both
taken from the standpoint of an institutional defense, protecting Italian
Catholic Action groups and the German Catholic clergy, respectively.
Whatever victories were won by bargaining with the fascists turned out to
be hollow, but the Church was not alone in its credulity for II Duce, and
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u.t.mace,y i, was che Church which was left sunciin,, rather than
totahtar.an.snt, in this sense Catholic corporatisnt shouiU not he disn,isseU
Mmpiy as a tool of tyranny, but conceivably as a cletense against it
Finally, in contrast to the impersonal and exploitive business
corporation of the industrial revolution ( atholir, C c corporatism in this period
^^SRCsted alternative visions of whai-t . t what a corporation could be, Quadrages/mo
—ted
..Worhnten.s Societies'' as an apparatus of mutual aid and charity
and thus reasserted a traditionalist, intermediaty approach of assistance to
the needy and confronted the bureaucratic liberalism of the dawning
welfare state. Traces of the Catholic corporatism of the late 1 9th and early
20th centuo. can be found in the Church-sponsored corporations of today
How the values of Catholic corporatism carried fonvard from the early 20th
century to 1998 is next tested in the contemporary
,ymerican worlds of
education, social service and health care, to which we now turn.
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ClIAl’TIiK 7
SOCIAI. SliKVlCliS ANI ^ niii CA'niouc ciiukch
liiuiiUiiaiim
'Ws chamer he«i„s an analysis o(
.hrce lields wellaro-snuo
acuvuy ror c,„ue.nporary Ca.hnn,.
— can. n.
.
,,,
cdncaMon. De.p.te what many imagine Co bo a wall bo.weon church and
s.a.e, ,he hovonnnonr,, re^uhuory role and h. n„anclal parUcIpallon In
.'K.0 InduMrlo.
,naho
.he
..a.e a .najor par.ner in Ca.hollc-.sponsored
.n.sdU.,ions. Thus, Ihese religion-sponsored companies which scwe ,he
wellare s.a.e are necessarily caunlu up in .he in.eres.s o,
.he s.a.e, even
IhouHh
.hey are by law
.,o, .o be "en.an).led” will,
.he s.a.e,
we be«h. WI.I, C:a.hohc-spon,sored social sen^ices (n.os.ly represen.ed
hy (>atholic (^harilies) because il most lully combines Ihese lliree
characterislics:
,
I
,
i. is a si^nilican. subs.i.u.e lor .he s.a.e h. i.s held, (2,
i> receives mos. ol its revenues Iron,
.he s.a.e, and (3) its corporate
..rKaniza.ion is idemiliably
"Catholic." TI.oukI. Ca.holic-sponsored heal.h
care is also mostly funded by (he state (throuKh Medicare a..d Medicaid)
and is a major par. of i.s industry, it is neither as tightiy organiWHi as
Catholic Chari.ies, nor is i. as shn-ularly predominant in i.s field. And
although Catholic parochial
.schools are afso clo.sely bound .o the Church,
and the single leading industry group in field of private
.schm.l educa.
Catholic elementary and high schools do no. receive any significan.
lOtl,
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n. fro„ government. Lastly, CathoUc post-sccontiary eaucatlon,
ough funded by government-backed
student foans and grants, are
nettber as professfonaffy predominant as CathoHc Cbarft.es, nor as
accountable to ecclesfastfca, autborfty, except ,n tbeologfca, matters. Thus
compared to bealtb care and education, Catbollc soda, se.lces most
’
completely encompasses tbe structure and style of welfare state surrogacy
and best setves to Introduce a modern perspective of Catbollc welfare
'
corporatism.
However, before any type of Cathnlir cnrv-y c r Latnolic-sponsored welfare state
surrogacy is described, some background Is necessary to put tbe Catbollc
Cburcb s political posture into modern context, Panicularly m fields wbicb
are so intensely dependent on government money and regulation, the
degree to which the Church can maintain its Catholic identity and yet not
impede its secular commission is a revealing balancing act, and one which
IS dependent on a subtle and careful choreography of political footwork
We have used the traits of Catholic welfare corporatism
- organicism,
subsidiarity, and multimodaiity
- as a framework by which to consider
Catholic concepts of vocation in the Middle Ages and as a formula for social
justice among workers in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.
Our inquiry into contemporary circumstances continues to use these
reference points, which are again reviewed and applied in the study's
conclusion.
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The Kls^ii'p's I i.hhy'
What the Church says about itself politically in the US is a primary
—bility Of the national Conference of Catholic Bishops
,KCCB, anassembly of over 300 active and auxiliary bishops. As the highest level
athohc collectltdty in the United States, a looh at the MCCB is an essential
mtroductlon to contemporary Catholic pollticlsm In its e
modem American state
ncounter with the
The NCCB is both a representative to government for Cathollc-
sponsored organizations, and is the Catholic businesses community's most
comprehensive theological resource. Although It Is not an exclusive
bargarnlng agent, it has a limited "meso corporatist" role to play in that it
Often spealts for a suf„ subset of Catholic sponsored agencies and
faclrtres. Catholic-sponsored human services, health care and education
have representative organizations in their respective fields as well, but the
NCCB shapes an Integrated, applied philosophy for the American Catholic
Church, and symbolizes in concentrated form the Church's sixty-million-
person presence in the US political culture. The NCCB furthermore fits into
the coordinates of Catholic welfare corporatism, demonstrating organicism
by serving the integral whole of the universal Catholic Church;
subsidiarity because it is composed of diocesan
"executives" (bishops) with
extensive local powers; and multimodality by its effective and simultaneous
participation in government, business and civil society.
The NCCB is a "corporation of corporations" in that US bishops are
themselves
"corporations sole" - one-person civil corporations who take
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personal control over the Church-owned property In ,h r
. ,
^ c i t eir districts. Their
possessron is passed on to each bishop's successor and then to the/r
uccessors, potentially forever, consistent with the concept of corporations
eveloped by canon law el.ht centuries a,o. in an or.anl.^^^^
hierarchrcal as the Roman Catholic Church, bishops
both spiritually and materially,
bishop, of Rome.
count for a great deal,
exceeded only by the pope, who Is himself
The evolution of the NCCB naraii^ic tunt,bb parallels the growing participation of
Catholics in America's destiny. Originating in the war-wracked year of l.,y
With the porntedly patriotic title
"National Catholic War Council," it was
later renamed the "National Catholic Welfare Council " ,'-iidi t^oun , a more accurate
renecuon of its peacetime mission. After World War 11, because Rome found
tbe term "council" vaguely pretentious (potentially confused with Vatican
councils) and also because American Catholics' ascendant fortunes
contrasted with the word "welfare " thr> Mrr« nucii re, e NCCB changed its name to its
current form, the National Conference of Catholic Bishops.
The United States Catholic Conference (USCC) is the NCCB’s nonprofit
civil corporation, which produces and sells a wide range of NCCB
publications and videotapes. Their seventy eight page catalog offers policy
presentations on several "Current Issues" including Politics, Substance
Abuse, Women and the Church, Sexuality, Disabilities. Healthcare, AIDS,
Pro-Life and Euthanasia. Under the "Social
.Justice" heading are Catholic
Social Teaching, Poverty and Economic Justice. USCC publications provide
Catholic-sponsored institutions with ethical guides, some for specific
practical application, most notably the NCCB's Ethical and u,.ii|,i,.|, .
;
182
mrM iVPs for rathniir
,
official mission statements of Cathoiic heath
otten cited explicitly in the
care corporations, 1
In heaith care reform, the poiitical posture of the NCCB and the
Catholic Health Association. (CHA,
. mostiy non confrontationai and
offers something for both ends of the politicai spectrum. The NCCB
recommends universal access;
..fair', allocation of resources; a 'Treedom of
conscience- which hoids that neither providers nor patients should be
forced to submit to procedures contrary to their personai beiiefs;" and
finally that financial responsibility be shared by individuals, investor-
owned (10) and nonprofit businesses, and government. 2
As a tax-free nonprofit publishing business, how political is the USCC
allowed to be7 The USCC determinedly claims the right to be politically
relevant, stating that "[I]n a nonpartisan
society of certain fundamental moral
way we [bishops] seek to persuade
issues, not as sectarian but as
universal principles." 3 Operating from a five acre office facility in
Washington DC, the NCCB/USCC - dubbed "the Bishop. Lobby" - have a
combined $40 million yearly budget, of which about $5.4 million on is spent
on publicity and promotion, and $1 million on legal staff. 4 The NCCB
frequently generates amicus curae briefs and provide testimony at
regulatory hearings, but according to IRS regulations, "no substantial part
of the activities of [nonprofit organizations shall be] carrying on
propaganda, or otherwise attempting, to influence legislation
... [or
benefiting] any political campaign on behalf of any candidate for public
office." 5 There was a challenge to the USCC. nonprofit status on this basis
in 1989, but the IRS. standard proved sufflcientiy vague for the Second
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District Federal Court to find no "bright line test" on what c
"substantial" lobbying by nonprofit
onstitutes
corporations.^
With what degree of authority does the NCCB speak for Catholics?
Vatican
,I spares few superlatives in defining the bishops' role as
authentic teachers" in the Church, holding that Catholic bishops "by
ivine institution have succeeded to the place of the apostles
... he who
Who sent Christ." 7 Subject to the Hontan pontiff's agreentent, the bishops'
teachings on faith and morals can on rare occasions be taken as
infallible" (ett cathedra), to be accepted on faith
"absolutely." 8 gut this
teaching authority is meant in the sense of the Church's
"magisterium" -
Its theologically-based ethical guidance.
As a general rule, the bishops are entitled to the utmost credence from
the faithful, but according to the Church's formal position, they do not
formally carry the same moral weight in matters of public policy as they do
in matters of faith. 9 nccB statements have an order of official importance
Occasionally the NCCB issues a statement containing what is termed
"authentic teaching," but only if the Holy See approves it in advance. 10
When opinions are a product of a majority vote of the Conference, they are
called pastoral statements, rather than authentic teachings, and further
stratified on four levels: joint pastorals, formal statements, special messages
and resolutions. 1 > In the NCCB's Statement of the Bishops Committee for
Pro Life Activities, their teaching is presented as in some ways tentative,
neither infallible nor authentic, as in the case of withholding nutrition
and hydration to those in persistent vegetative state (PVS), on which the
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bishops state that they "are fully aware that such
necessarily final." 12
guidance is not
Electoral throw-weight
There have been individual bishops who have explored the lintits of
clencal politicisnt, with mixed results. The tactics of New York’s Cardinal
O'Conner, who urged votes against
"pro-choice" candidates (most famously
Geraldine Ferraro's)
- were rejected by 70»/« of New York Catholics
surveyed. 13 At other times in the 20th century the ballot box has been a
direct source of political currency between the Catholic Church and eiected
officials, but in the US, the days of delivering the "Catholic vote" to (or
against) candidates seem faded, if not entirely gone. «
Since the 1960s, writes Patrick Allitt, "it becomes difficult for a
historian to discuss 'the Catholic position' on any issue, because Catholics
themselves were voicing a wide diversity of opinions and often echoing the
diverse opinions of their non Catholic neighbors." 15 Boston's Cardinal
Bernard Law, though a personal friend of former President Bush, has also
dismissed the idea of a Catholic "religious voting bloc." 16 Although there
may not be a single Catholic voting bloc, considering the size and diversity
of American Catholicism(and despite the nearly invisible Catholic Left)
there may still emerge blocs, plural, of Catholic voters of interest to
politicians in the future.
Revised 1983 canon law prohibits clerics from serving as elected
public officials, but Catholic bishops are hardy ignored by political
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places to meet, you've got a Inf r^f th'
,
politician would like,
„
have at his disposal." 18 The Ford fort-Caner presidential contest - the first
national election after «oe v H^ade - did much to raise politician's
awareness level of the hishops, especially as candidate Carter tried Hard towoo t e NCCB. Carter's failure to win them over further enhanced the
bishops' perceived electoral salience. 19
Kehgion-based political activism has had a period of success in the US
although there are indications it has peaked. The
Jeff
Kosen described the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of ,9,3 as "asserting
a sweeping congressional power to displace state law.
. . creatling) a
-atutorr right to religious exemptions beyond what the Court has said the
First Amendment requires." 20 The Act was ruled unconstitutional by the
Supreme Court in June 97.
The election of George Bush, the congressional shift of 1 994. and bans
on "partial birth" abortions have been credited to the conservative values
embraced by the Christian Coalition, some of whose members are Catholic.
21 Yet there are tensions between Protestant conservatives and Catholic-
conservatives. In September 1996. only a year after it was formed by Ralph
Keed, the Catholic wing of the Christian Coalition - the "Catholic Alliance" -
split off to form its own group. Though the Catholic Alliance had touted
membership figures claiming 30,000 Catholics (Stephen Glass says it was
probably 10,000) the fact remains that churchgoing Catholics are more
likely to be Democrats than Republicans. 22 p^en among Catholic
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Republicans the. is a genetationai tiivitie atnon. Catholics which
m.t.gates Cathohc conservatism. According to Comii™. in the ,.96 US
elections 7..
seldom, occasionally or never, anti those that do attend are lar more
moderate than the 1996 Republican party platform. 23
Though the NCCB is not synonymous with the politics of all Catholics
.s Amencan Catholics' most telling leadership group, and its opinions
reveal political diversity. The NCCB is at odds with Christian conservatism
on some key points, as noted by Michael Novak's attack on the bishops'
«^‘<^ments
and Ib^enee of 24
^he
NCCB encourages local welfare initiatives, but not at the expense of AFDC
and food stamps, declaring. "We cannot support reform that destroys the
structures, end entitlements, and eliminates resources that have provided
an essential safety net for vulnerable children ImCuding immigrants] or
permits states to reduce their commitment in this area." 25 ^ko the NCCB
opposes the death penalty because of its disproportionate effect on
minorities, and supports an end to the economic embargo to Cuba. The
Catholic position in politics as it is expressed by the NCCB is not uniformly
conservative, nor predictably partisan, nor always popular. According to
one bishop, "nothing is sacred about majority will when it departs from
basic moral norms" 26
it
Sex and the seamless garment
In their judgment of individual choices in matters of sex, the bishops
are not without an astute appeal to the left. Dubbed the "seamless garment
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argument, the NCCB, and later rh^ \/at- -
attempted to link the life-atfirmmg tone of the bishops' Challenge of Peace ,h6 ‘ t e very popular 1983
ar weapons campaign, to the abortion issue. Chicago’s late
ar
.nal Joseph Bernaclin introduced this intriguing issue linkage by
associating the Challenge of Peace with a sweeping
.'ethic of iife'. - against
abort.on, euthanasia, and physician assisted suicide. 27 j„Hn Paul IPs 1995
Oospe, Of fife expands on this rationale, pitting a ''cuiture of death" against
a cu ture of hfe,"
.nsisting that technology requires moral consistency
especially now, when
"postmodernism has conditioned us to procedures
which were previously considered criminal." 28
However, apan from the NCCB's sometimes astute navigation of
American partisan currents, the bishops' opinions are necessarily affected
by their Obedience to the Vatican, with negative consequences for their
popular appeal. Church attendance experienced a 16 percent drop in the six
years following the controversial 1968 encyclical llumanae Vitae, but has
stabilised Since then according to Greeley, retaining a loyal and stable
following of churchgoers. 29 creeley says a key to the post-f/umanae vitae
era are parish priests, which have provided American Catholics a tolerant
flexibility such that "almost four-fifths of the weekly church attendees
(and at least as large a portion of the weekly communion receivers) do not
accept the Church's official sexual teaching." 30
But this adaptation to the Catholic Church's internal contradiction
over sex morals is not new. As far back as 1974 Greeley found that 83% of
American Catholics use anificial contraception, 73% approve of
remarriage after divorce and 36% supported legal abortion. 31 Greeley adds
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a houcs ana ste.n.a«on che ™os, popu,a. fo™ of Ca.HoUc contraception
esptte wHat tHe
.etatcH. says. 3. , ,
'
“ Off- tHe bisttop. ™ore tepeUent
notions of organicism.
Economic Justice
In a less intimate realm of morality, in the mid-Eighties the NCCB
addressed economic
"social iustlce" - exactly the sort of thing which fired
the polifcal imagination of «erttm No.antm and Quadrages/mo 4nno, But
the.r 1986 pastoral toaomiUmoU^ failed to stimulate much
outside of church groups because comparatively few American
Catholics see structural impediments to their upward mobility. 33 The
NCCB's Widely inclusive
"universal" approach further lacks sharp
rhetorical dichotomies, and avoids the exploitive-rich-versus-the-
oppressed-poor language of Liberation Theology.
The studiously Inoffensive tenor of the NCCB's socioeconomic pastoral
prompts critics to dismiss it as neither serious theory nor as a specific
program. 34 Though Michael Novak has attempted to divine a portentous
pro-capitalist spin to the opinions of John Paul II, the USCC's Economic
°f “Mer, social democratic, capitalism-
with-a-social-conscience (aka "Christian Democrat") position. 35 gather
than follow Novak's cheerleading for big business, the bishops prefer to
cite John Paul II's Laborem Exerren : "the principle of the priority of labor
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capUa,
. . . remains a ™ere instrument or instrumental cause." 3.
reemphasizes «erum, affirmation of the
ri.ht to p.vate property antf the corporatist principle of suhsi.iarity
auv.s.ng the restraint of the ,ar«e centra, izecf state so that it unciertahes
on y What smai, and intermediate sized
"communitarian" groups cannot
accompiish,
or resources, basics shouid tahe priority over itutury; that the common
good Should hold precedence over individual success; and that the
international weapons race should be quit. Repeating long standing
Catholic doctrine, the NCCB cites the treatment of the powerless in a society
as dehnitive of its social justice. 37 Economic
reconciliation of capita, and labor at arm’s length from the state is vintage
nineteenth century corporatism, tempered by the indispensabiiity of the
welfare state.
David llolienbach, one of the chief drafters of Economic insMc,
AU. was asked how the NCCB and Catholic social doctrine addressed the
subjectivity of perceived need, that is, the surprisingly common belief
among many wealthy individuals that the 'wolf Is at the door,’ and for this
reason they need every penny - frequently yours - to protect themselves
from the impending realities of brutal life, 38 what moral argument is
convincing enough for these persons to care about redistribution to the
needy?
190
Hollenbach answered cha, there are so.ne needs which are concrete
and quantifiable
- hunaer is nnr» u . •
"perceptions
t cross borders easiiy." „e .ays that redistrihutive ar«un,ents are ntore
eastiy ntade in weaithier societies than ones with widespread poverty bnt
that ior the US. sonte ntinintnnts can be estahiished. iVesutnabiy this is a
task tor the persuasive power and ntorai authority of the Church, furtheredby the public mission of the NfY'u r./-,
may he seen as
somethin, iess than revoiutionary, but there are few tis organisations
wh.ch represent sixty miiiion Americans and have been as wiiiin, to ar,ue
m.ntmai standards of redistributive justice as persistently and
systematically as the NCCB.
Overall, the NCCK has proven nimble and prolific in helping; Catholics
and Catholic sponsored public benefit corporations maintain their Catholic
identities in the midst of American culture and politics. Not overtly
partisan, yet in some cases issue-driven, the NCCK lends unity and credence
to Catholic social values. In intensely personal matters, the laity has
nullified certain of the Church's more restrictive approaches to personal
conscience, coincidental with a levelin, off in the decline in church
attendance.
The Church's laws do not have the consequences of secular authority,
yet they do attempt to ref>ulate problematic behavior. In the context of
modern America, the result has been that ethical issues and moral
questions are put in normative terms, unevenly followed, yet without any
devastating schism. As Greeley has pointed out several times, the
stubbornness of the Church's hierarchy has thrown the rank and I'ile back
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upon their own personal consciences with rus, the result that they are
inclined to develop a more mature, self-realized faith.
more
he sori
ILC^ and ( Rtholi(~ ( ' haritif^^
Service to the needy is the traditionai mission of evety Cathoiic
church, but more relevant to Cathoiic weifare corporatism is the network
of US Cathoiic Charities, whose combined $2.5 biiiion yeariy revenues
makes it a ieader among non govemmentai sociai service providers 39
Sixty five percent of Cathoiic Charities’ income is from government, much
of It earned as a subcontractor of services which the government cannot
Itself adequately perform. 40 y^is devolution-by-subcontract
originated in
the iate 1960s, when Titie 20 federai funding was first made avaiiabie to
individual states. Overwhelmed by the influx of Great Society doiiars, the
states then hired independent agencies, the iargest of which in many
communities was the regionai Cathoiic Charities. Catholic Charities rose to
the task, now serving ten miiiion Americans through diocese-based
nonprofit corporations which, like the United Way, administer a variety of
programs under their umbrelia: thrift stores, soup kitchens, housing
facilities for AIDS patients or otherwise disabied, chiidren’s day care,
elderly services and other family assistance. 41
But the original impulse of Catholic charitabie work was to enable the
largely immigrant Cathoiic community to stand independent from what
they feit was a Protestant-dominated state. In 1901 Archbishop Wiliiams'
primary mission for what was then the Cathoiic Charities Bureau of Boston
was to prevent "the great ioss to the faith of so many Catholic chiidren who
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in becoming wards of the Cities and State
Protestant families," 42 cardinal O'Connell
Bureau Director Rev. M. J. Scanlan "to keep
[Protestant] social workers who
in
are placed out to board
later told Catholic Charitable
an eye on the activities of the
seem to be attempting to carry on a
Service work." 43 ironically, Catholic charitable
similar criticism.
work has now attracted
Doubts about government persist in another Catholic relief
organization with nationwide stature, the St. Vincent De Paul Society
(SVDP), which accepts no state funding. 44 Established by the French
Catholic liberal Frederick Ozanam in the 19th century as a layman's relief
organization, SVDP echoes Catholic corporatism's early wariness of the
state, and shares its inclination towards "mutual aid." In Europe since the
time of Henry VIII's expropriations of Church property in England, the
work of the Church had been largely replaced by government, but
according to Susan Walton the "Elizabethan Poor law and the modern state
relief which was its heir was formal, cold and at times heartless." 45
Instead, continues Walton, Ozanam encouraged a "personal witness to
poverty" Which featured direct outreach to the needy rather than what
seemed the mechanical relief of the bureaucratized state. 46
Nowadays Catholic Charities finds itself very involved with
government. So necessary have government funds become that critics
within the Church worry that in bidding for state contracts. Catholic
Chanties has been reduced to simply doing the state's bidding, and is
surrendering its Catholic identity in the bargain. The perceived threat
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er orm the.r social services stripped of overt religiosity, but that the
-ney chase has distorted its mission to suit the governmenfs inconstant
notions of social service.
Father Roben Sirico reports that 80% of Massachusetts' Catholic
Charities are now devoted to substance abuse programs, even though this
represents only one founh of Catholic Charities' traditional cases 47
(Catholic Charities of Boston disputes the figure as closer to is%) 48
contends that in accommodating federal funding preferences, thrift stores
and soup kitchens have been scaled back, and child protective service
contracts and adoption programs have virtually disappeared. (Robert
wuthnow and Martin Marty have echoed Sirico's concern). 49
further argues that the huge government presence amounts to
nationalhiation of private philanthropies, which are inevitably left
hanging by government cutbacks or changed policy standards, and then
forced into "subsidizing government projects out of private dollars" in
order to maintain services at a level suitable
standards. 50
to their professional
Though Sirico and others may complain that Catholic Charities are not
Catholic enough, some Americans are concerned about an opposite effect
that government is in effect becoming too religious, paying for charitable’
social services which are also being used as a pretext for religious
conversion ( catechesis"). Court challenges in the late 1980s reflected this
concern, which among other effects called a halt to US Department of
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lIouMng and Urban Development Community Develop
those groups described as
"pervasively religious." 51
ment Block Grants to
y ^entfrir j^:aaUaw for reiivfo.
^On.soro^j
a{|?nrir-;
Of specal significance to all US religion-sponsored
services is a 1988
upreme Court decision,
.o.en v.endric. 5. 3.,
ourt overturned a district court ruling against the Adolescent Family Life
Act lAPUl, a federal program which provides grants to organisations for
counseling and education on adolescent premarital sexual relations. AFLA
specifically seeks the participation of religious organizations and prohibits
the use of its funds for
"abortions or abortion counseling or referral " 53
The Supreme Court reversed the lower court and held that AFU did
not Violate the establishment clause, using the three-part criteria First set
forth in Lemon v Kunzman, namely, that AFU was (1) motivated by
legitimate secular concerns, (2) that the Act did not have the primary
effect of advancing religion and (3) did not constitute excessive
entanglement of church and state. 54
The district court's had held that AFU advanced religion because of its
specific request for grant applications by religious groups. In the opinion
of the lower court, to "presume that AFLA counselors from religious
organizations can put their beliefs aside when counseling an adolescent on
matters that are part of religious doctrine is simply unrealistic." 55
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However. Chief Justice Kehn.uisfs
™a)ority opi„i„„
at aithough AFU specificaily recruits reii,i„us,y
aiiiiiated
or.an.ations, it does not re.ufre that they he reii.ousiy aiiiiiated
quoting Roemer v Maryland Hoard of Public Works- 'V,.|- •ui L w , religious institutions
need not be quarantined from public benefits rh;,ft at are neutrally available
- a... Khentjuist maintains that the "Court has never heid that reiigious
institutions are disabled by the First Atnendntent front participating in
PUbiiciy sponsored social welfare progrants," and further cites the 1899
precedent Hradfield v Roberts, which allowed federally funded hospital
construction at a Koman Catholic facility. 57
Another question the lower coun raised in Hotven was that AFU^
involved
"pewasively sectarian" organizations and therefore risked an
intperntissible advancement of religion by indirectly financing religious
indoctrination. Among the precedents cited was Grand Rapids Schools
District V Hall, in which aid to religious schools was held to be an
impermissible advancement of religion, describing parochial schools with
the term "pervasively sectarian." 58 pehnquist notes that in Bowen no
specifics were given by the district court on how they arrived at the
opinion that the organizations involved in AFLA were "pervasively
sectarian." lie also disagrees with the district Court’s conclusion that AFLA
authorizes impermissible teaching on "matters that are fundamental
elements of religious doctrine, such as the harm of premarital sex and the
reasons for choosing adoption over abortion." 59 Uehnquist concludes that
fundine wm institutions who receive AFLAT With the message that Congress intended to deliver
Idonhon premarital sex is hariSul anda pti is preferable to abortion] is insuflicient to warrant a finding
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reli'So 'he primary effect „, advancing
Justice Kennedy, concurrence in ffo.en doubts "that the tern.
~y sectarian, is a weii hounded iuridica, category,, but conciudes
that even though exclusive or disproportional funding to so-ca„ed
pervas.vely sectarian institutions may in some cases impermissibly
advance religion, APIA was not one of those cases. 61
Justice Klackmun dissents that there is an important difference
between
.'running a soup kitchen" and counseling pregnant teenagers,
especially when "the religious organization is directly engaged in
pedagogy, with the express intent of shaping belief and changing
behavior. " 62 citi„g Cranff ffap/ffs Schools Dlstria y Ball, and other Court
decisions relating to religious education, he maintains that, especially
among children in the age group targeted by AFLA (college students are
assumed less impressionable), the law is careful about when religious
approaches are used in the process of education
.
63
Blackmun agrees that government support of secular social welfare
sen^ices by religiously affiliated organizations is constitutional, but that
"such recognition has been tied to the nature of the subsidized social
service." and illustrates this qualification by quoting Koemer v Maryland
Public Works Board: "'the State may send a cleric, indeed even a clerical
order, to perform a wholly secular task. ' " 64 giackmun expressly points out
the Catholic organizations' use of the NCCB's Ethical and
Uirett ives for Cathol ic Health Facilities and reports that a "nurse midwife
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ipita !. religious views on sex when she answered
'yes' to a
askpfi a 1 - ,
teenager who
ed, as a medical matter, whether she could have sex durinv n^ 5>e u g pregnancy. "65
to
in
The net result of ftowen Is that although the government continues
fund
"falth-hased" social sendee organisations, the overtly religious
aspects Of these groups Is kept low. Byron Johnson of Lamar University
Texas notes w^-ly, "We [canj use pet therapy, horticulture therapy
acupuncture.
. . hut If you mention Cod, there's a prohlem." hh
against religious rites is expensive. Joe Klein writes that "the 'faith' in
faith-based programs is often the veiy quality that makes them successful
"
but reports that when Michigan's governor John Lngler required that a
successful urban mission called
"Joy of Jesus" work through a secular
intermediary organization, with "no morning prayers or intensive Bible
study[, tjhe program soon fell apart." 67
Kel igion am i soc i al s<Tvlrps in Boston-
Among the Catholic social seiyice professionals interviewed for this
study, none of those who worked for organizations with state funding
appeared to have any problem whatsoever with limiting their work to the
wholly secular. The distinct impression was that no one wished to
jeopardize their professional mission for the sake of strictly secular
doctrine. In fact, questions about the extent to which the "Catholic identity'
of various agencies and facilities has disappeared seemed somewhat beside
the point.
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Pregnancy, abortion and adoption
Even in matte, relating to abortion, what many consider the
Kardened core of Catholic social doctrine, the position of Church-sponsored
agenc.es is more nuanced than what is commonly assumed, and clearly at
odds w,th televised images of screaming protesters. Father James A
O'Donohoe, a director of Covenant Health Care in Bedford Massachusetts
,aEubhc Jur,d.c Person under canon law and therefore directly owned by the
Church, said that, contrary to popular opinion, the official position of the
Church ,s that "abortion is not a sin, only the intent is a sin." 68
Gorman, Director of Programs for Catholic Charities of Boston agrees, and
adds that compassion for the individual, apart from the act of abortion
.tself, is axiomatic in Catholic social service. He says that on more than one
occasion pregnant women living in Catholic sponsored shelters have
briefly left it in order to have an abortion, then returned to the same
shelter later that day. The understanding is that the woman is welcome at
all times, but that the Church will simply decline to facilitate the abortion
by providing her transportation to it. 69
One Boston area social service office, "Project Rachel," is explicitly
sectarian in its approach to abortion, yet is also carefully compassionate. In
the aftermath of an abortion Project Rachel believes that religion is the
best therapy, using the Catholic sacraments as its therapeutic focus. Project
Rachel’s chief purpose is to culminate in "reconciliation" (that is, the
confession to a priest of the sin of an intentional abortion) so that once
forgiven, a woman (or a man who has intentionally facilitated the abortion
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seek.ns! absolution from a Catholic priest. 70
ProK-ct Rachers educational outreach features slide shows and
ectures mvoivin, pro life issues, but it cannot tfualify for pubiic funding
- it
.S financed directly through the Archdiocese's
"Fund for the Unborn''
cardinal Law's specially earmarked anti abortion campaign. Thorpe says
'
that this resource is limited, though, and that research on the
repercussions of abortion has been at a standstill because of the
government ban on funding for this type of counseling.
But Thorpe was not inclined to portray the government as a
particularly sinister force. The Church has constantly recommended
adoption as an alternative to abortion, but when Thorpe was asked about
the Sharp drop in Catholic adoption services (cited by Sirico), rather than
<o condemn morally relativistic welfare subsidies or to blame religion-
phobic government funding policies, Thorpe instead commented that all
adoptions have fallen off, not just Catholic ones, because of high profile
litigation, such as the "Baby Richard" episode in which a birth parent was
allowed to reclaim her child years after an adoption was in place. 71
Catholic Charities'
.James Gorman agrees that the "kids aren't there" to
adopt, but rather than to blame the state for permissive programs, he
attributes the increased social acceptance of single parenting and abortion
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to out of wedlock mothers.
which provided income
other practicing Catholic social service workers either pointedly
downplayed Catholic doctrine, or at the extreme si.ply avoided the topic,
desp.te ettorts to provoke argument. None of the five pastoral counselors
interviewed for this study recognized the NCCB’s Directive 36 on
dispensation of medications to prevent ovulation for victims of sexual
assault (see Chapter Bight). 73 st, Blizabeth’s Hospital in Boston staffs
several
"pastoral counselors" who are available for spiritual guidance to
patients, but none interviewed could recall "that sort of thing" happening
at any Catholic facility where they had worked. Fran Bogle, a Protestant
reverend at St. Olizabeth's. spoke of "encountering the person in the
lullness of the faith and in terms of who they are - without religious
rightness or wrongness," and another counselor said she'd simply refer a
Victim of sexual assault seeking Directive 36 treatment
74
to another hospital.
When asked about in vitro fertilization, which is specifically
disallowed by papal encyclical, (also detailed in Chapter Bight) the pastoral
counselors said that those leaving a Catholic hospital to undergo such a
tertllity treatment elsewhere would not necessarily be leaving the faith. To
the contrary, they would be welcomed back at St. Elizabeth's, perhaps to
have the baby once it was successfully conceived. Some of the counselor's
responses seemed mildly surprising to the priests and nuns in
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nistrative posts who were questioned bnr th
,
^ ‘-5>no c , ut the counselor’s views
typified the approach of the Catholir nrapractitioners interviewed.
Perhaps the tentative
,uahty of so.e pastoral counseling Is llnhed to abureaucratic
'Catch.22,. In which the
.overnntent plays the
..free
exercse.. aspect of the First Antendntent against the
..estahllshntent.. Cause
at er Boh Rochon, director of St. Anne.s Hospital In Fall River MA
conrnrents that providing spiritual care Is a re,ulren.ent for accreditation
y the JCAllO U0.nt Commission on Accreditation of Health Organizations)
and that JCAHO accreditation Is In turn a prerequisite for Medicare and
'
Medicaid funding. 75 yet, according to Rochon, none of his half-million
tiollar pastoral care budget Is eligible for Medicare or Medicaid funds. In
short, though the state requires the presence of religious counseling it
refuses to fund It, despite the contdctlon among many professionals that
what IS therapeutic is inseparable from what is uniquely religious.
James Gorman steers widely clear of controversy over theological
distinctions, noting that Catholic Charities' business relationship with state
government is increasingly good. Gorman claims that whatever church
and state issues arise in his work centers on professional standards rather
than religious faith. He cites an example from two years earlier when St,
Anne's Home in Methuen felt pressured by the Massachusetts Department
of Social Services to discharge children prematurely into less expensive
treatment. Echoing Sirico's sentiments about "nationalizing" private
philanthropy, Gorman says St. Anne's was faced with providing for the
children at their own expense in order to maintain their professional
principles.
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Condom use, sex education and AIDS
o,.c app^aches
.o infor.aUon about sexua, practices anU the
s approach to the use of condoms hardly fits the stereotype of
.nnextbie morai condemnation. The HCCB's I^alitttaa^ntnassion
simply warns that
prophylactics sometimes faii and can invite a false confidence- they
recommend chastity, Citina a inx 7 mccu
statement about sex education,
\ichard McCormick says the Nrrn'c q i • •y CCB s administrative board has "accepted
public educational programs that include factual i,
prophylactics." 77
nformation about
rn some cases the Catholic Church is ac,uiring a reputation for
especialiy weil-run sex information programs. In a 1992 study of church-
sute issues in Springfield, Massachusetts, Demerath and Williams ,uote a
representative of the Family Planning Council of Western Massachusetts
Who stated flatly that "Cathedral ICatholicJ High School has the best sex-
education program in the city, although it is formally part of their
religion- classes. They are not only willing to talk about abortion, but they
even invited m one of our staff persons to make a presentation." 78
-phe
study also found that of Springfield clergy surveyed, 90 percent of Catholic-
priests and sisters agreed that sex education in public schools should be
legal, compared to 71 percent of Protestant/.|ewish clergy (though this
second figure included
"evangelical and black pastors (whoj expressed rare
disapproval.") 79
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n June of 1996 the Boston G/ohe reponed that the director and several
other workers resigned Iron, the Catholic Charities' Haitian Multl-Se.lce
center In Dorchester after
"years of ,ulet struggle between the center's
^clers and ,ts corporate parent. Catholic Charities, over birth control and
prevenuon practices at odds with Catholic teaching." 80
another
occasion at St. Patrick's Shelter for Women In Somerville there was a
similar resignation, also attributed to Catholic condom policy. Gorman's
response was that the news reports neglected to note that the dispute was
over the Church's refusal to directly distribute condoms a, the center,
rather than to suppress the use of condoms in all cases. 81
When asked whether Catholic teaching wasn't an impediment to
dealing with homosexuals with AIDS, the slightly agitated reply from Sister
Madeline Gallagher of St. Helena's House in Boston's South End was, "Why
not love an AIDS patient? You don't love someone any less because they're
sick," noting that the Church does not consider homosexuality a sin 82
Neither does the NCCB consider homosexuality a "morally acceptable
option," but on the other hand, they add that "not every homosexual is
personally responsible for his or her homosexual orientation." 83 The
Church's official position is that "Homosexual persons are called to
chastity." 84
According to David Garten Director of Housing Development for the
Boston Archdiocese's Planning Office for Urban Affairs the Catholic
Church "may be the largest provider of AIDS housing in the nation." He
points out the AIDS housing is a mission apart from Catholic Charities,
204
participated in by many different ( athr^iir-
congregations, citing locally the
^ ' s St. Joseph s as an extensively committed order. «5
Si«.r Zi„ „™,„, ui,„.
„„
much ot Catholic service. She savs thar "n,.<- y t no one is rejected hy the Church.
there is no Catholic AIDS, no l-rotestant AIDS, no Jewish AIDS. There is just
AtDS." «h She underlines that there is great misunderstanding about the
Church's position on homosexuaiity and cites the NCCK's recent pastoral
encouraging love and care hy Catholic parents lor their gay children
•Stster
.ita coordinates three residentiai homes for AIDS patients in the
Boston archdiocese, Seton Manor in Brighton, Julie ilouse in Loweli,
Nazareth Kesidence for Mothers and Children in Koxbury, and is
anticipating the construction of a fourth, the Robert McBride Ilouse in the
Fenway area of Boston.
Housing
In addressing other, less high-profile housing projects which the
Archdiocese is involved in, Garten avoids the expression
"Catholic identity,
echoing Gorman and other Cathoiic social seivice administrators who do
’
not dwell on the theological "teaching function" of the Church. Instead
Garten suggests that the "personality and character [of Catholic housing
developments are] better reflected in our track record," which if anything
is "Christian rather than Cathoiic." 87 notes that the Church owns none
ot the 1800 units of housing which they have had buiit and "does not
recall" any divestiture of Catholic housing subsequent to Howen. ilousing is
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instead deve.oped by the P.annin, Office and then turned over to
.nd,v.dua, occupiers who wouid not otherwise be abie to own
property. 88 Sintilarly, Sister Madeline Gallagher
disabled housing of St. Helena’s in Boston's S
describes the elderly and
operation. We follow all the HUD rules and
staff IS led by a Jewish social worker
religiously diverse. 89
outh End as "strictly a HUD
regulations" and adds that the
and that the tenants are racially and
Despite the therapeutic conrntunity's somewhat paradoxical and
sennce practitioners mostly downplay sectarian differences if it would
mean hmitlng their ability to deliver necessary services. Madeline
Gallagher sunrmarizes it best when she says that the roles of Catholics in
soual serv.ce are not of any distinct
’’school." She says that there are no
courses taught in ’’Catholic" social service at Boston College or at other
Catholic schools for n,en and women religious who wish to work in social
sendee. She says that Christian or Catholic values may be conveyed if
teacher or student happen to emphasise these qualities in their own life
but she is careful to rule out any systematic or institutionalized
"Catholic”
doctrine woven into the teaching or structuring of the profession of social
work.
Ihc Calholig (.hun h and Amp rican Elnr."^li>;m
In the past centuiy, Catholic Charities have come to embrace the
pluralist American society which supports it, rather than to retreat into an
enclave of ethnic self-involvement. The nearly one and one half billion
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taxpayer dollars per year flowing into Catholir rh« Chanties is not simply topay for Catholic services to CathniiV'
to Win Catholic votes
thoiic social services have won the trust of American public by
becoming publicly Amedcan, Catholics have succeeded in running
effective agencies worthy of contract awards and individuals' patronage
through a Sincere and explicitly pluralist approach to both clients and
staff, part of the bargain with government in subcontracting
welfare-state
services. Catholic Charities' house organ SdoaUtagfu repeatedly stresses
this theme of pluralism, studiously avoiding
through litigation or moralistic theological
confrontational approaches
prescription. 91
e muted Catholic religiosity is not simply a convenient tactic among
agencies eager for government dollars. It is part of an ongoing theological
approach, especially among American Catholic theologians. David
nollenbach sees the expanding Catholic affinity for pluralism as consistent
With subsidiarity:
"The principle of subsidiarity embodies a pluralist model
of social interaction. It envisions society as composed of many different
g oups with many different purposes, needs and legitimate claims." 92 lie
says the days of promoting Catholicism as "the official religion of the
realm" were already on the wane in the 1950s, when some Catholics still
were insisting that the Church "had the vision" and wished to impose an
absolute religious unity on the daily life of politics, science, and the
economy, heedless of others' beliefs and dismissive of technical fact, 93
nollenbach goes on to quote the enormously influential Karl Rahner, who
warned of illusions of an all-encompassing religiosity in which "human
life can be unambiguously mapped out and manipulated in accord with
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certam universal principles proclaimed by the Church and watched overby her ,n the manner in which they are developed and applied." 94
Bryan Hehir of the Catholic Relief Service (the Church's Internationa,
charuable agency, has described Catholic Charities as at the
"intersection
of ecclestastrcal pluralism and religious pluralism." and cautions restraint
m the use of religious language and reasoning when pursing policy in a
public forum. 95 Hehir says religious symbolism is
"indispensable in the
effort to both identify the social issues facing the Christian conscience and
to mobilize the Church." but disagrees that it should be the dominant mode
Of policy discourse and hesitates about the "usefulness of public theology in
policy discussion. Interdependence points toward the need for systemic
solutions which are persuasive for a multiplicity of actors with widely
varying faith visions." 96 Mario Cuomo is similarly wary of sectarian heavy
handedness (implicitly from the Protestant religious right) and warns
against rigid approaches which seek to overtake the social order and which
insist that only their terms prevail.
At the same time. Catholic Charities’ national president Fred Kammer
interprets his organization's religious freedom includes the right to
participate in public debate and education, one which simultaneously
"transcend[s] and enhance[s] the interests of the state," and deserves "not
only respect but support from the public sector," 97 gut he recognizes the
necessity of collaborating with secular goals. To this end Kammer describes
Catholic Charities as determinedly pluralistic, openly seeking to join other
groups, and fully accountable to public assessment. Against this backdrop
Catholic Charities apply the scope and variety of Catholicism's small-c
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catholicity to the Church's
culture.
institutional work in America’s multiethnic
Pisctissif^^
«u,r .services IS tar less pronounced than at the hesinnlns of this
century, but this reflects the degree to which a pluralist clientele and a
Piurallst community of employees have succeeded in informing Catholic
values, Catholicism has converged with some of modern American society
’s
PUW.C ethics, just as Catholics themselves have successfully adapted to
American culture. Religious freedom and religious non-discrimination
have struck a balance, even in the treacherous terrain of pregnancy
counseling and AIDS, without any grave abandonment of Catholic
theological principle.
Though the state may be missing an opportunity to give financial
credence to the healing power of prayer and explicit forms of religious
devotion, Catholic social services continue without pressing their sectarian
point beyond the sustainable limits of a pluralist public morality. The
corporatist bargaining compelled by social services' financial and
regulatory interdependence with the state can therefore be seen as a
progressive means of adaptation by the Church to the state, as much as it is
an accommodation of the state to the Church.
There is no indication that Catholic Charities is about to relinquish
their funding because of any theological chill or regulatory suppression
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beyond the terms of Bowen v Kendrick Tn rhanck. o the contrary, Catholic theology
seems to support the trend to Americans, i- .pluralism in its downplayed
moralistic tone. The change in Catholic thi wse m c i thinking
,s not to insist that the
public yield to theology but that theology be personali 7edhy UL iz m a way which
empowers the Catholic individual to give meaning to thes their private faith in
a public forum.
jjircctivps Bishops, Ethical and ec||,.|„„,.
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CIIAI'TDK 8
CATHOLIC STONSOKOD HDALTH C.AKC
A.„ng the Catholic Church.
'.Institutional witness," health care
nvolves the most
.one. anh the
.ost controversy anh It lull. HIspla.s the
•hree traits of Catholic wellare corporatls.: or.anicis™ In Its Catholic
commitment to social justice for the need.; subs,dfarity in providing health
services to patients who are funded b. state or who would othe™ise be
patients at state facilities; and muft™„dahty in how it simultaneous!.
semes the communit., competes with private sector rivals, and pursues
public funds and regulatory support.
Market
to the
in 1995 Catholic sponsored
facilities accounted for about 10% of the entire US health care industry
with about one in six US hospital admissions, nearl. $46 billion in assets
and revenues of S31.9 billion - about twice the earnings and assets of the
largest for-profit corporation, Columbia/1 ICA. 1 Though Catholic health
care is not organized into a single business entity nor does ever. Catholic
y belong to the same industry association, the largest Catholic health
care trade group - the Catholic Health Association (CHA) - represents 425
Catholic sponsors of 600 hospitals, plus over 1000 long term care facilities
and 57 multi-institutional systems. ^
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«> l>avc a special openness wiM, U.e sn.all and weak
,
.
. ,,„„e u.a, are
'"""ilialod and lei. „n the ,nar«i„s
,,l sneiely
.
.
. « 5
•'pn,pl.e„c
.nandale speak
. . . |,-„„, u.e side U.e assess liles.yle
a.s well as social i,.s,i,nU„„s and policies i,.
.ern.s ol U.eir in,pad on U.e
poor."
Catholic I.ealU.care is no, u.e leader in service ,o U.e |,„o,- even
ana.n« nonproliis. Sis,er lean del.lois repo,-,s CaU.olic hospdal's
acce,nance ol Medicaid recipienis is con,|.ara,ively low, rinding lewer
Medicaid-inaUen, days s,,en, in Caiholic l,os|,i,als Ihan in ml.er no„,,n,|i,,
h..H%
... I U%. 7 Ciover.nnen,-™,. I.ospiials a,e far ahead in ,his ca,e,,o,y
w„h 1 ol U,eir paiien, days paid by Medicaid while ro.--pi'olii,
inveslor-owned ,l,„ laciliUes do U.e leas,: (,.4%, acco,din„ ,o dehlois. «
s:
' cWef de.er„,ina,u
„r a
,.„spUar,s Ca. i.y
con,o.Uo„
,.,u„dac.„ w„c. ,spo„».
,seu„, a.de U. a««.,a.e
if.urc6 for the enure Catholic healtitcare industry, titose individual
CalHohc hospitals which happen to he located in needy neitthhorhoods are
..stinttuished hy their care oh the poor, hut not necessarily because they
urban areas, and that poverty rates exceeded 2,1% in | |„ conununities
served by Catholic hospitals in 1990 (twice as ntany conununities as in
iy«0,. 10 Sanders' study o, Catholic lacilities largely concurs with llultntan
Mndin, no causal relationship between a hospital's charity care output and
'
Whether the facility has a lay or religious COO, or ntission effectiveness
program. ^ 1
As for senior citizens on Medicare, delflois, finds Catftolic hospitals in
Ihe aKsrettate are undistinguished in caring for the elderly. 12 ilerzIinKer
and Fonner found virtually no difference in Medicare service amon«
C;atholic-owned, investor owned or nonprofits: about 54% of patient days i,
llie averase US hospital were covered by Medicare in 1995. 15
Nonnrofii la^
In the US, a 501 (c) (3) (nonprofit) status qualifies a corporation for
exemptions from federal taxes on corporate inome, unemployment, and
revenue bonds. IKS rules allows individual contributions to the hospital as
deductible for the donor. H Almost all nonprofit hospitals are also exem|tt
from state sales taxes and local property taxes, but this has been subject to
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court challenge. In California alone, combined
exemptions to nonprofit community hospitals
1987.15
state and federal income tax
approached $300 million in
n
.mportant change occurred in April 1983 when Medicare changed
to a prospective reimbursement" method. Rather than case-hy-case
b.lhng, the government now pays on the basis of predetermined
'diagnostic related groups" (DRGs), which are cost categories numbered
from 1 ,o 468 into which patients are fitted by their particular ailment(s)
Profit margins have become much tighter since DRGs were introduced, and
the bottom line has occasioned new and difficult adjustments for Catholic
ealthcare including mergers and consolidations with non-Catholic
operations.
Compared to lO's (investor owned for-profits), nonprofit hospitals are
assumed to be less exploitive because they are not accountable to earnings-
conscious shareholders. Nonprofit hospitals "own themselves" because they
have no investors or shareholders to distribute profits to. Whatever
earnings remain after expenses (such as salaries) are used to finance its
own activities and cannot be distributed as shareholder income. Arrington
and Annock say the general impression is that compared to lO's, nonprofits
provide more community-oriented services and are more accessible to the
uninsured. 16
Though at first, tax exemption for nonprofit hospitals was justified by
their demonstrable service to the poor, the IRS eventually eliminated such
qualifications, 17 An IRS ruling in 1956 first gave nonprofit hospitals the
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C K„ce u, either turn.h helow-c.st set^iee. u.e „eec,y „r use ear„i,„s
orcapttal.ntpreventems. >« Then in i%9 ihe il<s ailnweci nnnprnii,
h..sp,tals u. screen patient acintissinns inr titnse whn cnuid pay icaiieci
n'dnnaiiy waiiet hinpsies"). ity ,h«3 the ,KS had reduced tite stt.ndt.rd n,
nonprniit charity tn sintpiy
..pn,.„un« cotnn, unity heaitif - re.ardiess „rWhn heneiits. -9 The nider notions ni nnnprnht hnspitais as a cnntpiete
departure Irnm standard healti, care in their treatment oi the
disadvantaged seems tn he fading, in a ,978 Michigan ruiing, the enurt
stated iiatly that charitahie hospitals were "a thing nf „.e past." 2»
Nevertheless snme states have set their nwn charitahie standards in
nonprofit healthcare. In Uuh Cniinlv y Imermnii nlal ii lle.ilih t^.p.
( 1 9x5 ,
die court disquahlied tIte property tax exemptions ol two religious-
Siionsored healthcare iacilities, (neither Catholic, hecause they did no.
poor equivalent to the value of their tax
demonstrate free care to the
exemptions, and neither were their rates any lower than other hospital.s. 2 >
In Cook V Oschner round,,Ion llospi,„l (
1
97 1 ) ten l.ouisiana hospitals
were compelled ,0 provide evidence o,' significant services to poor persons.
This led ,0 iederal regulations which made IlilMturtou construction funds
contingent on a standard minimum of citarity care (ttithough the program
also produced overbedding and ultimately h.rced the closing ol' individual
hospitals in poor neighborhoods).
I he litigious regulatory mood at the state level has inspired tite
Catholic Health A.s.sociati„n
,0 publish the Social A.ronni:,hiU,v
,
a
workbook which teaches how to calculate - and publici/e - the dollar
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ommunity benefits produced by its member hospitals. 22 other
.U.o.
,,,
cent than
.Os (and presumably more dese^ing of taxpayer money) 23
^
found that between ,99„
and 1994 overall costs at for-profit hospitals show twice the rate of increase
as nonprofits. 24 gnt
..erxlinger and Krasher found
'.nonprofits required
.7
cents of public investment for every dolI;ir nv tuc a la of their capital in 1981
iwhilej for-profits required only 2 cents." and further confirmed life's
Mndmg that nonprofits "do not price less aggressively" than their for-
P It competition. 25 LeKlanc found no significant difference in
providing unpopular services such as IIIV/MDS. 26
Nonprofit hospitals argue that they function as quasi governmental
agencies, filling in gaps where the government chooses not to be. But lOs
argue that they, too, serve patients who would otherwise be in state and
municipal hospitals, so why are they not tax exempt? 27
Sanders found that nonprofits (Catholic or otherwise) apportion about
1% more of their total budgets for
"uncompensated care" than do 10s
(investor-owned).. 4.2»^ and 3.1%, respectively, 28
„erdinger repons lO's
and nonprofits were about the same in the average number of patient days
provided to persons with "poor payment sources:" 1 4% for lO's and 1 6% for
nonprofits, (both had identical proportions of Medicaid days, 8%). 29
Sullivan found 14.2% Catholic Hospital revenue devoted to "the poor" for a
total of over $5 billion per year. 3(1 But deBlois says government-run
hospitals do two to ten times as much, devoting 20%-30% of their budgets to
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the uninsured, and Gray found «overnnienc sen^in,
,e.S% of i.e uninsured
population to the nonprofits' 7.9% and for-profits' 6%, 31
Catholic hospitals are not particularly generous corporate cithtens
either. Kauffman found in a 1990 sui^ey of S95 acute care US Catholic-
hospitals, "only 4 percent of the sample made an annual formal payment in
i.eu Of taxes (PiLOTs) or paid a user fee to fund the ioca, taxing district's
public services," 32
organizations sometimes pay PiLOTs to
offset the costs of the safety and sanitation services a city provides.
Biflionnel relations: Workers profe.ssiom.i „n,„..
Because much has been made of the Church's support of collective
labor, one would expect Catholic-sponsored institutions to treat their half-
million employees especially wcll.33 gut some Catholic healthcare
managers have been hostile to unions. 34 The California Nurses
Association described recent anti-union tactics by Catholic Healthcare
West, a chain of 35 southwestern hospitals sponsored by seven orders of
Catholic nuns, as "one of the most acrimonious ever in our organization,"
35 Sullivan and Craypo found "[tjhe labor management atmosphere in most
Catholic institutions can be described as tense or hostile, depressing or
smug."
Catholic sponsored healthcare facilities are also struggling with
increased proportions of non-Catholic staff, and though as we have seen,
pluralism is presumably congenial to the ecumenism of Vatican II, but in
practice. Catholic values sometimes clash with non Catholic staff. In
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- «. „
.mn, fo..d K,
^ ^
managers believed he was homosexual. 37
The peofesslona. suff ,n CathoUc heaUh ca.e facihUes ha. been found
to be treated differently fro. other labor. In particular the professional,
can be seen u..„« the nonprofit hospital, as a vehicle for highly profitable
Side ventures. The Pauly-Kedi.ch ntodel ar.ues that
"nonprofits exist to
enable doctors to practice their profession and earn the bulk of their
income in an institution free of market discipline." 38
Krasker further accuse nonprofit hospitals of increasing
"professional
staffs’ comfort level through tax exemptions and deferral of capital
replacement without providing better, cheaper or more accessible health
care in return." 39
Though nonprofits cannot distribute to investors, the nonprofit
corporate form can be manipulated to allow lucrative deals for the
professionals who work with them. Paul Starr reports that nonprofits
shelter highly profitable businesses operated within them run by
radiologists and pathologists organized as professional corporations. 40
what is described as "polycorporate," a parent holding company which
operates a nonprofit hospital (with its tax exemptions and reimbursements)
"unbundles" subsidiary depanments into separate, prof.tmaking
corporations, most commonly, nonprofit hospitals subcontract their
emergency room services to a separate profitmaking company which
supplies doctors and equipment. Starr claims this method turns nonprofit
hospitals into "a beehive of corporate activity."
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)-.nald Johnson reports that the profit ntakin^ snhsidiaries o, a
are kept separate, 42
medtcal office buifdin.s, tnedical ec,uipntent supply operations, laundries
«.tf stores, restaurants, shopping centers or even contract managentent
firms.
he..
How Will the pressure of market techniques such as polycorporate
restructuring, profitmaking subsidiaries, consolidations and mergers with
non-Catholic facilities affect the meaning of a "Catholic hospital.' deHlois
reports that in 1 985, sixty percent of all Catholic acute care hospitals were
part of a multi-institutional arrangement. 44 ponner cites a 199
1
su^y of
Catholic healthcare managers which found about one third foresaw
collaboration with non Catholic hospitals as "very likely" within five years,
and about a third of those surveyed indicated that they feared of the loss If
their institution's Catholic identity. 45
Many Church leaders insist that if Catholic sponsored facilities must
merge to survive, that they do so with other Catholic corporations
whenever possible. In the Boston area. Cardinal Bernard Law persuaded
Carney Hospital to drop its plan to merge with duincy l-ublic Hospital,
despite the fact that Carney was sponsored by The Daughters of Charity, an
exempt rehj^ious order" which is accountable directly to the Vatican
rather than to the local bishop. 46 According to Monsignor Dennis
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Sheehan of .he Boston Anchd.ocese,
.he ea..on.e was
.ha., ahhou.h
Carneys internal administrative input by the Daughters of Mercy is
techn.cally free of Archdiocese involvement, the moment It went "puhlic"
y seeking to associate itself with another facility in the Archdiocese -
even though the other facility was not rathnii. .
the affair. 47
<he bishop was drawn into
Sister Marylin Perkins is Counselor for Health Care at the Daughters of
Charity, an order of nuns which sponsors a network of 42 hospitals
nationwide in the US. 48 she was asked about the Daughters' sponsorship
Classification -
"pontifical right" - which presumably exempts them from
the ordinary iegai ties to the iocai bishop, linking them instead directiy to
the Vatican. (This is a classification not limited to health care, but pertains
to Catholic-sponsored institutions in other fields, e.g., Catholic University
in Washington DC is of pontifical right,. She expiained that for practical
purposes in their case "pontifical right" means that they are "not
necessari/y iegaliy bound to the bishop" (my emphasis) and that their
"direct accountability" to the Vatican is that the Holy See may exercise
"reserve power as stewards," but that the Daughters do not require
permission for alienation (the sale of property).
When Sister Maryiin was asked about the Cardinal's intemention in
the merger of Carney, (owned by the Daughters of Charity) she said the
decision to forgo the merger with Quincy was made in voluntary
cooperation with the bishop, not because of any canonical ruling or even
because, as a canonical Public Juridic Person, Daughters of Charity
property is ecclesiastical property. The impression given was that although
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hu Ch HOM. certain canonical Inrinence. It ,s a persuasive, potential
oruers are particularly Interested In pusHIn, to a test. Sister Mary, In said
witat the issue of nter.ers wItH non-CatHolle facilities co.es down to Is
requently not a matter of choice, but "a matter of su^lval." I lowever she
maintains that lay persons should not become Involved In Catholic
healthcare unless they are consenia, to Catholic doctrine and "not |ust
support it but embrace it."
The Catholic Hospital Association however flatly prohibits mergers
w.th for-profit facilities and will retract its orttanl.atlon’s certification
from those facilities which do. 49 „n Feb. 26 ,996 the Chicago Archdiocesan
ofhce began to strip St. Olizabeth's Hospital there of its official Catholic
"identity" because it chose to join a managed care network led by
University of Chicago Hospital, rather than the Catholic group favored by
Chicago's late cardinal ,,ohn Bernadin.SO Although the Church has not
P ed civil litigation m the case of businesses using the word "Catholic"
Without Church approval, the assumption is that whoever would do so would
not risk the publicity.
Some Catholic hospitals in Oast coast cities and the Midwest have
proceeded to form partnerships with Colombia/HCA Healthcare, including
many at a March 1996 Chicago conference who argued that such
partnerships with for-profit corporations did not contradict Church
principles. 51 opposition. Cardinal Bernadin characterized Catholic
healthcare as part of ".Jesus' healing ministry" and therefore a type of
sacrament, asking: "Can a 'sacrament' be something that is bought and sold
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in part or in whole, like
instrumentality used to
a commodity? Can a Wamenf become the
return a profit for an investor owned company?" 52
The dividing line between profit and non-profit is not so clear in
Practtce. Covenant ifeaftb Systems, a f 0 year oid Bedford Massachusetts
P rganization which took over operations from the Congregation
O the Ststers of Charity (the "Grey Nuns") has several nonprofit
subsidiaries. According to Director James O’Uonohoe, the Grey Nuns, an
order founded in i?37 in Canada, discovered that modern marhet reaiities
and the disappearance of younger nuns in their order meant the aging
ststers were facing an oid age in complete impoverishment. exchange
for convening some of the facility into a nursing home, the nuns sold
their remainder of the properties - including facilities in Cambridge
Massachusetts and Bogota Colombia, to Covenant, which subsequently found
a mixed structure of profitmaking subsidiaries under a nonprofit umbrella
corporation a competitive necessity. 53
Bernadin’s speech acknowledged that some Catholic hospitals have
for-profit subsidiaries, and was careful not to condemn profitmaking as
intrinsically evil or immoral, but nevertheless maintained that healthcare
was a special sector - "a fundamental human right" - echoing John Paul II
that there are some "goods which by their veiy nature are not and cannot
be mere commodities." 54
Bernadin's comments had more consequence than simply his ethical
opinion. Bishops have varying degrees of direct control over Catholic-
facilities in their diocese, subject to the canon law categoiy of sponsorship.
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Which
.n some cases is the archdiocese itself is the sponsor, and in other
cases ,s based outside the archdiocese. The potentialiy determinative roie of
.ndividuai bishops rankles some iay managers, including one who said Td
be happy to conduct our business any way our bishop wants, if be wouid
guarantee to pick up our deficit at the end of the year. If he is not willing
to pay up, he has no credibility with me or anyone eise who has to run a
Catholic hospital in today's impossibly competitive market." 55 Nevertheless
according to canon law. the hierarchical status of the bishop is a defining
characteristic of what makes a facility Catholic. 56
Sponsorship ih„ |i
„i,|ir l,iri,tir
What are the canonical specifics of Catholic sponsorship, and what
power and responsibility does sponsorship hold? Catholic sponsorship is
nowadays broadly construed as a "canonical stewardship" with reserve
powers, while day to day operations have been professionalized, and to
some extent secularized, because of the necessary inclusion of non-
Cathohcs. 57 Nevertheless, depending on the type of sponsor, decisions as
far reaching as a facility's ownership, divestiture, merger or consolidation
must involve the Church.
Typically, before the 1960s, individual congregations of nuns or local
churches or monasteries were the owners of Catholic healthcare facilities.
But nowadays "men-religious" and "women-religious" (monks and nuns)
are increasingly rare. Fonner and Tang found nearly 300 Catholic hospitals
are sponsored by religious communities whose members' median ages
exceed 70, and in about a dozen cases there are fewer than 50 members left
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m those communities. 58 Catholic nuns, iong the mainstay of Catholic
slLlri’
or healthcare sponsors
and number halt of the CEOs of Catholic heaithcare systems. Lay maies now
constttute 40% of Catholic system CEOs, 75% of hospitai CEOs anti more than
ot long term care executives. 59
Changes to the structure of sponsorship have been explored at least
s.nce 1974, when Sister Mary Sengelaub, the Catholic Ileaith Association’s
hrst woman- religious CEO, established the framework for nine system
network models. 60 Kauffman reports that, anticipating the drop in
vocations, consultants at Arthur O. Little advised the CMA to begin creating
separate busmess corporations
"to assume ownership of Catholic hospitals
m the absence of other viable alternatives." 61 catholic healthcare has
consequently turned to corporate forms which under canon law can
acquire heaithcare facilities from small religious communities and place
them under the direct domain of the greater Church as "ecclesiastical
goods." 62 Macpherson has compiled cases of inter-congregational
collaboration with other faiths that are accommodated through new
sponsorship arrangements, and, more controversially, some successful
associations with secular nonprofits. 63
Two basic forms of Catholic sponsorship which relate to health care as
described here are Private Associations of the Christian Faithfui (PACFs)
and Public Juridic Persons. Canon law (CIC) describes PACFs as
organizations created by private agreement among individuals who wish to
carry on "apostolic" work, and which are allowed by the bishop to use the
231
name "Catholic." 64 cic cites the examples of the Knights of Columbus,
canon
Marriage Encounters and the Mav Dav Rr.ca nlay y Rosary Procession. &5 u^tier
law
"Isiuch associations are called private associations even though they
are praised or recommended by ecclesiastical authority
... but not
established by, the hierarchy. 66 There are large hospital corporations
Which are PCAFs. St. Francis hospital in Memphis is one example. 67
A step up the ecclesiai ladder is the "public juridic person" whose
St construction is true to its medieval corporatist roots by defining it
as an association which
"transcends the purpose of the individuals that
make it up." 68
^ ^
liosuass. is the vehicle of choice to allow a "continued commitment to
Catholic health care regardless of the sponsoring body." 69 a hospital once
sponsored by a small, aging monastic community can thus transform itself
into a "full-fledged ecclesiastical entity" which. Catholic healthcare trade
publications specifically note, are able to acquire the divestitures of other
healthcare facilities.^O
The public iuridic form also Implies a protective affiliation with the
global Catholic Church. The CIC notes that "the civil authority may lack all
competence in regard to it - at least in internal matters. Neither can the
civil authority interfere in its activity" but hastens to add that this removal
from public jurisdiction exists"H]nsofar as the work of the association did
not involve some public good. Hospital public health standards, as opposed
to, for Instance, the designation of a clerical chaplain, may come into play
here."
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on o,Hen
.ana,
.o„„w:n. Mo..ey,
.He po.en,.. a...H...e n. aAC.F
.s .Ha. U .
tinances or policy, nor does it require
.He hivh,
,. „
^
‘"‘-'’‘’>'’"P '‘P..™ission to dissolve
or divest. However as witH Boston's Carney llosni.al . ,
. , .
P > even if a sponsorine
y IS technically exempt from the local bishonp, expansion by merger or
consolidation can be effectively determined by the bishon n iu inc mshop, and more so bv
a cardinal. ^
WHen non Ca.Holic corporations are drawn into mergers and
consolidations, tHe exclusivity of
"ecclesiastical goods" and tHe weigHt of
CatHolic doctrine is less certain. THis is especially telling in tHe matter of
reproductive services. Kev. THomas
.ScHindler, director of OtHics a. Mercy
HealtH
.Services in MicHigan, lists tHree elements to maintaining a
"C:a.holic identity" in tHe event of mergers witH non-CatHolic institutions:
prudential judgment, material cooperation and "toleration of evil."
Kecalling St. Augustine's view of prostitution in tHe city of Hippo
ScHindler notes "WHen you Have goods and Hads tied together, you haw no
nice, easy, pure way out. In some situations, it is possible to tolerate evil
because in stopping it, other greater goods would be lost," 73 ,This shares
some affinity with Richard McCormick's
"proportionate reason" a
controversial adaptation of Catholic ethical thought explored in depth later
in this chapter).
In the specific case of direct sterilizations, a shared obstetrics unit
could be arranged so that "only remote forms of material cooperation exist
.
• . it would have to be clear that the staff of the Catholic hospital iiIS not
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ciTectly involvea," 74 tw, „eans
.hac though servicos such as ahonhms
are torb.Uden on Church-sponsored hospha, grounds, amiiations - such as
Caritas Chrisci with Tufts - do occur in which one institution ntay aiiow
procedures in its own facilities which are not ailowahie on Catholic
hospital prentises. Uoctors on staff at Catholic hospitals, however, would he
asked to leave" should they be discovered providing services which are
torbidden by the Catholic Church. 75
What becomes obvious is that there is a considerable amount of gray
area in which the canon-law strictures of the Catholic hierarchy can
mpmge on the business decisionmaking of Catholic sponsored health
facilities. There is tension, but at this point a type of balance has been
struck between the Church's interest in maintaining an identifiable
"Catholic" presence in the field, while leaving to individual organisations
necessary managerial leeway. In some cases, what were once very Catholic-
operations run by devoted orders of religious men and women have become
in varying degrees less Catholic as market realities require. In some cases
facilities have cut ties with the Church in all but name. The question then
becomes, beyond business decisions, what role does the Catholic Church
have in professional applications of bioethics in medical institutions?
Latbdli c bioethics nnd th(‘ Sr.qtp
Catholic bioethics looks to government not simply as a regulatory
instrument but as a moral agent, llehir applies three Catholic concepts of
state and society to bioethics: (1 ) Following the Pauline body metaphor (and
bedrock corporatism), Catholics conceive of an organic society,
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interconnected and interdependent fh.. k
^ ^ ,
‘^pe , as though pans of a living body; (2
)
at o .cs have a positive concept of the state, expecting i, to respond to ,3,an expansive view of the relationship between law and ntorality 76
^he
nne between public and private is not as sharp as iiberaiisnfs, but it agrees
w.th libera, is^'s restraint of an activist state in two ways: to protect the
human rights of individual persons ^nrii a d to preserve the rights of voluntary
organizations.
Elements of nineteenth century Catholic-school corporatism can be
seen in Catholic bioethics. Organicism is represented in the vocational-
corporatist sense in that the Church expects the medical profession to focus
on Its ethical mission to society, rather than simply function as a trade
association. (Thus it embraces the moral charge to corporatism which is a
distinct characteristic of Catholic corporatism, .77 Further - consistent
With concept of corporatist subsidiarity introduced in Qu.^ragesJmo Anno
- the Church holds that although the state has important responsibilities in
bioethics, medical decisions should primarily be placed in the hands of
families and their doctors.
"Proportionate reason
The Catholic theologian Joseph Fuchs explains that Jesus did not add
substantively to Aristotle, nor did he issue a new set of concrete written
rules, but rather exemplified through his life and relations a new way of
living. 79 This emphasis has helped Catholics to feel capable of conducting
their lives without, so to speak, "checking the manual" eveiy step of the
way, that is to say. Catholics are aided by an ethical philosophy which can
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address one. own di.nely unique circumstances and chaiien.es
-.anty to Protestant approacHes is more tHan coincidentai, dut modernth
..c theologians iihe Puchs wii, maintain that this
..interna, torum.. ofmor accountahiiity is consistent with the traditiona, Cathoiic hehef (since~ 'h-'- human heings have a capacity to disc^
tell nght from wrong"
- even if fho,,if they cannot or will not read the Bible.
Richard McCormick takes things a step further, writing that an action
proportLnM rea»™'jusdf^^^^
thmgs considered, there is not
an unchaste act. 80
conception is necessarily
But John Paul ,1 increasingly feels that discussions of
"proportionate
reason., are out of control, and is alarmed by the
..systematic dissent-
endemic in the Church, „is I,.3 encyclical Verltarls»on notably
relies on the fixity of Scriptural source materia, to battle the threat of
moral relativism and what he calls
..situationism,.. McCormick counters that
sttuationism
'.shouldn.t be a pretext to tar all approaches providing
exceptions to normative statements." 81
Although moral imperatives are the essence of Catholic natural law.
the process by which those imperatives are applied in real life has become
a challenge to the finality of certain Vatican pronouncements.
Furthermore, the dissent which John Paul II refers to in Veritatis is not a
recent development, but a continuation of the tectonic upheaval caused by
Ilum^n^e Vitae in 1968, in which pope Pius VI overruled the approval of
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contraception by an 80%
population.
majority of John XXIII s commission on
But s.„ce W,e, the ancient exptession first useti for the
ntpenai emperors, focnta. cans. «nfta ("when K„„e speahs, the
argunrent is entieti", no ionger hoids in Cathoiic theoiogy. The pope's
personai veto provoked an instant end to the centuries-oid Cathoiic
-d.tion to cease puhiic dehate once the pope has pronounced his decision.
Instead Catholics worldwide mcp nr^ jP n protest in their own version of what
was, in 1968, a worldwide cultural revolution.
Ilumanae Vitae and when life begins
The most teiiing dispute over Humane Vicae is not about iimiting birth
but encouraging it. The Vatican refuses to accept fn vftro fertiii.ation (iVF)
’
because it vioiates the mseparabie connection, wiiied by God
... between
the two meanings of the conjugai act: the unitive and procreative
meaning 82 j^is "inseparability" is taken literally to exclude any extra-
corporeal procedures among married partners, including artificial
insemination.
What has proven so devastating a blow to the Church's credibility is its
justifications for disallowing any separation of the "unitive and
procreative" either to preclude orpromow conception, among married
couples. McCormick says he knows "no one" in the Church who accepts the
"simple case" of rejecting in vitro among husband and wife, although he
does draw the line at participation by third party donors, where McCormick
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fears endless permutations" which "blur senealogy." 83
y question which the Church should be considering is whether
sternutation or contraception helps or hinders the total relationship of
^^arr.ge, and cites baud,urn: "human activity must be |udged as it refers tohuman person integrally and adequately considered." 84
Koman theologians Marceliino Zaiba
,S.J, and Jan Visser CSSK describe
e an on artiiicial insemination by married couples as too
"physicist
"
anC Cucran has similarly termed the Catholic hierarchys intransigenc
’
as
hiologism" because the
"physical structure of the act is m ime ade normative
and cannot be intetfered with." 85
steriii.ation similarly places reproductive physicaiity as supreme. Tubal
ligations are not allowed for women who simply wish to limit the si.e of
their families, or even as a preventive health measure, to which Haring
admonishes, "the tubes are for the women, not the women for the tubes " 86
The Double Effect Principle: Abonion and contraception
Catholic bioethics has provoked confusion even at the highest levels
of the Church, especially when it is applied to the issue of abortion when a
mother’s life is at risk. The late Cardinal Humberto Medieros once told a HS
Congressional subcommittee that the Catholic Church forbids all abortions,
even those which result in saving a mother’s life. 87 McCormick puts it
somewhat differently: "if pregnancy would threaten the life or health of
the mother or risk a seriously defective child, that is insufficient reason
tor a Catholic hospital to tolerate the procedure." 88 These are both
somewhat misleading statements.
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Kisk to a mother's life is insufficient reasnn ,^ o alone to conduct a
proceaure Which results in the tieath of a fetus. The relevant «uiUe is the
effect" principle which is tfescrihe in the content of sterilir.ation
.st.net from abortion, in f/umanae VTtae. This has been interpreted
even .n the case of abortions, particularly in the light of intent. Though as
noted, the encyclical has been otherwise attacked, it does provide for how
Church appraises situations whose secondary effect may well result in
eontracepfon
- or even the death of a fetus, ffumanae VUae holds that the
C-Hurch "does not at all consider illicit the use of those therapeutic means
truly necessary to cure diseases of the organism, even if an impediment to
procreauon, which may be foreseen, should result therefrom, provided
such
.mpediment is not, for whatever motive, directly willed." 89 yhe
double effect principle thus makes provision for sterilization,
contraception, or the death of a fetus if it is an unavoidable effect - not the
pnmao. or sole intent - of a procedure (such as the removal of a cancerous
Uterus).
Ilamanae Wtaedoes hold that direct sterilization is "intrinsically evil"
because it "sacrifices a basic human function without the necessity of
preseryin, life " ,my italics). 90 gut what is disallowed is the primary,
direct and intentional act of sterilization. In the case of extra uterine
("ectopic") pregnancies, though abortions are illicit, what is construed as a
direct abortion is substantively different from the removal of a lethal
diseased fallopian tube, of which the conceptus is a simultaneous, and
therefore unavoidable, victim. 91
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But th.s also means that sterilization with only a preventive intentWhich assumes a pregnancy m„ht risK a mother, life - because of high'
ood pressure or some other potentially threatening health condition - is
tiot acceptable. Neither does the high likelihood of a seriously defective
child justify sterilization, according to the Church. Contextual arguments
based on the totality of good in marriage in which, in ffumanae Vitae,
words, a 'less abundant but more rationalized fecundity might transform a
materially sterilizing intervention into a licit and wise control of birth-
reason and his Will, rather than to the biological rhythms of his organism
the task for regulating binh." 92
„aring counters that if physician and
patient agree that "a new pregnancy must be excluded now and forever
because it would be thoroughly irresponsible
... it cannot be against the
principle of medical ethics, nor is it against the 'natural law.'" 93
How these theological arguments play out in practice is in flux. A
Sisters of Mercy of the Union study in 1978 proposed that, for the health
facilities under their sponsorship,
"tubal ligations be allowed when they
are determined by patient and physician to be essential to the overall good
Of the patient." 94 xhe NCCB intervened however and the Sisters retreated
from their position. O'Lane, in a 1979 survey of Catholic hospitals found one
out of five (66 of 336 responding) permitted sterilization for medical
reasons, and "forty seven percent of the 270 not permitting sterilization
reported that their medical staffs were interested in doing sterilizations."
95 Westoff and Jones’ 1 975 survey reported 9.8% of Catholic wives had been
sterilized, compared to 13.9% of non-Catholic wives. Among Catholic
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husbands, 9.9% had undergone steriUzacion procedures.
Of non Catholic husbands. 96
compared to 12.4%
The Church recognizes that sex within marriage has a purpose not
.nuted to the production of offspring, acknowledged in the 1930 encyclical
ash connub, and repeated in Gaudiuw et spes:
"Marriage to be sure is not
mstuuted solely for procreation.
. .
" 97 g,,
o he, and argues that this sharing of Cod's intent to transmit life is said
preserved even in the case of naturally infertile couples (due to age
or generative dysfunction)
"since they always remain ordained towards the
expressing and consolidating their union." 98 vacek feels
"lUc seems
especially contrived to say that the human sexual act has a procreative
meaning even when it is (permanently) Infertile" and sums up the Vatican
position as "reasoned but not reasonable. " 99
llumanae Vitae regards taking into account "the natural rhythms
immanent in the generative functions" - the so-called 'rhythm method' of
sexual relations during infecund periods - as not an intentional frustration
of procreation. 100 g,, ,,,
temperature-taking involved is difficult to reconcile with lack of intent,
and seems to contradict Pius Xll's condemnation of reproductive techniques
Which "convert the home into a biological laboratory." 101
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"Mornini- after" contraceptives and annulments
e Vattcan's discourse on procreation is buiit on its funUantentai
un erstandtng of ntarria^e as, to cuote Gaud,an, et spes, "an unbreaKabie
compact between persons.
.
.
.which demandsj that the mutua, iove of the
apouses be embodied in a rightly ordered manner.
. .
"102
Eii,,beth
McKeown points out that marriage and family is central to Catholic-
doctrine and provides the basis on which Catholicism justifies much of its
soca, commentary. Hut she writes "there is very iittie evidence to suggest
that this use Of family has been undertaken in a critically self-conscious
manner.
. .
"103 This is especially conspicuous in Church's approach to
marriage annulment. Marriage frames the discussion of reproductive
matters as fundamentally defined by the
"inseparability of the unitive and
procreative." Yet the "unbreakable compact" of marriage can in fact be
broken by annulment, a matter given recent publicity in the cases of
Massachusetts' Sen. John Kerry and Congressman
.Joe Kennedy.
According to Rev. Michael Smith Foster, the canonical grounds for
annulment holds that a marriage may never have been viable because "a
particular facet of consent was lacking" at the time of the vows. 104 gut if
the unitive spirit of marriage is contingent on consent, would it not follow
that the procreative is as well, especially since the "unitive and
procreative" are inseparable? In the case of rape, in which consent is
clearly absent, should a woman be required to bring to term a cellular-
level /Cygote only hours old, when a marriage of ten or more years can be
aborted retroactively on grounds of consent? 1^5
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A Catholic rneans of indirect contraception for victims of rape
There is tor Catholics a circumstance in which drugs used for
contraception are appropriate tor use hy a rape victim, absent proot that
an ovum has been fertilized. According to the NCCB:
against a Potem1al'’c“ncem^^^^
1
°
prevent ovulation, sperm capacitationZ fe“toTl 06
'
According to Dr. Mark Vonnegut. fertilization cannot be definitiveiy
determined for severai hours after an assauit, so "appropriate testing-
leaves room for the "unintended" interference with a fertiiized ovum when
medications are dispensed. 107
Respite this, a patriarchal
"transmission of life" doctrine reigns in
Catholic health doctrine. Even
partner without regard for his
though "a conjugal act imposed upon one's
or her condition and lawful desires is not a
true act of love" a standard of love (the "greatest commandment") can not
lustify any act "which is detrimental to the faculty of propagating iife." 108
It is this ordering of the physical over the spiritual which presumably
prompts Vacek to describes Vatican birth control policy as overly
"biological and reductionist." 109
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Catholic bioethics and the end of life
The NCCB holds that a person is morally obliged to use "ordinary or
proponionate means of preserving his or her life" but that gravely i.i
md,v.duals Whose death is imminent may forgo means which do not offer
reasonable hope of benem," 1 10 extreme cases where the patient is
unable to feed themselves, the NCCB advises that there "should be a
presumption in favor of providing nutrition and hydration" to all patients,
assuming there is "sufficient benefit outweighing the burdens to the
patient and family," HI Assuming nutrition and hydration brings no
comfort to a person close to death, the patient may choose to withhold it.
The Church defines euthanasia as ",
.
.
an action or omission which of itself
or by intention causes death, in order that all suffering may in this way be
eliminated (my italics)." H2 Withholding nutrition and hydration can be
seen as such an act of omission which causes death through starvation but
presumably the case of withdrawn nutrition and hydration would entail
liberal use of palliatives with the expectation of "imminent" death. The
double effect principle which the Church applies in the case of
reproductive matters also holds in terminal illness. It rejects the deliberate
use of medications with the primary intent of hastening death, but allows
the use of palliative medications to reduce pain even though this may
hasten death. H3 Thus, there appears that there is a course, assuming
imminent death and some suffering, in which medical means to hasten
death is acceptable to the Church's precepts.
Father Bob Rochon of St. Anne’s hospital in Fall River MA, (part of the
Caritas Christi health system) was asked about the use of palliatives, and
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P ce.ved by the pubhc to be more severely restrictive on the use of drugs
an secular hospitals. He responded that
..o pain is good', and that pain
™a„age.ent Is a hey aspect of their therapies. Prayer „ay worh for sonre
“ an outpatient basis at St. Anne.
'
proof that pain alleviation nrethods aniong Catholic facilities are not
’
restricted to those facing ini.lnent death. Father Hochon added that
patients are counseled one on one and in matters of medical
decisionmaking, patients are encouraged to developed
"informed
internal forum" rather than simply by interpretations
imposed from sources outside the immediate circumstance that the patient
may be facing. 114
The Church strongly opposes Oregon's physician-assisted suicide
statute, affirmed by the Ninth circuit in 1995 as protected under the
Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause. H5
.^ere was a similar statute
passed in New York, prohibition of which was held unconstitutional in 1996
under the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause. Symptomatic
of the court's predicament in the absence of a clear statutory framework,
in Oregon's Compassion in Dying case it was noted that the statute's
prohibition would probably be upheld under Due Process, the reverse
conclusion of New York's case. 1 16
Catholic criticism of these public policy innovations centers around
the distinction between "killing and letting die." H? Consistent with
Catholic values which keep skeptical vigilance on technology, there is
sympathy for fears of interminable coma perpetuated by technology.
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2
''“ ^ NCCBreco„ that ithe case Of terminal ntne.s, etnphasis shouM be on the non-chntca,
understanding that a person may wish to forgo
"heroic" efforts to extend
the.r iives in the absence of reasonabie hope of improvement.
The generai bioethicai debate within the Church, clarified by the
NCXB, and which informs the practice of Cathoiic heaith care is based on
the fundamentai Cathoiic beiief that our bodies are gifts from God over
which we are stewards rather than owners. Thus, seif imposed death is
determined to be a moraily unacceptable rejection of God's grace.
Nevertheless value statements on "unreasonable burdens" and "heroic-
efforts must be put in the context of unprecedented state of the art
techno,ogy. What is a dying patientf is it one who, without kidney dialysis
would not sundve? Should public policy then rightly require and
guarantee maximum techno,ogica, intervention in ail cases, including ail
organ transplants? If technology can go to extraordinaiy length to extend
comatose subsistence, why not a measure of technology to shorten an
agonizing death?
The slippery-slope response by the Church is that subjective 'quality
of life' arguments might not be limited to the terminally ill. but extended to
the less afflicted, and that this might degenerate into highly qualitative
definitions of sub-optimal life, e.g. mental illness, physical handicap or
"foreseeable" demise, eroding further into a duty to die on the part of well
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intentioned victims looking to preserve
for society.
resources for their survivors or
The Cathoiic argument further sees the roie of the physician
drastically reformuiated. requiring a betrayal of Hippocratic "do no harm"
pnnciple and, more concretely, inviting liability lawsuits in which
agreements for termination of life between patient and physician may
afterward be construed as coerced. Support for physician assisted suicide
has been shown to correlate with age: the older the respondent, the less
enthusiasm for the procedure - and the psychological repercussions to
family and society are seen to be prohibitive.
The exact circumstances for withholding nutrition and hydration to
PVS patients (Persistent Vegetative State) however, continues to be unclear
and controversial especially in the wake of the Cruzan decision, a case in
which a young Missouri woman's family was not allowed to remove feeding
tubes in the absence of the patient's clear wishes. 120 O'Rourke and deBlois
criticize the NCCB's statement on Nutrition and Hydration as inconsistent
and unspecified on the question of the futility or uselessness of treatment.
121 The Church itself confesses doubt on the subject, admitting that it "has
not resolved the question whether medically assisted nutrition and
hydration should always be seen as a form of normal care." 122
Review Di.smssinn
Catholic sponsored health care is highly dependent on money,
technology and the close cooperation of the state. As the number of
247
Catholic facilities decline along with their market share, many are under
pressure to consolidate, merge with other types of facilities, or change
their sponsors. How many Catholic health care facilities wiW ll choose to
Juridic Person under canon
become ecclesiastical property" as a Public
law remains to be seen, but even in those cases the. •Lo s, the imperatives of running
a business in medicine requires great deal of flexibility.
Although the name
"Catholic" is still associated with a huge portion of
the American health care indust^, what that name amounts to in practice
does not correspond with a tightly disciplined corporate regime. There is
no Single Catholic holding company, nor do many Catholic health care
facilities act as though they were a business subsidiary of the Church.
Though Catholic sponsored health care is related organically by the ethics
of the Church and by the doctrinal interpretations of the NCCB, their
practice of medicine is not substantially divergent from the rest of the
industry, with the notable exception of reproductive services.
Depending on their form of sponsorship. Catholic health care
facilities can be largely not interfered with by the Church hierarchy,
thanks also to a continually developing theological discourse within the
Church. There are hospital managers who are undoubtedly frustrated with
what they consider meddlesome bishops, and Catholicism casts a serious
doubt on what are otherwise common reproductive choices, but overall
Catholic health care seems to enjoy a significant degree of subsidiarity, in
corporatist terms, from the Church itself. And in the mix of their
multimodal capabilities. Catholic health systems seem more intent on
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business survival and regulatory compliance than
obedience to the Vatican.
an all-consuming
Of preference for the poor. Catholic
e care as a group has not demonstrated a level of charitable serviceW rch exceeds other nonprofit facilities. Nor is there an especially
avorable treatment of organized labor. Various
"polycorporate" business
arrangements which include for-profit subsidiaries have furthermore
attracted the criticism and legal challenge of competitors who must pay
taxes. The Church's clear preference is to keep Catholic health care non
prom, an agenda which may be served by a public image which is
underscored by high profile stands on bioethics. But at this point, survival
has taken precedent over the best intentions.
Church bioethics, especially in abortion, reproductive, and end-oMife
.ssues, may contribute to a Catholic image of a highly principled practice of
tnedtcine, but in practice the Church does little to aggressively stand in the
way Of most patients if they choose those alternatives elsewhere. Despite
the Church's condemnation of in vitro fertilization and its curious "unitive
and procreative" rationale, newer modes of fertilization amount to off-site
P alizations. Even sterilization or abortions, under the "Double Effect"
standard, are permitted if they are the secondary and unintentional
repercussions of another procedure. Similarly permitted is the use of
palliatives which may secondarily hasten death in cases of terminal illness
But the tumult of Humane Vitae is not easily forgotten, and perhaps the
decision some have made privately (in their "internal forum") is not to
force issues within the profession. The Church actively contributes to the
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public s ongoing bioethical discourse, but not always as a judge. In many
as PVS and life support termination, tbe NCCH and tbe Cburcb
.s franKly undecided In tbelr efforts to come to grips wltb fast changing
technology. ^
Heligion appears to be Kept strictly at the discretion of the patient In
atholic health care, and pressure for catechesls Is not evident, nor does
their appear to be any organized Initiative on the part of the Church to
explore links between Catholic prayer, by that name, and healing. In fact,
some of the practitioners are so evenhanded in matters of faith that any
one particular religion. Catholic included, does not appear to matter,
of Catholics, Catholicism in
an internal matter of conscience, far more
or practice. This suits the pluralist facts of life in a
society such as the United States, and the Church's sponsorship, to the
extent that they wish to remain effective in their witness, makes its peace
with culture.
Though Catholic health care still Involves a lot
this field has grown to become
than an external matter
Where the Church hierarchy and the practice of Catholic sponsored
institutions have had some particularly spirited clashes is in a field where
the profession is religion, and for this we turn to the next section on
education.
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CHAPTER 9
catholic education
Chapter Nine covers three subjects: the first concerns Catholic
pnntat. anti secontiat. schools (..Catholic schools- or
..psrochia, schools,
the second deals with Catholic higher education (Catholic coiie.es and
'
universities) and the third concerns the Church.s
'..a.lsteriun,..
- its
teaching authority in matters of faith. These are separate topics because
most Catholic primary and secondary schools are ecciesasticai property and
therefore materially bound to the Church, whereas twentieth centum
Catholic higher education in the US comes in more independent corporate
torms. . Furthermore, though the magisterium is a far more controversial
and theologically portentous matter in American Catholic higher education
than ,t is for grade schools and high schools, the tension between the
Vatican's teaching and the practical application of that teaching is not
simply a matter of academics. 2 Therefore, though the magisterium is first a
matter of '.teaching" and is understood most clearly in the context of
higher education, it has implications beyond college life and thus will be
treated as a related but distinct topic.
atholic primnn' and secondar'/
.,h|, nii--n
As with Catholic sponsored healthcare and social service. Catholic
parochial schools are giants among non-state providers in a field in which
the state othenvise dominates. Two thirds of all US non public secondary
students (about a million of the country's fifteen million 9th to 12th
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graders) attend nearly fifteen hundred Catholic h- u u
^ ^
high schools in the US 3
Nevertheless the total of nine thousand
schools operating in the US in 1990
of thirteen thousand in the 1960s,
Catholic primary and secondary
reflects a 31 percent drop from its nep ak
boom. Enrollments and school
not all of it due to the passing of the baby
openings have been flat for years.
Huge drop-offs in religious staff have meant a surge in lay employees
many ways retained their
"Catholicity far more successfully than the
other Catholic sponsored institutions. In Catholic high schools. 890/0 of the
students are Catholic. 86o/„ of full-time teachers are Catholic, 99% have
Catholic principals and 95% have Catholic administrators. 5
Though the government generates most nfCath^r6 Cl cu ot Catholic sponsored health
care and social sen,ice revenue, for Catholic primary and secondary
schools the money role of the government is relatively nonexistent, with
the exception of some textbook and transportation assistance. Government
aid for non public education through tuition tax credits and vouchers
continue to be rare local experiments. One hundred percent of the 910
respondents to a NCEA survey of Catholic high school principals repotted
zero income from state or federal sources. 6
Administrative details in Catholic schools
According to Sister Ann Dominic Roach, Superintendent of the
Catholic School Office of the Archdiocese of Boston, the economic
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-cenc. o. Boscon Ca.oBc
.Hoo,s
. wBH pe. ppp„
- a. a.o. S:S00-S.000 co.pa.e.
. .e CU. Bo.on pu.. scHoo, p.PUP., expense or S7000. Avena^e tulUon Ca.HoBc seconaa.. scBoo.
nat.onw.de now averages S4800 (with the suburban Massachusetts' St
Sebst.an school reaching a high of $1 5,000 per year), 7
some Tide
, and „ funding is available to Cathoiic schools for at-rish
students' remedial education, though the disabled i
not subsidized by the state, and therefore
schools. Federal assistance is available i
n Catholic schools are
are underrepresented in Catholic
as for transportation for students
m some cases for textbooks, as well
in cities and towns.
In a series of decisions from 1968 to 1977 allowing aid to private
parochial schools' purchase of textbooks, assuming those books were
already approved for use in public schools. 8 However local state laws have
ontrary to federal policy, especially in Massachusetts. Demerath and
Williams note that in 1977 the Springfield Massachusetts school depanment
apportioned S200,000 of their textbook budget (32%) for the purchase of
textbooks to be loaned to parochial and private schools. But a 1978 court
challenge, Eleanora F. Bloom et al. v William C. Sullivan et at. as members of
the School Committee declared unconstitutional a 1973 state statute
requiring that public schools loan books to private and parochial school
Students on request. ^
The Massachusetts state constitution Amendment Article XVIII §2 had
been revised in 1974 to allow "grants-in-aid to private higher educational
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institutions or to students or parents or guardians" of ,h
.
,
« d u those attending such
schools, a provision which paralleled federal conn h m-i urt holdings which found
no establishment issue in school loans to students at • ,religiously affiliated
CO eges and universities. Nevertheless the bulk of the earlier 1917
amendment
, of the original
.855 Article of Amendment) still stands
proh.b.ting the otherwise unexceptionable use of any public money for
"founding, ntaintaining or aiding any school or institution of learning
whether under public control or otherwise, wherein
doctrine is inculcated.
. .
" 10
any denominational
The legendary Massachusetts State Senate president William Bulger led
statewide refenda ballots in 1982 and 1986 to reverse Amendment XVlll, and
thereby to facilitate the potential for voucher funding of secondary and
elementary school students, but both votes failed. Demerath and Williams
attribute the failures in part to the lack of a distinction between parochial
schools and private schools. Many voters apparently felt that aid to private
schools meant public funds would subsidize wealthy prep schools. 1
1
Superintendent Roach feels the era of voucher payments will
inevitably arrive. 12 She noted Cleveland's voucher experiment in which
33 of Cleveland's 39 Catholic schools have been allowed to participate in
Cleveland's pilot program, but in extremeiy limited fashion. Though 60% of
voucher students attend Catholic schoois in Cleveland, this amounts to only
2% of public school students. >3 (Very recently, the US Supreme Coun
refused to review the Wisconsin Supreme Court's ruling that Milwaukee's
school choice program in constitutional).
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upertntenaent Koach acknowledge, thac, as wUh CachoUc sponsored
He.tH cace and so.. secv.ce, CatHoHc edncadon >s
.cceas.g.y
.econdng
profess.ona,ized and
,ay-staffed,
,n Boston only 1 3% of staff are religious87% lay, according to Koach. Though nine of the archdiocese high schoo.
are currently unionized, Roach echoes the sentiments of pastoral care
workers of St. Elizabeth's Hospital, that although they believe in collective
bargain,ng. interest in unionizing is low. She cites Donna Boyle's finding
of httle compatibility between the union and the faith community in Fall
River. ^4
Personnel policy in Catholic primary and secondao- schools is far
oiore rigid than it is in Catholic higher education, although in either case
the Church has much to say. Half of Catholic high schools responding said
they would terminate the contract of a teacher who publicly announced
they were an atheist. 15 y^e role of the Church in day to day operations is
more direct in Catholic primary and secondary schools than It Is in Catholic
higher education, social service or health care. 65% of respondents to the
NCEA high school survey report a "Very or somewhat innuential degree of
influence" by the diocesan office or religious order. 16
The role of faith in grade schools and high schools
Because state funds are virtually nil in Catholic schools, there is no
impediment to an unashamedly pronounced emphasis on religion. These
are very much "religious schools." As the Vatican's Congregation for
Catholic Education (CCE) makes clear, the mission of the Church is to
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evangenze "an. ,he school, are an ln,poc,an,
„eUlun, ol this." >7 ,,,
National Catholic Educational Association (NCEA) aims specifically to teach
a religious dimension in the woHH um rld oi human history." 18 39,%
-pondln. Catholic hl,h schools In a nationwide survey recfulce non
Catholic students to attend liturgical services. >9
students to take eight or more courses in religion
,e.g„ morality
sacraments, doctrine, Church history, and 75% re,uire that non-Catholic
Students do the same. 20
Vet, consistent with postconciliar Catholic doctrine on tolerance and
pluralism, the Church is careful to tread an ecumenical path.
Acknowledging that many Catholic school students are not Catholic, the
schools pledge to 'proclaim the Gosper but remind teachers that to
'proclaim or to offer Is not to impose, however; the latter suggests a moral
Vtolence which is strictly forbidden, both by the Gospel and by Church
law." 21
Course load requirements reflect an emphasis on religion. Catholic
High schools on average require almost twice as many course hours of
religion as hours of science (not including mathematics). 22 The
preference of religion over science is purposive and unapologetic.
According to the CCE, "Students learn many things about the human person
by studying science; but science has nothing to say about mystery.
Teachers should help students begin to discover the mystery within the
human person.
.
." 23 Three quarters of Catholic high schools surveyed
provide in service training for faculty to instruct them on their role in the
school's overall religious mission. 24
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Ke,.,.ous c.Hcu,a . Bos.n Ca:Ho„c scHoo.s
.e,. wUH 0,a a„U New
a.en. texts taught in the 9th gnahe, Catholic sacraments and moraiity
for sophomores, with I ith and i.th graders offered electives in world
re
.gton and human sexuality, ail from the point of view of the Catholic
Church. Catholic sex education aims
.'not to supplant parents hut to he.p
t etn" and so rather than eliminate sex education, the NCCB suggests that
parents should not allow continuing anxiety to be translated into
.ndtscrtminate opposition to all forms of classroom education in sexuality '
Perhaps the most demonstrable effect of Catholic primary and
secondao. schooling is that they are uniquely effective means of cartying
the Catholic faith from childhood into adulthood. The more Catholic
schooling a student has, the more Catholic he or she will become. A third of
those attending eight or more years of Catholic school will go on to receive
weekly communion, which is about twice the number of those attending
Catholic schools for less than eight years. Says Andrew Greeley,
Confraternity of Christian Doctrine (CCD) "Sunday school" type classes "do
not have anywhere near the same effect." 26
Social Justice in Catholic schools
Catholic approaches to community service are founded on principles
of an interconnected, moral inseparability among individuals in the
human family - and therefore can be considered in a broad sense
organicist." The NCCB manual lajeach as lesps Dj.l describes the Church
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the community therefore becomes Venrraientral to educational ministry." 27
>n Catholic schools, Beyle has measured the ellectiveness of this
comntunlty of Catholic pel^a. anti secondary schools care foe each other
.n a way which is „oee effective that what he calls the
'.client eeiations" ofPU tc schools, lie compares dropout rates of 4»/„ in Catholic schoois to 15 4o/„
compared to 17.8% in public schools. 28
The Catholic sense of community is linked to service for the
disadvantaged. 48»,
,aff and students in Catholic schoois experience a
deep sense of community," and about half of Catholic high school seniors
parttepate ,n one or more service programs. The Church's sociai teachings
are sa.d to "inform the school philosophy, goals or yearly objectives" in
92.7% of Catholic High schools surveyed. Nearly 73% of Catholic high
schools say that Catholic social principles are held as an important
criterion in hiring or evaluating teachers. 29
Yet 97.3% of Catholic high school administrators
are non minority whites, while less than half
and 94% of teachers
a percent (0.05%) of school
boards include Black, Hispanic or Asian members. 30 Location is also
disproportionate. Catholic high schools are located in districts where over
90% of residents are non ilispanic whites. 31 Only 8% of Catholic high
schools nationwide enroll more than two out of ten students from low
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income families, and about a fifth have
32
no low income students whatsoever.
.
however, there are outstanding examplesOf serv.ce
.0 Che chsahvanca.eh Cn panCcu.aCy poor pe.hhorhoohs
ccorchng to Superintendent Roach, the secondary school student
populanon throughout the archdiocese Is 7P/„ „Hlte and 21 «/„ minority, hut
schools minority participation predominate. St. Matthews in
IS virtually 100% minority," with heavy African
enrollment. ^3
American and Vietnamese
Catholic schools favor an "infusion method" which teaches Catholic
social lustice principles. The method includes mathematical formulas
which correlate poverty and disease, and ESL classes using biblical
passages as texts. Newark archbishop Theodore McCarrick won national
attention with an "anti-sweat" curriculum which Joins lessons about
exploitive working conditions in textile manufacturer sweatshops with
student boycotts of school uniform manufacturers who are not in
compliance with equitable labor procedures. All Catholic secondaiy
schools offer social service programs in their communities, conducted for
graduation credit as a practicum, in conjunction with retreats based on
social justice themes.
Catholic higher education is involved in an even more structured way,
Oavid Hollenbach says volunteer service programs are part of Boston
College’s core curriculum, a philosophy/theology twelve hour weekly
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ourse with over 600 students enrolled and a waiting list. Featured are
nner city volunteer education program and an "integrated services
initiative" - a cross disciplinary effort involving
education and nursing. 34
an
social work, law,
Boston’s most famous recent episode of applied social justice involves
the Church’s role in Boston school busing crisis of the 1970’s. in which
leading members of the Church were at the forefront of school
desegregation. Sister Maty Augusta Neal was, along with NAACP education
chair Ruth Banon, among the first to note the conditions of segregation
and disrepair in Boston Schools. Boston’s Richard Cardinal Cushing was
among the drafters of the ’’Kiernan Report" which led to the Racial
Imbalance Act (RIA) of August 1965. The Kiernan Report was the first to
fmd that half of Boston’s blacks were attending schools with over 80»/o
black enrollment.
Cardinal Cushing’s successor Humberto Medieros issued a five-point
policy in 1974 to prevent the use of Catholic schools as a haven for white
night. Applications for transfer from public schools would not be accepted
unless: (1) acceptance improved the racial balance of the school to which
he or she is applying (2) there was evidence that the application is due to
change in address (3) the family had other children in school (4) the
number of acceptances conformed with the average number of
acceptances of previous years and (5) all acceptance policies were
"consistent with the principles of social justice as enunciated by the
official teachings of the Church." 35
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Glinski found that in 1974/75 there was an overall decline in
enrollment in Catholic schools by 908 students. 36 Vet over 2500 students
were sa.d to be accommodated by the parochial schools in or around Boston.
as families found wavs to tho »-,,i uay defeat the rules by generating phony addresses
changes.
Cardinal Medieros' busing policy - and the extent to which Catholic
famtlies willfully betrayed it - give historical evidence of the intent and
effect of the Church's maglsterium
- the weight of its moral teaching in
application to administrative policy. Of particular relevance is how much
the Boston Catholic schools as a system were accountable to the Church
hierarchy. The Church's interaalon with Catholic colleges and universities
provides a different view of how the Catholic faith and Church leadership
influences education.
Lathplic higher ediirqprm
In the case of Catholic higher education, the relevance of Catholic
welfare corporatism takes on a second dimension. Here, the dynamic is not
simply between Church-sponsored institutions and the state, but there is
also a parallel tension between these institutions and the Church itself.
Here the Catholic welfare corporatist traits of subsidiarity, multimodality
and organicism are not only guides to Interactions between institutions in
surrogate roles delegated by the secular government, but of the
corporations within the greater corporation of the Church. In this way it is
analogous to some of the medieval monastic and lay-religious movements of
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the Middle Ages, as they struggled with
Church to the practicalities of their
reconciling the hierarchical
work and professions.
While .any health care and social service organizations chafe at the
hmrtations inrposeti on then, hy Church doctrine, the burden is particuiariy
noteworthy in teaching institutions whose inteiiectua, product" is in so.e
respect identical to the Church's. The interna, concenation of the Church's
own intermediary organizations is thus another illustration of the protocol
and bargaining technique suggested by Catholic welfare corporatism.
Canon Law and Vatican control in higher education
Many Catholic colleges and universities were originally founded by
local Catholic religious orders, but nowadays most function as independent
corporations which are accountable only to their own (increasingly lay)
boards of directors. The Vatican's greatest influence is on so-called
"ecclesiastical" universities and faculties, that is, those Institutions which
pope John Paul II defines as "canonically erected or approved by the
apostolic See, which foster and teach sacred doctrine.
.
.
" and which have
the right to confer academic degrees by authority of the Vatican. 38 the
US, universities such as these are rare - Catholic University in Washington
DC is one of note - but by vague locutions the Vatican attempts to impose its
will on all institutions calling themselves Catholic.
The 1996 apostolic constitution on higher education Ex Corde Ecdesiac
contemplates" that even those Catholic Universities which are not
specifically established or approved by the Holy See, "will make their own
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"7 ... -(No..ac.epH.se.aa.W.e.e.ow„.e
at none of these
”non-ecclesasticar US CathoHc coHeges anti univetsicies
wouiti he consitfeteti a puhiic
.uritiica, person untiet canon iaw, that is
recogntfon of a corporate group (canon 1257 §2, is founded on ntedievai
egai theory as we have noted, so to this extent reiations between US
Cathoiic higher education and the Church are
"corporatist" oniy in a
diminished, iess traditionally formai sense. Gaiiin argues that "without
lundicai personality the Institutions do not have any standing in the canon
'aw." 1
"^"h-cantheChurch supersede the rightsofpropertyprotected
by civil law.
The use of the word "Catholic" however, is a type of franchise over
which the Church does assert a propeny claim, consistent with the
Church's approach to Catholic sponsored social service and health care
corporations, and set forth by apostolic constitution: "A Catholic University
may also be established by other ecclesastical or lay persons; such a
University may refer to itself as a Catholic University only with the
consent of the competent ecclesiastical Authority." 42 phe distinction
between acting in the name of the Church and simply using the name of
the Church is not widely understood by the laity, however.
—Mag lStCni im—and hi^rher education
An even sharper distinction can be drawn over how the Catholic faith
is taught when the "magisterium" becomes the substance of a college
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«>urse. Canon 8 1 2 of the 1 985 revised Code ol ( -.non iOI Lano Law reads,
"It is
necessary that those who teach theoio.iea, disciphnes in an. institute of
.Her studies have a tnandare front the eontpetent eeeiesastiea, authority(my italics). The ('mnn i nwi c
«;LSA, connnents titat
.s terse, new canon caused more apprehension and provoked more
opposition than any other provision of IChurch, iaw, » and traces the
«r..n o, canon 8 1 2 to Germany in
, 848 when the Church hierarchy was
to retain some control over the teachinu ra r •uic ic cm g ol reh}»ion in the
newly secularized German schools (simihr fh>noi S mila to the creation of "Roman
monasteries" during the investiture era,. 44 y^e controversy stems from
Che tdea that this present canon extends ecciesiastical authority over all
teachers of Catholic theoio^y in any Catholic college or university,
eccTesastical,"
"public juridic," or not.
An American challenge to Itoman hierarchy: Charies CLirran
The command of faithfulness to the magisterium borders on the
exhaustive throughout Cx CorUa and Sapiemia
,
in at ieast five separate
variations of the following: ",
.
.
Catholic theologians, aware that they
fulfill a mandate received from the Church, are to be faithful to the
Magisterium of the Church as the authentic interpreter of .Sacred Scripture
and Sacred Tradition." ^5
These conspicuous and repeated assertions of papal authority,
especially Canon 8 1 2’s revised inclusion of a necessary "mandate" to teach,
follows in the wake of the celebrated legal dispute between Charies Curran
and the Cathoiic University of America. 46 curran is an eminent Cathoiic
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theologian who is now a professor at Southern Methodist University
Author Of over twenty five books and fornrer president of both the
Antenean Theoiogiea, Society and the Cathoiic Theoiogical Society, he holdstwo doctorates front the ntost respected pontifical universities in the world
t e Gregonan University and the Academia Alfonsiana in Kome. studying
under perhaps the two greatest CathoHr iL L hc theologians of this century:
Bernard flaring and Joseph Fuchs.
Father Curran first made waves in June 1966 when he presented a
paper to the Catholic Theological Society of America disputing the official
cathohc teaching that masturbation is always wrong and a matter of grave
evil, 47 subsequent to this and other positions Iwhich Notre Dame planned
to publish) the faculty of Catholic University's school of Theology voted
unanimously in 1967 for Curran's promotion, as did the academic senate
But in April. Bishop William McDonald announced that he had decided not
to renew Curran's contraa, with no reasons given. Curran was offered
position in a department other than Theology teaching ethics, but
in Theology was not honored.
a
tenure
Curran's argument was that because CUA's board of trustees is
autonomous {controlled half by clergy and half lay people) they are
therefore in fact
"depontificalized" and cannot claim nor do they owe
canonical obligation. Though CUA has been considered a pontifical
university because it was originally founded with the Vatican, Curran
maintained that CUA's "department of Theology has a pontifical faculty, not
that It IS a pontifical faculty," 48 civil litigation upheld CUA's decision. 49
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Personnel policy in Catholic higher education
The debate in Catholic higher edurarfnnvn c tio s personnel policy has been
seen as really about the control of the content of Catholic theology
According to Douglas Laycock. religious universities and colleges,
"must
indulge a hiring preference. They must be free to take into account their
need to maintain the necessary core of Catholic faculty
or whatever." 50
or Mormon faculty
aycock academic freedom m a religious institution of higher
education is not an absolute, whether or not it is a seminary exclusively
dedicated to instructing prospective clergy, 51 imagining that a professor
may attempt to protest the Church's policy on abortion from the lectern,
Laycock argues, "The Constitution protects the free exercise of religion
from state interference; it does not protect the right of religious dissenters
to use the name and facilities of religious institutions.” 52 Nevertheless,
Laycock does draw the line on racial equality, acknowledging that the
State's compelling interest was upheld in the celebrated case of Bob Jones
University V US. 53
In 1989 at least half a billion dollars of federal and state funds went to
religiously affiliated colleges and universities (RACs), in accordance with
the 1 97 1 US Supreme Court approval of the use of federal funds to RACs. 54
The First Amendment thus does not preclude government aid to religiously
sponsored universities or their students, but the schools have successfully
drawn on the Establishment clause to argue that certain of their internal
policies, particularly regarding personnel, should remain beyond
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government jurisdiction. There has been lively local litigation. Loyola
University has been sued for a "Jesuits-only" hiring policy in their
in at least six other cases the Church has
philosophy department and
claimed immunity, including disputes
organizations to exist on campus, 55
over pay scale, and the rights of gay
The intellectual chill of Church doctrine
There is anecdotal evidence of how the doctrinaire Church affects the
content of course work. According to Director Helen Fagan of Boston's St.
Elizabeth's School of Nursing, the school does not teach any procedures
contrary to Church doctrine. 56 Maternity students are specially instructed
on the Church’s position on abortion and physician assisted suicide and
euthanasia. In one case an Amherst graduate attending St. Elizabeth's
School of Nursing was prevented from submitting a critical assessment of
the Church's policy on palliative care and suffering, and another occasion
a student’s mildly affirmative paper on physician assisted suicide was
quietly withdrawn after consultation with her professor. 57
The issue then becomes whether there has been a chilling effect on
the intellectual climate of discussions of Catholic theology in higher
education. One measure is the precipitous decline in Catholic seminaries:
the number of Catholic theology schools in US has been cut about in half
since 1966, from 133 to 57 in 1984. 58 the 15 years from 1968 to 1983,
enrollment at the high school and college levels of seminaries declined
74%, and Religious novitiates declined 68% while theologates declined 50%,
59
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ose vascy reduced nunrbers, the seminarians who continue do so
r reasons of persona, faith rather than for more communitarian
,oais
such as socia, (ustice. Oniy one in ,00 picked
..concern for socia,
.ustice’. as
.rst cho.ce ,n
.'most important quaiity for reiigious ministry .. 60 y^e
eros.on in the regard for priestiy reievance
,s refiected among Cathoiics in
genera,. Wh.,e m a ,952 survey 72% of CathoUcs surveyed thought that
their parish priests were
..ab,e to understand practica, probiems... by ,974
the percentage had dropped to 48%, 61
Teaching the Magisterium and teaming from the laity
The overarching issue in Cathoiic higher education then, is not
Simpiy the hiring choices of a given institution, but the Cairn over how the
faith of neariy a bi„ion peopie is conveyed to the worid. Part of Vatican „.s
impressive iegacy was a ca„ for an increasing ro,e of the iaity in
determining their own understanding of morahty. This was constmed by
many Cathoiics as a more mature approach to discipieship, beyond a
perhaps chiidiike dependency on the received wisdom of father-
confessors. One of the key documents of Vatican it, Constitution nf
Church i n the Modern World (Cudium et spes) advises that
..the iayman
not imagine that his pastors are aiways such experts that
.
.
.
they can
readiiy give him a concrete soiution, or even that such is their mission
iet the iayman take on his own distinctive rote... 62
Fuchs adds that it is a right and duty for Cathoiics to practice an
..innovative morality., colored by the nuances of our own peculiar
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circumstance, for which ready made ethics are not adequate, « Vatican i,
has been seen to encourage a rejection of the ru,e-bound preoccupation
With
.hhings
. must do to get in good," putchased through simpiistic
calcuiattons of prayers and penance. Simiiar to the issue of bibiicai
•fundamentaiism,' the question becomes how to best adapt traditionai
doctrine and scripturai truth to the specific iives of the iaity, in the words
of Archbishop Robert Coffy,
"faith-ianguage needs to be immersed in
concrete pastoral situations before theologizing.
. .
" 64
The tectonic upheavai marked by Humanae Vitae in the revoiutionary
year of 1968 would not have been so far-reaching were it not for the rich
premise for change set by Vatican 11. That Paul VI should have overruled
80/o of John XXlll's population commission was made even more
conspicuous by what many saw as a violation of the spirit of Vatican 11 in
how such a far-reaching matter should have been discussed and resolved.
Such questions of authority have direct implications not simply how the
Catholic religion is taught in schools of higher education, but for the
relevance and credibility of the magisterium itself.
Not surprisingly, because the story of the internal upheaval over
Humanae Vitae was leaked to the general press in 1968, the ruling
authorities in Rome continue to have a problem over how publicly to
proceed with the project of moral renewal. Nevertheless, the challenge
remains to cogently convey matters of faith to mature adults. McCormick
writes. Simply to say 'this is Catholic teaching' teaches no one," and he
insists that because theology is a public enterprise in which we form our
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consciences in a community, the teaching of the
enlighten conscience without replacing it.” 65
magisterium should
vet When the eminent Catholic theologian Bernard iihring justified
dtrect sternutation in his book Medfca/ EMcs. the response from Cardinal
Katztnger (the Vatican's
"Prefect of the Congregation for Doctrine of the
Fatth") was that such dissent is appropriate only in a closed conversation
among theologians in select theological journals. To air these opinions
publicly, especially in the mass media, Ratttinger maintains,
"runs the risk
of causing scandal to the faithful." 66
.Joining the call for change in Rome are feminist arguments which
appeal to nuanced, specific and contemporary adaptation.
.John R Donahue
cites the rejection by St. Thomas of the ordination of women, on the
assumption of the era that a woman was in the state of subjection, such that
she could not receive the sacrament of orders. McCormick presents
Aquinas' argument about the inferiority of women as a ''prescientific
global conviction" but says that today, "it would be identified as a colossal
cultural bias and would be thoroughly disowned." 67
The papal magisterium insists that artificial insemination is always
wrong; that every direct abortion is morally wrong, and that masturbation
and direct sterilization are intrinsically evil. These are positions which are
all widely disputed among Catholics in the US. McCormick argues that
dissent on such issues does not intend to undermine authority but serves as
a high form of loyalty to the magisterium, by protecting it from theKind of self preoccupation that subordinates truth to authority.
. . To
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negate this critical role its to conceive thn
pyramidal, other-worldly, and magical way er'"'''™
According to the Vatican Council's
on tho ( h^|rr-|-|
(iumen CenUun,)" In matters of faith and morals, the bishops speak in the
Christ and the faithful are to accept their teaching and adhere to it
wuh a religious assent of soul." 69 America's National Conference of
Catholic Bishops reflect some of the yalues of their American faithful yet
are clearly constrained by the pope's wishes in discussing some matters of
great sahence. But, says McCormick,
"If the bishops cannot report the
experience and reflection of the faithful, or if, when they do, it is brushed
as.de, then clearly the presumption of truth that ordinarily accompanies
authentic magisterial teaching has been undermined." 70
Review ni scussion
Catholic education, both in the sense of independent business
corporations and as corporatist vocational affiliations, attempt to deal with
the pressures of greater collectivities such as the state - or the Church - in
ways which are consistent with Catholic welfare corporatism: organic, as
integral parts of the Church, the nation and their profession; subsidiarist,
to the extent that they are free to be individualized; and multimodal in the
sense that they act not only as educational professionals, but
simultaneously in spiritual life and public policy as well. They do so with
varying success.
280
Though Catholic grade schools and high schools are identifiably
Catholic, it is at the expense of public funding. However the US Supreme
Court's recent refusal to consider overruling Wisconsin's Supreme Court
finding of constitutionality for that state's school choice program is a
strong indication of change in this regard. In the
"marketplace," Catholic
grade schools and high schools continue to be a large part of private
education, but their share of the market is dwindling. Their noteworthy
performance among the poor, especially in the years before college, gives
credence to the Church's notions of economic justice, but this goes largely
unrewarded by the state. Arguably, their lack of success in winning
voucher reimbursements is a measure of how potent their corporatist
lobbying capacities are. At this point they bargain for little.
Catholic universities have more academic freedom than Catholic
elementary and high schools, but most are less intensely Identified as
Catholic (with the obvious exception of religious seminaries). As to the
current status of the magisterium, civil law has vindicated the Church's
position that the teaching of Catholicism as a religion is a matter for which
the hierarchical Church is competent to judge, at least among its employees
at Catholic University. But the teaching of Catholic values is in flux, with
new adaptations pressing their case both in public forums and within the
Church Itself. As with Catholic sponsored institutions in health care and
social service, it is practical experience in society which gives meaning to
a faith which might otherwise remain abstract and out of touch.
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CHAPTER 10
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
Summary
The purpose of this section is as a brief
highlights covered in the chapter summaries
conclusion of the study follows this review.
recapitulation of the
presented earlier. The
in Part Two the medieval canon law concept of the
"Mystical Body of
Christ was seen as a forerunner to the modern legal construction of a
corporation. Beyond its sacred connotations, the Mystical Body of Christ
also functioned as a means of legitimizing, defining and protecting the
professional independence and public authority of religious vocations, a
key precursor to modern
their representation.
corporatism's notion of work associations and
Demonstrating early signs of organicism, subsidiarity and
multimodaJity, the medieval monastic movement acted as parts of systematic-
orders" or affiliations; developed professional skills in social service,
medicine and education; and innovated business techniques in finance and
capital management. The monastic gift economy, its use of Active kinship,
and its combination of Germanic group ownership and Roman notions of
private property, created an early form of institutionalized philanthropy
and public service. The medieval monasteries were corporate prototypes of
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mediate social articulation"
and society.
which integrated the individual State, Church
Modern understandings of a freely formed "body politic" were traced
to the investiture contest. The Church-state jurisdictional disputes Involved
professions with public authority and the fiscal
Other public benefit funds. Clerics
control of taxes, tithes and
were steadily replaced by secular
afes and secular universities, a movement crystallized by the
establishment of the University of Naples during the 1
Frederick II.
imperial reign of
In Hart Three, the Catholic corporatist social doctrine Introduced In
Rerun, Novarum was seen as mostly a nostalgic vision of class
reconciliation through paternallsltic, vocationally based social relief
remedies, but Included the Church's endorsement of Independent labor
organizations. Later, Quadragesima Anno Introduced the concept of
subsidiarity as a principle by which to keep the expansionist state at bay.
Subsidiarity has also had lasting effect as a credo of localism within the
Church.
The Church proved uneven in its attempts to engage modern electoral
democracy. Beginning in the nineteenth century with the non expcdit, a
posture to shun elections which ultimately influenced them, disputes arose
between the institutional Church and political Catholics over who
controlled the Catholic vote. The Vatican's hostility towards communism
blocked effons at a Catholic alliance with the socialists, paving the way for
a fascist ascendance.
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Mussolini exploited the Church's antipathy towards liberalism and
socahsm by drawing the Church into a disastrous bargain symbolized by
the Lateran Accords, which restored the established Church in Italy by
cultivating the Church's instrumental interest in Fascist party
government, in the process, Catholic corporatist ideas were converted into
Fascst state corporativism, a development which was aggravated by the
contusion among the papacy and Catholic intellectuals about how to
interpret and apply corporatism. Only when the Church's own vocational
interests were threatened did the Church publicly confront the Fascists,
belatedly condemning Mussolini and Hitler's
"statolatry."
In Chapter Seven we turned to contemporary
"Catholic welfare
corporatism," first examining the role of the National Conference of
Catholic Bishops as a representative organization which aggregates
Catholic interests in several ways: as a lobbying group which is political
but eludes partisanship; as an interpreter of how Catholic ethics shouid be
applied in professional practice among Catholic-sponsored social services,
health care and education; and as the voice of the Church in broad matters
of public policy and morals.
We also saw how Catholic-sponsored social services increasingly serve
non-Cathohcs and are staffed by secular and non-Catholic professionals.
Post - Vatican 11 Catholic doctrine encourages this pluralistic approach, a
development which furthers Catholic Charities' ability to expand their
services as state subcontractors. Catholic Charities has succeeded in
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working within the reguiatory iimits of Bowen
wiiimg to downplay exclusive Catholic religious
V Kendrick 3ind appear
identifications.
Chapter Eight described Catholic health care as a loose affiliation
whose members have varying ties to the Church, depending on their
canontcal classification of sponsorship. Its made up of many different
types of Civil corporations: some are wholly nonprofit, many have
profitmaking subsidiaries; others have become parts of non-Catholic
systems by affiliation, merger, or takeovers by profitmaking companies.
Furthermore, as with most health care, Catholic-sponsored facilities are
minately funded by the state through Medicare and Medicaid, so their
accountability toward state policy is necessarily similar to other types of
health care systems.
Though the total combined revenue of all Catholic sponsored health
care represents a tenth of the industry's market share, this is declining.
Under pressure to merge or consolidate, faltering sponsorship associations
or declining religious orders are encouraged to convert into the canon law
category of Public Juridic Persons, tying ownership directly to the Church.
Depending on how popular this conversion process becomes, the Catholic
Church may develop into the direct sponsor of one of the largest
concentrations of nonprofit healthcare management in the American
economy.
When compared to other nonprofit or government providers, the sum
total of Catholic healthcare is not demonstrably more effective in its
service to the poor, contrary to the Church's public intent. However, those
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Catholic facilities which happen to be locatPri it.
.
particularly disadvantaged
ne.g borhoods are on a par with other nonprofits in si^iiar geographical
P acements. Church doctrine is more distinguished as a part of Catholic
healthcare in matters of bioethics, imponant to the Church's bioethica.
principles is a "double effect" standard which offers some discretionary
scope in applying religious doctrine to the
non-Catholic medical practice.
areas where it abstains from
In Chapter Nine, Catholic-sponsored education in elementary and
high schools show close structural ties to the Church and the local diocese,
a circumstance which has removed it from participating substantially in
state funding. Though they claim that Catholic principles and its
educational style are particularly effective among the inner city poor, they
have yet to enter into the mainstream of voucher provisions or other state
funding programs, although is changing, especially in light of the US
Supreme Court s recent refusal to review the constitutionality of
Milwaukee's school choice program.
Catholic-sponsored higher education participates in state tuition
funding because US case law finds older students less vulnerable to
religious indoctrination. However, as with other Catholic sponsored
institutions. Catholic higher education varies in its Catholic identity
depending on each corporation's canonical classification. Professionally,
Catholic colleges and universities have embraced American values of
academic freedom, but case law has found that compliance with the
theological standards of the Church is necessary when teaching the
Catholic religion.
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-n the larger Issue of the Catholic
"ntagisterlunV. In ntatters of faith
the Church has slowly refined the application of Catholic belief to
contemporary realities, cultivating a disciplined effort towards mature
ethical responsibility, founded on moral absolutes but open to
proponlonate reason. The magisterlum
- and the vigor and relevance of
Cathohcism
- is made real by its
"institutional witness" in the manner of
Catholic welfare corporatism: with orgamcism, subsidiarity, multimodality.
Conclusion
The Catholic corporatism of the 1891 encyclical Rerun, Novarum
restored a spiritual sense of personality to the idea of a corporation,
imagining it as a living body with a social conscience. But Catholic
corporatism never matured into a political theory, instead, as Luigi Sturzo
said, the corporations of the encyclicals were symbols of "human relations
in the spirit of class cooperation," not the building blocks of a distinct type
of political regime. ' Catholic corporatism was as much about the Church
Itself as it was about politics, picturing a world made up of collective bodies
created in the Church's own image, as vocational groups in a bid for power
like the state's. The key to Catholic corporatism then, lies not in its
Structural details, but in its spirit.
Though corporatism did not live up to its grand promise as a theory.
Its techniques should not be overlooked, particularly in the case of the
welfare state. This study offers Catholic welfare corporatism as a way to
look at the behavior of Catholic sponsored public benefit organizations in
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e c lef traits used to trace the development of Catholic welfare
corporatism over time - organlclsm, subsidiarity and multlmodallty
- are
now presented as the framework for some concluding observations.
Organicism
Organlclsm
- which imagines a group to be a living organism - is
really a form of political poetry (like "holism",, universally applicable to
any collective body, and therefore especially vulnerable to how It is
construed. At the turn of the century, when it was aimed at rescuing an
oppressed industrial work force, organicism was a stirring and imaginative
term. But nowadays its early resonance is diminished. For many Catholics
organicism is epitomised by the Latin expression Hoc est corpus mens - this
ts my body - the sacred Eucharistic reference to Christ's martyrdom. Others
hear merely
"//ocus pocus, " derisive of the dogma of transubstantiation and
religion's capacity to deceive. Though Catholic organic unity may be
meaningful in Latin America, Africa, Poland and Cuba, in advanced
economies organicism is no longer nearly as compelling as it was. At its
worst, political organicism is dangerously susceptible to totalitarian misuse,
a biological metaphor which Tillich called the mark of reactionaries who
"want to keep dissenting groups in conformity
.
. . Prussian conservatism
and Roman Catholic family glorification agree at this point." 2
Organicism m Catholic welfare corporatism has two interrelated
effects, as a theologically based credo which the Catholic Church uses to
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»..y P«.c, „, c„.«„„„,^
»P.c„„ ,,C.,l«„„p„.„„
„„
an
.nev,table tension over the Church's patriarchal notions of "fa^ny
values," eiizaheth McKeown fiuhs little evidence that the Church hierarchy
understands how probiematic the assumptions that they make about the
antily are in relation to contemporary conditions
. .
. either they must
develop a more complex and nuanced concept of the family, or they must
seek another foundation for their teaching." 3
Medieval monasticism made imaginative use of the family by
inventing Active kinship and used it as a social refuge. Monasticism
became for some an institutionalized form of divorce which not
incidentally took in the children who were cut loose as its consequence.
Instead, the contemporary Church's reluctance to embrace alternatives to
the traditional family is taken as a rejection by those who feel they have no
choice. Lectures on conventionality seem particularly hypocritical coming
from a clergy which is defined by its celibacy.
In more specifically sexual matters, though Pius XI finally recognized
that the purpose of marriage is not simply to have children (in Cast/
Connubii of 1930) the hierarchy persists in a curiously one-dimensional
preoccupation with reproduction. The "unitive and procreative" aspects of
sex are held as "inseparable" which, by a tortured logic, disallows in vitro
fertilization among married couples because of its absence of simultaneous
physical union. Ultimately the mechanistic details of the Vatican's beliefs
appear, in Burtchaell's phrase, "starved for love."
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'his debate is thacw„„,en are now center s,a«o in
athoiic etbica, discourse, although this is not entirely surprising nor is it
particularly pacifying, Boston College's Lisa Cahli, is not easy to dispute
When She writes that Catholic teaching about sex and gender tends to
"define wonten's nature in ternrs of reproductiye function, to tie sexua,
meaning to the biological structure of sex acts or to rc i , to focus on the morality
of tndividual acts instead of on the personal, familial, and social
relationships in which they occur." 4
Despite these painful difficulties, the Catholic Church has yet to
collapse. To the contrary it has produced a stream of modernizing
improvements, especially since World War ,n the US. liturgical changes
bear an obvious similarity to Protestantism, such as a new emphasis on
Scripture and sermons, and the de-emphasis on the externalized moral
authority of priest-centered confession (now called
"reconciliation,"
marked by a "personal relationship with God"). Some Catholics see in these
developments a creeping relativism,
"situationism," and an erosion of the
basic identity of the traditional, hierarchical,
"organic" Church.
In the field of Catholic-sponsored public benefit corporations, it is
tempting to argue that the Church is selling its soul to stay in business and
to keep the flow of government dollars coming, but this is not a complete
answer. The Church also generates cogent new applications of fundamental
Christian principals and a tolerant, pluralistic maturation of the Catholic
faith. Yet the business of social service, health care and education requires
some degree of "secularization."
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Demerath and Wi„ia.s describe sea„ari.aU„n as a process wbicb
".nvoives demystification and disenchantment with respect to religion,
meaning’ dimension, and disengagement and displacement concerning
reUgmus
'belonging.'” 5 gut Demerath notes that secularization may
actually invigorate religion by offering it something to simultaneously
adapt to as well as to defy. 6 Demerath and Williams suggest that
secularization is part of a dialectical relationship which engages its
opposite,
''sacralization," in a way which continually effects change and
redefinition in each other. 7 Thus, they add, secularization may not foretell
a downfall from "the sacred heights into a meaningless abyss," but rather
can be seen as "a transition between two different conceptions of the
sacred," especially among those who seek in religion a proxy for their
deeply felt secular concerns. »
A similar dialectic can be seen among Catholic-sponsored
organizations in the welfare Industry. Though increasingly driven by the
imperatives of business, they also are led by the NCCB in a conscious and
persistent effort to invest the Catholic institutional witness with Christian
ethical values. It is profoundly more meaningful than brand name
marketing. The doctrinal positions of the Church regarding poverty,
bioethics, and learning are the result of deep piety and refleaion, and in
many cases are too annoying to be confused with pandering for popularity.
The real-hfe struggles of Catholic-sponsored work also provide a much
needed learning experience for the Church itself, as well as an opportunity
for the Church to make real the values that It proposes to teach. This
learning exchange, though difficult, is perhaps the most valuable outcome
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Of or^anicis™, but U ts inte„str,ed when subst.UtUy is aiiowe. to nourish
tHe versatiie an. responsive potentiai of the corporation. Or.anicisnt, then
as part of a matched pair with its companion concept, subsidiarity
Subsidiarity
With specific regard to "welfare state surrogacy," can Catholic
sponsored institutions be considered as true replacements for the welfare
state? For subsidiarity to be a meaningful answer it must amount to
autonomous self-regulation by a yocational field distinct from the formal
apparatus of the state.
At the outset of this study, subsidiarity was seen in an updated
neocorporatist sense as part of mesocorporatism, which emphasizes
localism and subsectors, rather than larger scale groupings.
Mesocorporatism was considered a potential framework for Catholic-
sponsored corporations because many of them are regionally administered
and act as subcategories within existing professional fields, rather than
constitute an entire economic sector of their own. But mesocorporatism still
entails a fundamental corporatlst criterion, namely, authorized agency.
Writes Schmitter:
Only when specially organized intermediaries are involved - onlvwhen the process of deliberation effectively empowers them torepresent the collective interests of some group and t^tak?
responsibility for any decisions made - that one canspeak of corporatism strictu sensu. It is not the same as mere
consultation and it is not open to participation by anyone. 9
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TO cue a concept devetoped
.y nted.v. canonists, Cat.oUc sponsoceU
power Of negotiation which speaks for then, coiiectiveiy. The Cathoiic
Church has the pope as its head, but this is a theologicai roie. Kegionai
bishops tnay exercise significant influence over business decisions among
cathohc sponsored institutions, and the National Conference of Cathoiic
Bishops, the Catholic Health Association and the National Catholic
Educational Association may offer guidance and conditional endorsements
But among the various Catholic-sponsored civil corporations there is no
single authority which negotiates agreements on behalf of all Catholic
sponsored corporations as businesses. Even in the case of canonical
"public
lundic persons," the strongest category of Church ownership, though
these organization technically
"speak" for the Church, bishops have
neither the time nor training to perform competently as CEOs, nor do they
appear to be inclined to do so. There may be a meaningful organic identity
conveyed by an association with Catholicism, but in practical
decisionmaking terms the Church has only limited binding force.
Catholic sponsored health care and social seiydce agencies fall short
of mesocorporatism in another way. Though they perform some of the same
work as state facilities. Catholic agencies and hospitals function
predominantly as subcontractors. They are without true powers of
allocation because unlike the state, they cannot compel taxes from the
community nor apportion them according to their own judgment of need.
State funding is furthermore restricted to services which can be defined as
secular, a reason why Catholic schools receive a comparatively small
fraction of public revenues. Also, necessary certification standards are set
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by the state and outside professional bodies.
Catholic-sponsored
organizations do
State.
not by the Church. Thus
not truly possess the authority of the
^
In welfare production, the lack of a formal intermediating institution
- e corporatist sense pertains not only to Catholic organizations, but to
the entire welfare industry. That is, modern welfare production necessariiy
tnvoives a broad scope of overlapping professions, it is not suntnted up in
one held such as 'social services" or "health care," At the ntontent, welfare
.s not represented as an entire interdisciplinary sector, instead the goals
and methods of welfare services are represented by separate job
classifications or different professional specialties. Welfare as an integral
Whole is rather defined by the purchasing power and regulatory judgment
of the state.
This is not to say that Catholic-sponsored welfare organizations do
have a collective political consequence. Demerath and Williams suggest
that in Springfield Massachusetts, Catholics "run interference" for other
faiths which do not have comparable clout with city officials. 10 Catholic
not
sponsored organizations are involved in most fields of welfare production,
as well as the single disciplines within in them, and therefore amount to
the largest comprehensive welfare industry group outside of the state
Itself. But because of its religious associations it is somewhat limited in how
fully it can be formally engaged by the state. As welfare services become
privatized, perhaps there may emerge some investor owned or secular
nonprofit group equal to the inclusive scope and size of Catholic sponsored
agencies. But in a corporatist sense, there is no formal vehicle of
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authoritatively aggregating the interests of the (non-state) welfare
industry, including Catholic associations.
A telling signal that subsidiarity is strengthening (relative to the
state) is the increasing acceptance of vouchers for tuition at Catholic
elementaty and high schools. Like Medicaid, educational vouchers would
finance individual choice, but as seen in Bowen v Kendrick, US case law
treats children's education as a special category. The most recent Supreme
Court position on Milwaukee allows for local systems to experiment with
vouchers. Clearly the tide has turned. At the very least, the argument can
be made that if the US Supreme Court has allowed government to pay for
textbooks used in Catholic schools, then it would follow that reimbursement
of those courses taught in Catholic schools which are the same as those in
public schools might be similarly allowed. Some objections may likely arise
with an "infusion” teaching method which teaches mathematics using
examples from the Catholic Bishops' pastoral on economic justice.
A final conclusion regarding subsidiarity among modern Catholic
sponsored welfare services is that it challenges the notion that Catholic
corporatism is simply a form of "state corporatism." Catholic corporatism's
basic tendency toward institutional independence from the state can be
seen throughout the entire historical reach of this study, though it is less
apparent in the Church's treatment of its own affiliated organizations,
when the Church can act much like a state of its own. Nevertheless modern
Church sponsorship as well as its corporatist antecedents demonstrate that
Catholic corporations are clearly not creations of the state, even though
they must be licensed by the state.
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Multimodality
There is nothing new about corporations which operate
Simultaneously in the three different dimensions of government, business
and community. But the overtly moral mission implied by Catholicism gives
a special power to Catholic corporations' multimodality. Alternatively,
religious identity also threatens the balance of those multimodal
capabilities. The more religious an organization appears to be, the less able
It may be to participate in the welfare state.
The decrease in Catholic identity among its contemporary
organizations is symbolized by the sharp decrease of religious personnel
Who manage and work for them. In
helps its interaction with the US
some ways a lower Catholic profile
government, but this does not mean that
the Catholic Church has abandoned its presence in the arena of political
debate. Though the Catholic Church's approach to political involvement
nowadays stops short of party politics, (a lesson learned from the Lateran
Accords between Pius XI and Mussolini) it has only been since 1979 that
John Paul II rescinded electoral office for Church religious personnel, and
the Church persists in taking stands on what it considers principles of
public policy. It distributes Its positions on both sides of the political
spectrum: bioethics, human rights, nuclear arms limitation, and a
preferential option for the poor" in economic justice are mostly disparate
themes which are not tied to one political party. The Church favors instead
a wide "seamless garment" linkage around a "culture of life," Judging from
history, however, Catholic politicism has latent potential for partisan focus.
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Implicit in Catholic welfare
the possibility that an
corporatism's informal bargaining weight is
.ssue may someday arise on which the nation's sixty
million Catholics more fully agree.
Cathohc interpretations on when human iife attains iegai status are
famously at odds with estabiished US law, with direct impact on Cathoiic
nstitufons. Despite the iack of unanimity among US Catholics on issues of
personal morality, the Church continues to operate an extensive
communications apparatus in a constant attempt to mobiiize public interest
m matters of reproductive ethics. Though it may at first appear otherwise
th,s may not have an entireiy negative effect on business. Obviousiy
Catholic hospitais iose patients by rejecting pregnancy termination and
some fertiiity treatments, but the insistence of the Church to run against
the grain of popular opinion can aiso be seen as a principled approach
which determinedly places conscience above revenue. "Ethics over profit-
may not in the long run prove an unpopular trait when competing with
investor owned HMDs. Furthermore, ob/gyn departments in generai - not
simply in Catholic hospitals - have extraordinarily high maipractice
litigation rates, such that many are deliberateiy set apart under different
corporate structures to protect their affiliates. Ali things considered.
Catholic healthcare may ultimately do well to relinquish parts of this
specialty to their competitors.
In health care and social services, another trend which may affect
the market image of Catholic sponsorship are non-drug and non-surgical
therapies, variously described as "mind/body awareness," "meditation," or
"acknowledgment of a higher power," in the terminology of step-programs
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'.ke Alcoholics Anonymous. Catholic health care treads very caretully in
notmg the affinity of prayer to these techniques. Among the practitioners
of Cathohc social sewices interviewed for this study no information was
Offered on any organized effort to link Catholic liturgy or prayer to
healing or "recovery" therapies (with the notable exception of Harhara
Thorpe, whose office accepts no government funds). Yet this association
between medicine and faith may someday position faith-based medical and
social service institutions at the lead of their industries.
The Fourth Mode
Among neocorporatists a "fourth mode" has been proposed to refer to
corporations' treatment of each other, as distinct from the state's treatment
of corporations. Lowi has complained that "special interest liberalism-
gives to lobbying groups the same rights as individual persons, and Lowi
may be right about the damage this does by increasing their private claims
on the state. But what if corporations were to treat each other not only as
institutional competitors, but as though they were persons, with the same
potential for goodwill and altruism that individuals may sometimes have for
each other?
Reinhold Niebuhr would immediately respond that groups cannot
achieve the moral discipline of individuals, and that it is dangerous to
assume that they could. But this does not necessarily exclude the idea that
corporations are capable of some relative scale of ethical behavior, not
simply in the sense of "corporate citizens" but in their competition with
each other as well. This might seem less improbable when the field is
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welfare, in which different standards of fair play are required because of
government's decisive presence. Catholic corporatism carries with it a
not,on of civic "good" which was admired by Kant, Hegel, Durkheim
Keynes and others. Religious sponsorship also places an emphasis on
public duty. Is It reasonable to expect, just as individuals might at least
aaempr moral commitment, that group-persons in the welfare business
might also be expected to approximate some standards of competitive
restraint?
The profit maximizing
"rational actor” cliches of realist political
theory do not adequately explain the huge increases in the US nonprofit
sector. But neither are nonprofits immune to market competition and
bureaucratic pressure. Critics note that executive salaries among
nonprofits hardly constitute vows of poverty, but the nonprofits in turn
point the finger at the market and argue that they must pay the going rates
for competent employees. This has been the case at least since the 1950s,
when priests who wore professors at Catholic universities won the right to
income parity with their profession. The market effect on salaries has been
essential for Catholic priests and nuns who would otherwise be facing
retirement in poverty. But walking a line between principle and
practicality is not new among professions whose origins extend to the
medieval monasteries' struggle between gifts and simony.
Moral leadership is risky business in an already risky marketplace,
and as a matter of survival many Catholic organizations have developed
sophisticated hybrids of profit and nonprofit operations, especially in
health care, A revealing test of the spirit of Catholic welfare corporatism
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then, wni be the extent it can «uide a "fourth ntode" of corporate
nterachon, that is, whether faith based corporations can survive
ZrrT "" — TH. aisowouid depend on ,ood faith coiiaboration a.on« corresponding
organizations in business and government.
the financial resources to provide welfare s
particularly if society is to find
state-of-the-art ways.
tate services in egalitarian,
Corporatism is sometimes referred to as a "private interest
government" which typically retfuires that negotiation be conducted away
from pubhc scrutiny. Corporatism therefore runs against popular political
fashion, which demands: (1) complete transparency to the public of all
political processes and persons, in every way; and (2, as much unfettered
tree market competition as possible. The realistic approach to human
nature assumes that unrestrained self interest requires both constant
vigilance and structural liberty. But in the case of welfare services, and in
a field with so conspicuous
perhaps there an opportunity to relax
a presence among Catholic sponsored agencies,
some of the public's assumptions of
moral relativism, and allow a corporatist efficiency to prevail.
On the other hand, by making a point of claiming the moral high
ground. Catholic sponsored facilities must also be accountable in
quantifiable ways as to how well they serve the poor, and with what
justification they might claim regulatory latitude or market relief.
Preserving welfare production from the litigious and profit-driven
strategies which afflict the rest of the business world wouid benefit
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everyone, but this assumes that religious principles have evident
discipline.
Cathohc sponsored social services, health care and education enjoy a
great deal of trust on the part of the non-Catholic American public, which
nghtly expects that when its tax dollars go to religion-sponsored
organizations, they embrace basic American concepts of fairness
including standards of religious tolerance and (non, preference. When the
government runs public benefit facilities in similar lines of work, they are
held to standards of non discrimination, fiscal accountability, and Justice.
No less should be expected from non-government organizations. Similarly,
If bureaucrats are expected to be politically agnostic and not to exploit their
positions for partisan benefit, so should religion-sponsored agencies resist
the temptation to capitalize on their public-funded roles to press sectarian
agendas.
Some final thoughts
For Martin Luther King, political courage was drawn from personal
faith or congregational fellowship, rather than from nationally organized
religion. He failed to overcome the National Baptist Convention’s
entrenched, self-interested hierarchy, but King’s experience points to two
factors which also affirm Catholic welfare corporatism. First, what served
Civil Rights so well was what Greeley calls "religious imagination." Matched
with a clear perception of reality, religious imagination finds meaning in
education, health care and social service, because it tests faith with
usefulness, and requires productive change as well as belief. Second, King’s
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faith in congregations, rather than large organizations, is also
accomntodated by corporatism, especially when It puts to creative good use
the versatile, adaptive potential of the corporation.
Many Catholic theologians have argued that religious sponsored work
needs encouragement from government, not simply permission and
protection. Others say that in a market system with many alternatives if
some religious method works demonstrably well, then resources will be
found, in time, to support them without depending on government money
Keligious freedom in the US allows a huge scope of religious practice and.
according to the Emory Uw loiirn a l , in 1989 religious organizations raised
$54.3 billion in charitable contributions. This is hugely disproportionate to
the $1 1.4 billion raised by human services organizations and the $10.7
billion raised that year by health organizations (the second and third
highest fund-raisers), n The question to put to religious contributors,
then, is how much more can be done for the needy when donations go to
the direct works of religion, rather than to the religion itself? Of the
individuals in the daily practice of Catholic sponsored welfare services
interviewed, no one complained that there was not enough religion in
their work, only that there was not enough money to do what they felt
needed to be done.
Perhaps the best answer is a blend of charitable contributions with
government funding, in the hope that it amounts to more than the sum of
the parts. Though most of their revenues are from government, Fred
Kammer says that at Catholic Charities, combined receipts from non
governmental sources grew from $139 million to $620 million per year
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from 1973 to 1993, and the participation
225,000 in 1993. 12
of 20,000 volunteers in 1981 grew to
The welfare state is a relatively new invention in politics, which
creates an enorntous new realm of authority for government. The state's
unique power of taxation allows an unprecedented expansion of public
benefits, distributed more or less rationally and democratically, but it also
created professional roles for the state as direct providers of these setvices
Thts is not a particularly oppressive condition among Catholic sponsored
organizations, which have done well to the extent that they have mirrored
American values of tolerance and pluralism. Accordingly, Catholic welfare
corporatism is not meant to imply that the entire welfare state should pass
from government hands, only that part of the delivery apparatus be
hared and perhaps given some chance to experiment with techniques
based in faith. We have seen that there can be rich varieties of
corporations - as altruistic, diverse and enterprising (or as organic,
subsidiarist and multimodal) as they can imagine themselves to be. A
culture such as America's is fertile ground for experimenting with this
form, even if it might require suspending the dogma of political
correctness, or the insistence that Jesus is in competition for moral
preeminence.
The question is not whether Catholic sponsored corporations could
replace the US government in service to the poor - the US Catholic bishops
have confirmed that they cannot. Even if all faith based institutions
combined were to have the financial resources of the government, there
are not nearly enough facilities or personnel to carry the load. Neither is it
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n«ht Chat welfare sendees be consUfere. fHe exclusive an of cHe rell.lous
e rel.g.ous faithful are not the only ones to make personal sacrifices to
serve the needy: many non-rellglous social workers, health professionals
and teachers do their work with commitment comparable to the religious
and government workers are equally capable of selOessness and
dedication.
Though there is power to be found in an institution's religious
identity, careful consideration has to be given about how it is expressed if
.t Wtshes to reach beyond its own special world. Perhaps the hardest lesson
for religiously minded citizens is outlined by Michael Walzer:
Coleman writes that Christians should be conscious of how religious
language sounds to those who are not familiar with it. He says religious
people need to be "bilingual" in order to make their case
-’only in a
discourse of secular warrant and public reason." 14
The power of Catholic corporatism lies in what it imagines a
corporation to be, but the good it does depends on the people who create it
and on the political culture it serves. The Church may not pay sufficient
credit to what it learns by its institutional experience in the pluralist,
multiethnic, democratic capitalist system of the United States, but Church-
sponsored institutions flourish because American political culture suits the
Church, as much as the Church serves American society. Modern public
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bencm corpo.a.o„s a., share oH.ins anticipace. in Catholic ie.ai anti
professional history, but in the US. Catholic-sponsored
education, health
care and social service also thrives on a characteristically
amalgam of faith, politics and
American
commerce.
Movemem''‘'DL“"?a‘ie Smity?Xrch™^
^
Oxford UP, 1954): 92.
Cambridge (Cambridge (UK):
5 Demerath and Williams, Mndginv of F.ith. 286.
(SumLe; w'irsz'"’ and Capital Religions." nae,iai„t.
^ Demerath and Williams, ikidgins of Faiths. 286-187.
8 Demerath and Williams, Bridginv of Faitht 298.
toernmemandOnn,^!Hnn Wimeri989™6^^ Corporatism!"
'« Demerath and Williams, Brideinv of F.uht 257
.
God Regulate Religious Corporations?"
r
Kammer "We Serve 10 Million in Need " letter Wall Strmt“
Chan-tfe'
'1
1.1 million elde^
children, 6.4 million aduhs and
13 Coleman, 20 quoting Michael Walzer, IlieSoheres of Insrirp- a
_.efense of Pluralism and Equality (NY: Basic Books, 1983): 278.
Citi7enlil?n " A'
Pedagogies: Discipleship and
h“;^e o^ mah summer 1994: 20,
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appendix a
differences between gifts and commodities
£ommo(ii^y
completely alienable
finite obligation
motion mechanical,
can terminate
increase is separable from object
profit taking
increase to individual
freeform, unwritten
anticipation of return
can be between two individuals
Gift
spiritual aspect inalienable
open ended obligation
motion organic, aims to
perpetuate
increase is attached to gift
appreciation
increase to group
explicit contractual calculation
requires three-parties
311
appendix b
OTHER MODES OF FICTIVE FAMILY
Confraternity
Another multimodal dimension of monasticism which multiplied its
effect was its status as an adoptive, fictlve family, m one sense monasteries
adopted" wealthy patrons by granting them something called
confraternity, by which they were associated with the abbey, much as
monks from other abbeys with whom they had exchanged prayers and
"acts Of ritual charity." 1 For other, less wealthy faithful, there was another
type of pretend family which religion could offer, one which also provided
one of the few available avenues for property acquisition.
Godparenting
Beginning about the sixth century, under the official auspices of the
Church, the commater/compater (godparenting) custom enabled unrelated
families to choose a sponsorship arrangement by which property rights
could be transferred outside the bonds of matrimony. 2
"Unlike the
involuntary ties of kinship, those of ritual sponsorship are formed on the
basis of choice. This enables the godparent to serve as a social link
connecting divergent income groups, disparate social strata
,
and separated
localities
... 3 There is an affinity suggested here between the clienteiism
of godparenting and the integrative yet hierarchical scheme of
corporatism, particularly the nineteenth century Catholic social-doctrine
versions of corporatism which sought to integrate labor and management
into the same representative bodies. 4 Ail share the clientelist precedent of
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the late-Roman patrocinium, but Godparenting added the benefit of the
written accountancy and righteous imprimatur of the Church. 5
Maritll^Fkui^^'nd Solfgn^ XTrrang°ed ^f"
’gift" Which became formalized into a "conf/rteraitv^^^^
Players, a
associate membership Confratemitv firci- status, a type of
mon;,sfPri.c
' fi^st was extended to othorasteries, then later offered to secular clerics, especial^Bishops. Little
eds., (Boston: Little Brown, 1967) 179.
’ ^ ^ ^ ^ Foster,
^ Mintz and Wolf 190.
participation by^worters^^^^^
^ godparent’s gift of land was stock
^ Cantor 199.
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